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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, in six states, felons convicted by juries are routinely
sentenced by juries. These states form a sizeable segment of the
United States, beginning with Virginia at the eastern end, and
proceeding west, through Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and
Oklahoma, following the trail of early settlers. Juries in these
jurisdictions select an appropriate sentence from within a statutory
range of punishment provided to them in their instructions from the
judge. The use of juries to sentence felons in these states began well
over a century ago,1 well before the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 which has generated
1. These states have practiced jury sentencing from early in their history, or, as one judge
put it, "since the earth cooled." See infra note 192. For more on the origins of felony jury
sentencing in Virginia and Kentucky, see Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing
in the United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2003).
2. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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renewed interest in the appropriate role for juries in sentencing. 3
Roughly 4000 juries deliver felony sentences every year.4 The number
of felons sentenced by juries in Texas alone exceeds the number of
federal defendants convicted annually by jury, for misdemeanors or
felonies, in all districts combined. 5
Despite its continuing influence, jury sentencing in noncapital
cases is one of the least understood procedures in contemporary
American criminal justice. While scholars and commissions have
repeatedly dissected other sentencing systems and jury functions,
felony jury sentencing has managed to elude systematic empirical
inquiry. 6 This Article looks beyond idealized visions of jury sentencing
to examine for the first time how jury sentencing in noncapital cases
actually operates in three different states-Kentucky, Virginia, and
Arkansas. Dozens of interviews with prosecutors, defenders, and
3 The Court's latest Apprendi-related opinion, Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632, 2004
U.S. LEXIS 4573 (June 24, 2004), handed down as this article was going to press, promises to
have a particularly widespread impact on sentencing systems nationwide. See Susan Klein &
Nancy King, Beyond Blakely (forthcoming); Sentencing Law and Policy (collecting commentary
and case law updated daily), at http://sentencing.typepad.com (last visited July 11, 2004). The
rule in Apprendi and Blakely, however, defines only which facts must be treated essentially as
elements of the offense under the Sixth Amendment; it does not speak to whether a jury or a
judge must select a sentence once those facts have been admitted or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Nevertheless, some commentators have used the Apprendi rule as a platform for
proposing that jurors, not judges, select punishment in felony cases. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman,
The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 (2003) (calling for the "reintroduction of jury
sentencing" and arguing that because of "their deliberative capacity and democratic makeup,
juries are better situated than other political institutions to perform the sensitive tasks of
deciding between contested sentencing goals and applying the law with due regard for the
individual circumstances of each offender").
4. This very rough estimate is derived by adding the 836 sentences imposed in the year
2000 in noncapital felony cases from the Kentucky, Virginia, and Arkansas data sets discussed
infra notes 11, 70, 120 & 174, the 2647 jury sentences in noncapital felony cases reported in
OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., TEX. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS JUDICIAL
SYSTEM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 (2001), and estimating conservatively at least 300 felony jury
sentences annually in Missouri and Oklahoma. OFFICE OF STATE COURT ADMIN. FOR Mo. 2000
ANNUAL REPORT 125 (2000) (reporting 612 total felony jury trials); NAT'L CTR FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD TABLES, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS (1999) (noting
Oklahoma's criminal caseload is about half that of Missouri).
5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001 (2002) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK], http://www.albany.edu/sourcebookl
1995/pdf/t532.pdf (Table 5.32 shows that 2035 total defendants were convicted by jury in all
United States District Courts). 2284 defendants were "convicted by jury or found guilty/insane"
in United States District Courts for 2002. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics
Resource Center, at http://fjsrc.urban.org (last visited July 11, 2004).
6. Existing empirical studies of jury sentencing are limited to single localities or offenses,
or examine sentencing data generated under now obsolete sentencing law. For a review, see
Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Non-Capital Cases: Comparing Severity
and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Three States (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
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judges, as well as an analysis of state sentencing data, reveal that this
neglected corner of state criminal justice provides a unique window
through which one can observe some of the most fundamental forces
operating in criminal adjudication today.
It turns out that jury sentencing in practice looks very little
like jury sentencing in theory. According to its academic advocates,
jury sentencing could perform a very special function-the jury's
sentence could reflect the community's view of punishment, a view
that may be different from that of a professional judge. Theoretically,
jury sentences would take into account the full range of penalties
authorized by the legislature and mirror community norms concerning
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.7
Bargaining in the shadow of the expected jury sentence, a prosecutor
could resort to the jury if judges were not punishing offenders severely
enough, and a defendant could resort to the jury if judicial sentences
exceeded community standards. Jury sentences, not those set by
professionals, would then serve as the default price for crime in each
community.
This sort of price setting, however attractive on paper, does not
seem to be the primary role currently played by jury sentencing in the
three states studied. In order to serve as a reliable "community-based
barometer"8 of punishment, the jury needs both the same information
that judges receive and the power to impose the full range of
sentencing options authorized by the legislature, whenever the
prosecutor or the defendant prefers the jury's judgment to that of a
judge. State law in each of these three states deprives the jury of
either full information or power, to varying degrees. In Kentucky,
jury sentencing is available upon demand to both prosecution and
defense and does appear to set the going rate, but the law drastically
truncates the jury's information and options. In Virginia, the jury
lacks both information and power. The jury's ability to set the default
7. See Hoffman, supra note 3; lontcheva, supra note 3, at 314 (calling for the
"reintroduction of jury sentencing" and arguing that because of "their deliberative capacity and
democratic makeup, juries are better situated than other political institutions to perform the
sensitive tasks of deciding between contested sentencing goals and applying the law with due
regard for the individual circumstances of each offender"); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing
in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again?), 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1777-82
(1999) (arguing that jury sentencing may be "a more direct and more effective mechanism for
expressing the recent populist and retributive trends in criminal punishment"); see also Ronald
F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1375-76 (1999) (jurors "have
better access to relevant information (such as current community views on punishment) than do
sentencing judges," and are "well-suited for decisions that are difficult to articulate through
general principles").
8. This phrase was used by an Arkansas prosecutor to describe jury sentencing. See infra
text accompanying note 32.
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punishment for crime in Virginia is undercut by judicial sentencing
guidelines combined with unfettered defense access to lower
guidelines sentences. Arkansas juries fix the default sentence as do
juries in Kentucky, but Arkansas juries remain blindfolded to key
sentencing information. Jury sentencing in these states is not a
systematic check on sentencing policy set by prosecutors, judges, or
sentencing commissioners. Rather, it serves at best as an occasional
shield, and at worst as a smoke screen that helps to hide routine
sentencing practice from public view.
The interviews reveal that jury sentencing is regarded by those
who use it as a device that performs several different, but extremely
important, functions within each state's criminal justice system.
Judges and attorneys reported that apprehension about a severe
sentence by a jury deters defendants from insisting on trial by jury,
funneling defendants to guilty pleas, or, in Virginia, to pleas and
bench trials. In Arkansas and Kentucky, support for jury sentencing
is linked to the selection of trial judges by popular election.
Sentencing by juries allows trial judges to avoid taking political heat
for the punishment of offenders. It also provides some assurance to the
public that those who may owe allegiance to campaign contributors or
the politically powerful are not selecting sentences. In sum, jury
sentencing may be appreciated for its democratic appearance, but its
vitality may depend instead on its perceived utility in streamlining
case disposition and in protecting judges and legislators from electoral
accountability.
This first hard look at jury sentencing in context reveals that it
is neither a one-size-fits-all cure for sentencing excesses, nor an
obscure and curious appendage of an earlier age. Rather, jury
sentencing is viewed by these criminal justice insiders as a critical
component of modern sentencing policy, serving quite handily their
most fundamental fiscal and political goals. These findings have
obvious implications for proposals to reform sentencing policy,
whether those proposals would replace jury sentencing with judicial
sentencing or strengthen the price-setting power of sentencing juries.
Proposals for sentencing reform that threaten to reduce the leverage
of prosecutors in obtaining settlements or that expose elected judges to
more intense political scrutiny are particularly vulnerable to attack.
This study also has broader relevance for criminal justice policy
generally. Jury sentencing itself may be unusual, but the way in
which it is implemented is not. Offering opportunities for efficiency
and political advantage that attorneys and judges have willingly
seized, jury sentencing in practice provides a remarkable illustration
of how the powerful forces shaping criminal justice policy leave no
8892004]
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"right" untouched. The research reported here is a reminder to
reformers that, when it comes to criminal procedure, "formal
descriptions do not adequately represent actual practices."9
A. Methodological Note
A brief summary of the methodology used to gather the
information reported here is appropriate at this point. This Article
presents the findings from fifty-three informal telephone interviews of
judges, prosecutors, and defenders from Arkansas, Kentucky, and
Virginia. In each of the three states, a minimum of five prosecutors,
five defenders, and five trial judges were interviewed. Interviewees
included a mix of professionals from urban and rural jurisdictions.
The interviews were journalistic in nature, and pursued, as time
allowed, the same core group of open-ended questions. Illustrative
comments from the interviews are reproduced in the text below, with
additional illustrations collected in the notes. 10
9. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 194
(1983).
10. Additional information about this qualitative study is included here. The responses do
not represent a random sampling of practitioners and judges. From a variety of personal contacts
in each state (practicing alumni, fellow professors, jury researchers, court personnel, and judges),
Professor King obtained names of people in each state who would be knowledgeable about jury
sentencing and willing to discuss it. Unless time did not permit it, she also solicited from
interviewees themselves additional names of others around the state to contact. Interviews
varied depending upon the time each interviewee had available. Most of them lasted about 25-40
minutes. After explaining the purpose of the research and the terms under which comments
would be used, each interviewee was asked a similar set of open-ended questions. Informal
interviews were selected rather than more formal survey techniques primarily because the
format allowed for follow-up on comments, for clarification or explanation when needed. Second,
the informative stories and examples these judges and attorneys offered candidly on the
telephone were less likely to be forthcoming in response to a written instrument. See, e.g., PETER
F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
61-65 (1988) (describing somewhat similar interview methodology). Professor Alschuler's classic
series on plea bargaining also included open-ended interview methodology. See Albert W.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975)
(describing interviews as resembling "legal journalism" more than a scientific survey).
A summary of each interview was typed from hand-written notes of the conversation
immediately after the interview. The typed summary of the interview was mailed to the
interviewee, with a permission form to sign and return, requesting that the interviewee edit the
summary as needed for accuracy, and either deny or grant permission to quote from the
summary, with attribution only by role (judge, defense, prosecutor) and type of jurisdiction
(primarily urban, primarily rural). A total of 53 interviews were conducted. One person expressly
declined permission, 12 never returned their permission forms. Quotes from these 13 interviews,
although generally consistent with the responses from the same state, are not referenced. The
remaining interviewees agreed to allow quotation from their interview summaries. About 1/4 of
the interviewees edited slightly their summaries before returning them, correcting a few words
or phrases. To protect anonymity, all interviewees are referred to as male in the article, although
several were female. Each quote is accompanied by a code indicating the state, role, and type of
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Also referenced briefly in this Article are findings from a
statistical study, presented in detail in a separate article,11 that
examines sentencing data provided by court, corrections, or sentencing
officials in Kentucky, Virginia, and Arkansas. The analysis
investigated whether sentences imposed after jury trial exceeded the
sentences that judges imposed in like cases resolved by plea or bench
trial, whether jury sentences were more varied than judicial sentences
in like cases, and the extent of judicial modification of jury sentences.
This qualitative study, along with the accompanying
quantitative analysis of sentencing data, is more comprehensive than
any existing research into noncapital jury sentencing. It provides the
first empirical look at contemporary jury sentencing in more than one
jurisdiction, as well as a platform for future research. Two important
caveats concerning the findings must be kept in mind, however.
Despite the wealth of information these interviews generated, and the
effort to query professionals from different areas of each state, other
practitioners and judges from these states may have had different
experiences or views to share on the subject of felony jury sentencing.
The number of interviewees from each state is fairly small and
criminal practice norms are notoriously local. Most of all, the reader
should remember that this study examines only half of the states that
presently use felony jury sentencing. Given the variations in legal
regulation of jury sentencing from state to state, inquiry into the
remaining jury sentencing jurisdictions-Texas, Missouri, and
Oklahoma-is bound to turn up even more surprises.
B. The Legal Framework in Each State
Variation in state regulation of jury sentencing is easily
underestimated. In the context of capital sentencing, the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment rulings have provided a loose unifying
force, but even this limited constitutional regulation is not applicable
in jury sentencing in noncapital cases. Jury sentencing states differ
as to whether or not trial is bifurcated into guilt and punishment
phases; whether or not the prosecutor can veto a defendant's choice to
be sentenced by a judge instead of jury; whether or not judicial
sentencing is bounded by sentencing guidelines; which felony offenses
and offenders may be sentenced by juries; which sentencing options
are available to jurors; whether or not the sentences that juries
jurisdiction of the source quoted. For example, KY-J2-U signifies a judge from an urban
jurisdiction in Kentucky, and AR-D3-R, a defense attorney from a primarily rural jurisdiction in
Arkansas.
11. See King & Noble, supra note 6.
2004l 891
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impose are subject to parole; and what information jurors are
permitted to learn about punishment options, the offense, and the
offender. Each state's jury sentencing law and practice has developed
its own individual characteristics, shaped by the unique legal and
political skeleton that supports it.
The three states examined here, however, have some important
rules in common. Each state bifurcates the jury trial into two
phases-guilt determination and sentencing. Kentucky opted to
separate guilt and sentencing proceedings for all felonies in 1986,12
while Virginia and Arkansas did so in the mid-1990s. 13 One of the
primary reasons for bifurcation in each state was to allow prosecutors
to introduce information about the defendant's criminal history at the
sentencing phase after the guilt-innocence decision had been made. 14
Defendants, too, may introduce evidence at the sentencing phase to
support leniency. 15 In each of the three states, sentencing juries select
a specific term of imprisonment within broad statutory ranges. 16 The
trial judge in all three states is authorized to reduce the jury's
sentence, but not to raise it, except to comply with mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes. 17
Of the three states, Kentucky's sentencing system has been
least affected by the revolutionary sentencing reforms of the past
12. Misdemeanor jury trials remain unitary proceedings, except in DUI cases. See Dedic v.
Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1996); Newton v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.
App. 1988).
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-803 to -804 (Michie Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1
(Michie 2000).
14. See Gary Taylor, Jury Sentencing: A Last Stand in Six States, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1987
(relating efforts of Louisville's prosecutor to secure law allowing prosecutors to inform jurors
about parole eligibility in order to facilitate the imposition of longer sentences); see also Byrd v.
Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d 243 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (bifurcation was adopted so that the state
could introduce prior conviction records for sentencing while avoiding the risk of prejudice
caused by presenting this information in the guilt phase).
15. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2)(a) (Michie 1999); Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 510
S.E.2d 232 (Va. 1999) (in assessing what mitigating evidence should be admissible in noncapital
sentencing proceedings, trial courts should be guided by the rules of admissibility in capital
proceedings).
16. Statutory ranges in Kentucky include class A, 20-50 years; class B, 10-20 years; class C,
5-10 years; class D, 1-5 years. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060. Broad statutory sentencing ranges
are found in VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (c), (d) (Michie 1996). Individual crimes may carry even
broader ranges. For example, rape is punishable by any sentence five years to life. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-61C. In Arkansas, ranges are similar to those in Kentucky: class Y, 10 to 40 years or
life; class B, 6-30 years; class B, 5-20 years; class C, 3-10 years; class, D 0-6 years. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-401(a) (Michie 1997).
17. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070(1); Commonwealth v. Young, 25 S.W.3d 66 (Ky.
2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107(e) (Michie Supp. 2003). A judge may impose a greater term if
the jury's sentence is less than the minimum mandated by statute. See Neace v. Commonwealth,
978 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1998) (judge could impose a sentence of 20 years for sodomy when jury
sentence was 5 years; class A felony required minimum sentence of 20 years).
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several decades. There are no sentencing guidelines, and most felony
offenses require service of 20 percent of the term imposed before
eligibility for parole.18 The prosecution may present information
during the sentencing phase that allows the jury to calculate when the
defendant would become eligible for parole, but the defense may not
introduce statistics concerning how many offenders are actually
released after they become eligible. 19 Trial judges in Kentucky are
elected every eight years. 20
Virginia abolished parole 21 and adopted voluntary judicial
sentencing guidelines in 1995,22 calibrating the recommended new
sentence ranges for many offenses so that they replicated actual time
served under the former parole system.23 The guidelines ranges
governing judicial sentencing are not revealed to the jury and are
much narrower than the statutory ranges from which juries choose
sentences. Trial judges in Virginia are not elected by the public, but
are reappointed by the legislature, a process known as "reelection."24
Arkansas adopted voluntary sentencing guidelines for judges
when it bifurcated felony jury trials in the mid-1990s. 25 However,
Arkansas retained parole. Prisoners must serve at least one-third of
their sentence if convicted of less serious felonies, and at least half of
their sentence for more serious crimes, with good time reducing that
required stay by up to half.26  As in Kentucky, prosecutors at
18. Persistent violent offenders serve at least 50 percent of their sentence before parole
eligibility. A handful of very serious offenses require service of 85 percent of the sentence
imposed. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.340 - 3402; 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:030 § 3(a).
19. See Abbott v. Commonwealth, 822 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1992); see also Young v.
Commonwealth, 129 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 2004). Courts have also allowed prosecutors to admit
evidence about good-time credits. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 570 (Ky.
1999).
20. For up-to-date information on judicial selection in all states, visit http://www.ajs.org/is.
21. These reforms were a response to truth-in-sentencing funding incentives offered by the
federal government. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., SENTENCING DIGEST: EXAMINING CURRENT
SENTENCING ISSUES AND POLICIES 15-19 (1998) ("In 1994, Congress enacted legislation
authorizing funding of the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing Incentive
Grants" under which states were eligible to receive funds if they could demonstrate that violent
offenders would serve at least 85 percent of their imposed sentences); NAT'L INST. OF
CORRECTIONS, STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS ON TRUTH IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF LAW AND
LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF
1994 (1995).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1994).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie 1994).
24. See supra note 20.
25. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-803 to -804; Stephanie Gardner Holder, Survey: Criminal
Procedure, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 99 (1994).
26. In 1995, the state required those convicted of certain serious crimes to serve at least 70
percent of their sentence. This information, like other parole eligibility information, may be
presented to the jury. See infra note 132.
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sentencing may present witnesses to testify as to parole eligibility
(termed "transfer" eligibility in Arkansas), but defense attorneys may
not present statistical evidence of actual parole release.27 In Arkansas
alone, the judge may choose to instruct the jury that it may include in
its verdict a recommendation that the judge suspend or probate the
defendant's sentence,28 a recommendation that the judge may accept
or reject.29 Also, Arkansas law allows jury sentencing after plea or
bench trial, but this practice was reported in the interviews to be
extremely rare.30 Arkansas Circuit judges are elected by the public to
six-year terms. 31
The text that follows presents patterns that emerged from the
interviews despite this legal diversity. Part II details what seems be a
very important feature of jury sentencing for prosecutors-its use as a
deterrent to jury trial. This discussion of jury sentencing as a trial
penalty is divided into four subsections: a general introduction, then a
discussion of each of the three states. Part III of the Article focuses on
judges and the advantages they reportedly derive from jury
sentencing. Defender views are presented in Part IV, including
reports of jury sentencing as a protection from judicial and
prosecutorial overreaching. The Article concludes with a discussion of
implications for sentencing policy.
27. Clark v. State, 944 S.W.2d 533 (Ark. 1997).
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101(4) (providing that the trial court may, in its discretion,
instruct the jury that counsel may argue as to alternative sentences for which the defendant may
qualify and that the jury may, in its discretion, make a recommendation regarding an alternative
sentence which shall not be binding on the trial court); ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL § 9111 (2d ed. 1994); see also Rodgers v. State, 71 S.W.3d 579, 581 (Ark. 2002) (noting
that jury may recommend an alternative sentence such as suspension or probation); Brown v.
State, 65 S.W.3d 394 (Ark. 2001) (jury recommended suspension of 10-year minimum sentence).
Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(a)(2) (Michie 1997) (court shall not suspend imposition of
sentence or place a defendant on probation if it is determined pursuant to § 5-4-502 that the
defendant has previously been convicted of two or more felonies).
29. Higgins v. State, 936 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Ark. 1996).
30. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101(6); see, e.g., Rodney Bowers, NLR Girl, 17, Gets 12 Years
in Stabbing of Benton Teen, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, July 7, 2000, at B1 (noting that
defendant's sentencing by a jury after guilty plea was "an unusual procedure in Arkansas" and
that "[niormally, a defendant either allows a jury to determine guilt or innocence before it
recommends a sentence to the judge, or he pleads to a judge who sets a sentence, often at the
recommendation of the prosecuting attorney"); AR-P5-R (reporting that a jury has sentenced
after a guilty plea only "twice since 1987").
31. See supra note 20.
[Vol. 57:3:885
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II. JURY SENTENCING AS TRIAL PENALTY: THE PROSECUTOR'S BEST
FRIEND
A. Jury Sentencing-Why Prosecutors Stick by It
Prosecutors in all three states are big fans of jury sentencing.
They volunteered a number of reasons for this preference. Many
expressed respect for jury sentencing as an important vehicle for
communicating community views on crime and punishment. One
said, "it is a wonderful mechanism of democracy. Having a
community-based barometer, I think it's appropriate."32  A Virginia
prosecutor explained: "It allows you to get a read on what a case is
worth.... You try three cases to a jury of burglary with no priors and
you get fifteen years each time, then you've got a good idea of what
future cases are worth."33  In Kentucky, prosecutors preferred that
sentencing discretion rested with the jury rather than with elected
judges, whom they feared would abuse sentencing power. 34
The most ringing endorsement prosecutors gave jury
sentencing, however, was as a tool to encourage defendants to waive
jury trial. Jury sentences following jury trial often exceeded sentences
after plea, they explained, giving prosecutors leverage in bargaining.
"Let me be candid," remarked a Commonwealth's Attorney from
Virginia, "there is another reason I prefer jury over judge
sentencing-it forces pleas. Those higher sentences from a jury tend
32. AR-Pl-U; see also KY-P2-U ("The community gets to reflect in their sentences a sense of
what the public thinks."); VA-Pl-U ("Because the important thing is to hear from the
community, to hear what they have to say about a crime ... when they do sentence, it is a better
reflection of community judgment. People in the criminal justice system for a long time
frequently get inured to crime, they think, 'Aw, it's just another car broken into, give him a
suspended sentence.' But to the guy whose car was broken into, it's a serious matter, to him and
his neighbor, there may be a plague of these in their neighborhood. To allow the jury to sentence
gives the community a greater say.").
33. VA-P5-R; see also VA-P4-R ("It is an opportunity to have regular people express what
they think is justice in a given case.").
34. See, e.g., KY-P5-R ("I'm not in favor of judicial sentencing.... Get a bad jury and you
get rid of it in 90 days. A bad judge and you're stuck for 8 years. Second, because judges are
elected-judicial sentencing has the potential to put judges in a position where they have to
make difficult decisions. I'd just as soon they not have to do that. Third, you've heard familiarity
breeds contempt? Well I'd modify that a bit, familiarity breeds conformity. Judges spend too
much time around the system. I like the jury, it is probably shocked at stuff that should be
shocking, and cluck their tongues at stuff that isn't that bad. Those of us in the system develop
so much tolerance. Q: What's wrong with tolerance? A: The sentences go down. The juries bring
this community attitude, it's what we're supposed to do.").
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to concentrate a defendant's attention. 35 "[Jluries will really lay it on
somebody who deserves it," reported an Arkansas prosecutor,
I think the fear of having those twelve people do that to 'em, it moves a lot of cases....
[O]ur system would suffer total gridlock without jury sentencing.., because every
defendant would exhaust every delay even more, cases wouldn't move as quickly. If
they're going to be no worse off, they wouldn't make an effort to resolve the case.
36
The discussion below examines why jury sentencing may serve as a
deterrent to jury trial in each of the three states.
B. The Plea Discount or Trial Penalty-Background
The difference between the sentence imposed after a jury trial
and the sentence imposed after a guilty plea is commonly known as
the "plea discount," or, less kindly, the "trial penalty" or "trial tariff. '37
Much has been written about this pervasive feature of American
criminal justice. In brief, this differential in punishment serves two
basic functions: First, it recognizes the greater rehabilitative potential
of the person who readily admits that he has committed a crime, as
compared to the person who insists that a prosecutor must prove that
he is guilty.38 Second, it encourages defendants to forgo trial, saving
money, time, and trouble for attorneys, victims, judges, witnesses, and
taxpayers. This predictable difference in the penalties that follow plea
and trial is commonly assumed to be fuel on which our system of
bargained justice runs.3 9 In jury-sentencing jurisdictions, where
35. VA-Pl-U.
36. AR-P2-R.
37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 289, 311-12 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli et al., Criminal Courts and Bureaucratic Justice:
Concessions and Consensus in the Guilty Plea Process, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1103, 1129
(1985).
38. For a recent endorsement of the practice of encouraging defendants to accept
responsibility by imposing lesser sentences, see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36-37 (2002)
(Kennedy, J.) ("Acceptance of responsibility in turn demonstrates that an offender 'is ready and
willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords
hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might other wise be
necessary.' " (quoting Brady v. United States, 297 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)); Michael M. O'Hear,
Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility," The Structure, Implementation, and
Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1507, 1513, 1553
(1997) (noting that a plea discount was viewed as a necessary "incentive to encourage guilty
pleas," and stating that the Commission apparently felt that Section 3E1.1 could advance the
same purposes of an automatic plea discount without the "unseemly results," and that Section
3E1.1 "seems generally to function as a plea discount," creating an incentive for defendants to
forgo their constitutional right to trial by jury).
39. E.g., David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential
Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 45 (1981-1982);
Easterbrook, supra note 37; David L. Weimer, Plea Bargaining and the Decision To Go to Trial:
The Application of a Rational Choice Model, 10 POL'Y SCI. 1, 1-24 (1978); Thomas M. Uhlman &
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judges might have less control over the punishment that follows from
trial, it could be more difficult to maintain a predictable "plea
discount."40 Yet in Kentucky, Virginia, and Arkansas, jury sentencing
not only accommodates, but is perceived as facilitating, the disposition
of felony cases without jury trial. Like so many other procedural
rights, particularly those associated with jury trial, the defendant's
right to sentencing by jury is in most cases not exercised but
bargained away. Unlike most trial-related rights, however, jury
sentencing often operates somewhat like mandatory minimum
sentencing laws, providing the government, not the defendant, extra
leverage in settlement negotiations. Ironically, rather than increasing
the community's say in the punishment of offenders, jury sentencing
as practiced is perceived as shrinking the frequency of lay
participation in criminal justice by steering defendants away from
jury trials and toward bench trials or guilty pleas.
For jury sentencing to serve as a deterrent to jury trial, two
features must be present: Some sentences after jury trial must be high
enough for prosecutors and judges to feel comfortable setting lower
sentences for conviction after guilty plea or bench trial, and
prosecutors must have the means to preserve that punishment
differential so that it remains a credible threat during negotiations
over disposition.4' The subsections that follow detail evidence
suggesting that both of these features are present in each of the three
states, for at least some offenses, which helps to explain the effects
reported by interviewees. For each state, we 1) relate comments from
the interviews that reflect the perceptions that jury sentencing is used
as leverage to secure jury waivers and that jury sentences are higher
than judge sentences, 2) offer reasons drawn from interviews and
state law that might explain that differential, 3) examine each of the
several mechanisms that serve to preserve that differential when it
N. Darlene Walker, "He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His" An Analysis of Judicial
Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 323 (1980).
40. In jurisdictions with few constraints on judge sentencing, judges can use their
sentencing discretion to maintain discounted sentences for defendants who plead guilty. Even in
jurisdictions with mandatory sentencing guidelines, judges and prosecutors can maintain what
amounts to a plea discount by taking advantage of guidelines credits for acceptance of
responsibility, remorse, or cooperation, for example. The plea discount in the federal system
under the guidelines was intended to replicate the going rate prior to the guidelines, about one-
third of the sentence. O'Hear, supra note 38; Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 40 n.32 (2002) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS (1987)).
41. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH 220 (2003) ("[P]lea bargaining
depends on the prosecutor's (or judge's) power to assure the defendant a lower sentence than he
would face after trial").
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exists, 4) summarize the statistical findings on the relative severity
and variance of judge and jury sentencing, and 5) examine the effect of
the jury's reputation as trial penalty on prosecutors' views of
abandoning jury sentencing in favor of judge sentencing.
C. Jury Sentencing as a Trial Penalty in Kentucky
1. Descriptions of the Jury Sentence as Bargaining Chip for
Prosecution
Kentucky lawyers and judges consistently described jury
sentences as severe. Summed up one defender: "Prosecutors like jury
sentencing better, juries [are] more inclined to give higher
sentences. '42 Prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges reported that
juries are particularly punitive in theft, sex abuse, and drug cases. 43
These high sentences reportedly serve as an incentive to avoid
jury trial. As one, defender put it, "[It is] hard to take chances with a
jury that might return a 3-5 [year] sentence when if you plead you get
7 months and 21 days."44  One judge thought it was the
42. KY-D6-U.
43. See, e.g., KY-P1-U ("They'll be more severe on property crimes.., it's hard to justify
some of these sentences. A guy shoplifts $305, he gets 1 to 5 years as a class D felony, and if
there's a [prior felony offender charge,] up to 20 years for that. Or 1-5 for possession of a forged
instrument 2d degree, up to 20 with [a prior felony offense] .... Property crimes are where the
jury tends to be hardest. Theft and burglary and forgery. Violent offense they are already pretty
tough."); KY-P2-U (juries are "higher in child sex abuse cases. They're tough on guilt or
innocence, don't even need to be guilty and they'll sentence you. If you make the case it's like
they'll drop nuclear bombs. Sometimes you wonder if innocent people plead guilty to avoid
that.... Out in other parts of the state, why I saw a guy get 5 years for cutting down 6 cedar
trees!"); KY-D3-U (in a sex abuse case before a jury, "if there is a conviction, you are looking at a
rather long sentence"); KY-D4-R ("You're not going to expect sympathy from a jury in a child sex
case or a violent rape. . . . There are some offenses where the juries are going to deliver really
long sentences."); KY-J1-R (reporting that juries imposed high sentences in crimes "that relate to
violence. There was a robbery not too long ago, I would have given much less, the jury gave 'em
40 years.... [Prosecutors] don't want [judge sentencing] either, they think judges have been
desensitized and would go too easy on some .... Take my jurisdiction here... I've got one
community that is terribly conservative. Sentences would be quite punitive, and there are very
few jury trials there."). Three of the attorneys interviewed, all from urban areas, did not report
that jurors were inevitably harsher sentencers than judges. Said one defender, "Jury sentencing
really makes no difference in the decision whether go to trial or not. If you have a good case, you
never get to jury sentencing, if bad case, wouldn't take it to trial anyway." KY-D1-U. One
prosecutor reported that juries were more lenient on white-collar offenders than he would be,
KY-P2-U, and another mentioned that the "defense attorney has the chance to put on mitigating
evidence, and may have their mama or boss or sponsor testify.... Juries respond to mitigating
testimony, sometimes they want to see the defendant take responsibility for their actions, they
pay a lot of attention to the demeanor of the defendant." KY-P1-U.
44. KY-D5-U.
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unpredictability of jury sentences that prompted settlement, "The jury
is a wild card, even more so at sentencing than at the guilt or
innocence phase, that's why they negotiate a deal. Judges are more
predictable, you can just look at their record, juries have no
memory."45
2. Reasons Given for High Jury Sentences
When asked why they thought jurors imposed stiff sentences,
some volunteered that they thought jurors become particularly
outraged about certain offenses. 46  For example, some attributed
serious sentences for property offenses to community norms against
stealing.47 Prior offenders were considered at special risk before a jury
as well.48
Features of Kentucky law reportedly reinforced higher jury
sentences, particularly rules creating disparities in the information
that jurors and judges receive and disparities in the sentencing
options each possesses. According to interviewees, because jurors are
only told about parole eligibility and are prevented from learning of
actual release probabilities, they tend to impose higher sentences than
they would impose if they were given more complete information. 49
"Unfortunately jurors ... think being eligible for parole means you're
going to get parole. They don't understand that with this parole board
you have now, prisoners seldom if ever get parole when they first come
up for parole. ' '50 Others mentioned that jurors may overestimate the
45. KY-J6-U. On the effects of unpredictability on settlement behavior, see infra note 122.
46. See supra note 43.
47. Professor James Lindgren mentioned to me that this suggestion that some Kentuckians
consider property offenses worse than violent confrontations between adults is reminiscent of an
alleged exchange with a Texas judge years ago. An incredulous visitor inquired how it was that a
man could be hanged for stealing a horse but barely punished for murder. The judge responded,
"I never met a horse that needed stealin'."
48. E.g., KY-D5-U ('Many clients have felony records, don't want jury sentencing. More apt
to go to trial with client who never had a felony before.").
49. This effect is somewhat similar to the problem addressed in Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (holding that where "the defendant's future dangerousness is
at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible"). See also Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the
Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 293-94 (2001). For a detailed account of this problem in
capital sentencing, see William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An
Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605
(1999).
50. KY-D3-U; see also KY-D1.U (' The way sentencing goes now invites speculation by jury.
They hear from the prosecutor's witness at sentencing, a parole officer, that the defendant will be
eligible in 20 percent. They think he gets out then, they can't calculate the odds. Also, they never
learn that a sentence of 1-5 will be served out in jail (counties get paid by state for keeping) and
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benefits of prison programs. 51 Finally, interviewees observed that
jurors do not learn the usual sentence for a defendant who pleads
guilty to the same charge, nor do they sentence regularly enough to
know when the sentence they select greatly exceeds or falls below
sentences in like cases. "Everybody's afraid that jury sentences are
higher than what a judge would do-jurors haven't seen one of these
guys before, don't know his is a fairly typical crime."52
Even if jurors in Kentucky had full information and were
inclined to exercise leniency and impose probation, they, unlike
judges, cannot do so. They have no authority to recommend probation,
nor can they suspend a sentence, send an offender to boot camp or to a
drug treatment program, or impose any other sort of alternative
sentence. Kentucky law requires a judge to consider the defendant for
probation or community service as an alternative to imprisonment for
most offenses, 53 but a jury's only choice is incarceration. 54
not paroled from there. State is paroling their worst guys, not the guys getting under 5 yrs ....
If we were to change it, I would give juries REAL truth-in-sentencing-more information about
the computation of time to be served."); KY-D6-U ("For most offenses the parole eligibility is 1/5,
but only a small percentage get parole at 1/5, 10 or 15 percent or so, and you can't get this
information before the jury."); KY-P6-U ("We'll use charts to explain, 'He'll be eligible after 20
percent on charge A, that's 1 of the 5 years, 85 percent on charge B'... Q: Do defendants ask
these witnesses to explain that not everyone who becomes eligible gets out? A: Yes, they always
ask about the probability of being granted parole, and our objection is always sustained because
it is speculation. He's not an expert on those statistics.").
51. A judge reported, for example,
Just recently a jury just gave a first offender a maximum sentence. They learned
during the trial about his family, really total thugs, this guy never finished high
school. They believed he would get an education in the prison and be isolated from his
family, give him a chance. That's why they gave him the max (yes, they said this
afterward). But there is no meaningful treatment in the penitentiary.
KY-J1-R. Even prison programs available in state facilities are not available in county jails,
where many class D felons are housed for up to five years. See Kentucky Releases 567 Inmates
Early, UPI, Dec. 18, 2002; supra note 50.
52. KY-D1-U.
53. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.010(2), 500.095(1) (Michie 1999). For a discussion of which
offenses are and are not eligible for probation, see LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, 9 KENTUCKY PRACTICE,
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 31.132 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2002).
54. One judge explained: "Truth in sentencing is a misnomer. Q: Why? A: Because juries
never get all the information. They just learn the defendant's legal record. That's about it. Q:
What should they learn? A: They should learn that if you give him ten years it's not going to be
ten years. Q: Don't they learn about parole eligibility? A: Sure, but they don't learn about shock
probation, [KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.265], and this new animal, prerelease probation. [KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 439.575 (allowing inmates eligible for a prerelease program to be placed in half-way
houses under supervision)]. And the juries don't learn that the judge can reduce the sentence."
KY-J1-R; see also KY-J3-R ("[The judge has more latitude, can look at more sentencing
alternatives, there is more the court knows about that juries never see.").
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3. Enforcing the Discount
If jury sentences are so high, what keeps a defendant from
undercutting the prosecutor's leverage by seeking a sentence from the
judge that is lower than the sentence a jury would give? Here unfolds
one of the most interesting aspects of criminal procedure in Kentucky.
Jury sentencing may serve as such a powerful incentive to plead guilty
because trial judges have given the prosecutor nearly complete control
over the sentencing differential between plea and jury trial.
Defendants in Kentucky have virtually no access to independent
judicial assessments of sentence severity. Their choice is stark: risk
the jury's sentence or take the prosecutor's offer.
Theoretically, there are four alternative avenues that could
allow a defendant to bypass both the prosecutor and the jury in order
to obtain a potentially more lenient punishment from a judge. First,
judges could reduce jury sentences-jury sentences would not be as
much of a deterrent if they were subsequently discounted by the
judge. Second, a defendant could ask for judge sentencing instead of
jury sentencing after a jury trial, thereby waiving his "right" to jury
sentencing in favor of sentencing by the judge. Third, bench trials,
while not providing the defendant with a jury's assessment of guilt or
innocence, would permit the defendant to contest his guilt while
avoiding the jury as sentencer. Finally, a defendant who throws
himself on the mercy of the judge and pleads "straight up" to the
charges could avoid both jury sentencing and the sentencing
preferences of the prosecutor. As it turns out, all four avenues of
access to sentencing by the judge are solidly blocked in Kentucky.
Limits on access to judicial modification. A judge may reduce a
jury sentence if the judge believes that the sentence is unduly harsh.55
However, judicial reduction or suspension of jury sentences is a rare
occurrence in Kentucky, according to those interviewed.
These judges, particularly in small counties, they are elected, don't want to be known as
the jurist who, after summoning sixty-five people to the courthouse, after twelve of them
deliberated and decide on twelve years, says, "No, I'm only giving ten." It is like the
unspoken rule here in Kentucky, judges will never probate a jury verdict.... I even had
a judge announce this as his policy. "If you go to the jury and roll snake eyes, even if
your guy is probation eligible, you won't get it." 5 6
55. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070(1).
56. KY-D5-U; see also KY-P5-R ("[It's a real burden, jury service is, just called in these
people, twelve jurors have sat there for $12.50 a day, they've made this decision, and our judges
are elected, they won't do it. If he does, that juror's going to go home and tell his family at the
dinner table, and his seven cousins, 'This judge just ignored us.' Our judges don't ignore jury
sentences.... [juries] come in higher than we offer on narcotics offenses, they don't like drug
offenders, and they come in lower on flagrant non-support.... They think it is a civil matter. Q:
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Said one judge: "[T]he judges have the attitude, 'Fine, if you want a
trial, you are stuck with the jury's sentence and you won't be eligible
for squat.' It's a judicial management thing, to encourage plea-
bargaining. It is also a genuine respect for the earnest work of twelve
citizens." "Ninety-nine percent of the judges," he reported, will not
probate a jury sentence. 57
Two urban prosecutors, by contrast, reported some
modification did take place, reportedly linked to greater anonymity on
the part of the judges in their jurisdictions. One noted that judges in
his jurisdiction do modify jury sentences in a small percentage of
cases. "These judges try a lot of cases, maybe things are different out
in [the] state where the judges cover 2-4 counties and try 4-5 criminal
cases per year."5 8
Do you get more trials on these because of the lower jury sentences? A: No, because judges will
not routinely probate jury sentences like they will pleas. Still a better deal with plea bargain
even with longer term because the judge will probate it. Normally I'd recommend 2 or 3 years on
a 5-year non-support. They're guaranteed probation if they enter into a plea agreement. If they
go to trial, they aren't .... So the defendants are better off with 2-3 years from me, than 1 year
from the jury."); KY-D3-U ("Seldom [do judges modify jury sentences]. Kentucky judges are
inclined to follow the jury's verdict. Our judges are elected."); KY-D1-U ("[J]udges don't modify
jury sentences except when they reject recommendations to run sentences concurrently and run
them consecutively .... Judges never bring jury sentences down. These judges are elected.").
57. KY-J1-R; see also KY-J2-U ("I can only recall once [modifying a jury's sentence]."); KY-
J4-U ("[Jurors] want to know what happens after the trial, they don't understand there is
another step where actual sentencing takes place and that I'll get a presentence report and may
get more information, some six weeks later, at the final sentencing .... Q: Do the juries ever tell
you when they hear about this later phase what they want you to do? A: Sometimes, they do.
They'll say, 'We don't want you to probate' or sometimes they may specifically request that
probation be granted. Usually it is pretty obvious what the jury wants by the sentence it gives.
I'll tell jurors that it's rare that I'll vary what they do."). Denying probation to offenders who
insist on trial has a long history. Historian David J. Rothman concluded that probation persisted
in the early decades of the twentieth century, despite public hostility and cost, because of its
"operational convenience." DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 98-116 (rev. ed. 2002). "The function of
probation was to facilitate [the] plea bargaining process, which it did remarkably well." Id, at 99.
58. KY-P6-U. This prosecutor also stated,
Jurors once they convict are ready to hit somebody hard with a term of years. Judges
are less willing to send people away. Judges will modify jury sentences by reducing or
probating. Probating is very frequent. Reducing the sentence happens less than 10
percent of the time; infrequent .... Judges respect the jury verdict as a sign of what
community thinks.... Juries are always shocked a month and a half after they
sentence to find out that the judge has ordered probation instead of the sentence they
imposed. They have no idea.
Id; see also KY-P2-U:
Q: Do judges ever modify jury sentences?
A: Sometimes. I had one judge [though,] he'd take defendant back and tell 'em, "If you
take this deal the Commonwealth's attorney is offering, I'm going to agree with it, but
if you go to trial and twelve people send you to the penitentiary, I'm elected, I'm not
going to change what they say."
Q: Do judges ever probate jury sentences?
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Limits on access to judicial sentencing after guilty verdict. In
Kentucky, the Commonwealth has a right to jury sentencing and must
consent before jury sentencing can be waived. 59 Many reported that it
would be rare for the defendant and the prosecutor to agree to waive
jury sentencing after a guilty verdict. One prosecutor explained, "We
had one guy who wanted a bench trial because he expected more
leniency in the sentencing phase from the judge; he [was] charged
with attempted murder of a police officer. But it would be a rare case
when I'd agree to judge sentencing after jury trial. When the guilt
phase is a slam-dunk, I want the jury to sentence him."6 0
In one urban jurisdiction in Kentucky, waiver of jury
sentencing has become common, but it has a price. Prosecutors have
managed to use the defendant's fear of jury sentencing to their
advantage: they'll agree to waive jury sentencing only if the defendant
agrees to waive his appeal rights. A judge explained it this way:
Q: How often is the sentencing phase of a jury trial waived by the defendant after a
guilty verdict as part of a sentence bargain?
A: 75 percent of all jury convictions here.
Q: What is the nature of these agreements?
A: Typically, after guilty verdict, I'll take a break and ask the defense and prosecution if
they've had a chance to discuss penalty. Prosecutor will offer a sentence at the low end
and agree to forego jury sentencing if defendant will waive jury sentencing as well as
waive appeal.
Q: Waive appeal of conviction and sentence?
A: Yes.
Q: Post-conviction as well as direct appeal?
A: Sure, right and left.... There is a lot of anonymity when you have such a large
community [with this many] circuit judges. They don't remember who the hell did it,
they leave, all they know is it was the guy with the red hair. People know so little
about judges. Nobody cares about judicial elections. The coverage during elections is
next to nothing. Different in more rural counties, probably.
59. Commonwealth v. Collins, 933 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Ky. 1996) (prosecution entitled to have
jury determine sentence following conviction; defendant cannot waive jury sentencing without
Commonwealth's consent).
60. KY-P1-U. Another reported that defendants have never asked to settle the sentence
after a guilty verdict. "Sentencing gives 'em one more chance to whine and beg a little bit. I'm not
noted for being one of the more lenient prosecutors when it comes to sentencing, They don't want
my opinion, they'd prefer the jury's." KY-P5-R. One judge reported that "[i]n 9 years [this has]
happened twice. Once, I think the prosecutor was being responsible, just doing the right thing,
the kid committed a minor crime, offered a low sentence. The other case the prosecutor knew the
jury would come in with a low sentence, and just gave it to 'em." KY-J1-R.
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A: Yes-I've had defendants come back later and say, 'My lawyer misled me," but I try
to take the waiver carefully and nail down with the defendant that he's had the advice
of counsel and he's happy with it, so when he comes back on [a] post-judgment motion to
vacate or set aside the conviction it isn't a problem.
Q: Is the appeal waiver a condition for no jury sentence, prosecutor wouldn't agree to a
sentence bargain without it?
A: Right-the prosecutor would be comfortable going forward with the jury, they just
convicted the defendant. Doesn't always happen, sometimes no deal.
Q: Do all judges accept these agreements, are there some who don't?
A: Usually, although the sentencing phase is relatively short, the benefit of no future
postjudgment appeals is very attractive.
Q: Do some defendants resist them?
A: They like them because they think they are getting a better sentence than they could
without the agreement and because they don't think there is any error to appeal .... 
6 1
61. KY-J6-U. Another judge reported:
[O]ften after a guilty verdict, I'll take a 15-minute break, talk about the line up of
witnesses for sentencing, and the parties will come to an agreement then, the
defendant will plead guilty and waive appeal rights, in return for a sentence
recommendation.... It is marked as a guilty plea after a verdict. Because pleading
guilty, the defendant waives right to appeal. It essentially wipes out the trial.
Q: How often does this happen?
A: Happens often when there is a PFO [a persistent felony offender charge], defendant
will go for trial, see if he can get an acquittal on the underlying offense, and then
agree on sentence.
Q: Why would the prosecutor agree to a lower sentence? Why waive jury sentencing?
A: Because the defendant waives his right to appeal, by pleading guilty and agreeing
to a term of years. This can take away post trial motions, appellate issues.
Q: This is seen as a fair trade off-lower sentence for appeal waiver?
A: Yes, now sometimes this doesn't apply. If there is a clean trial, sometimes the
prosecutor will say we'll just see what the jury says.
Q: How do the judges view this? What is the judicial attitude?
A: All the judges are fine with this. It's part selfish, from my standpoint, better than
the possibility that they're going to come back with an appeal.
KY-J4-U. This has attractions for prosecutors as well as judges. See KY-P2-U:




A: About 50 percent, no, more than 1/2. At that point the defendant is stuck. Looking
for the best way out. Usually he will take just about anything. And now they're doing
something that we didn't used to, they'll get defendant to waive his right to appeal.
Q: Now is this a guilty plea, or just a sentence settlement?
A: It's not a guilty plea. The defendant agrees to plead to the sentence. Like a guilty
plea, judge goes over what he's waiving.
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Limits on defense access to judicial sentencing after bench
trials. No Kentucky law bars trial by judge rather than by jury,62 but
bench trials are "incredibly rare."63 They are so rare, in fact, that some
attorneys and judges, when asked, admitted that the possibility of a
felony bench trial had never occurred to them.64 Prosecutors and
Q: Is there a set agreement, a standard set of terms?
A: Well, they just use the plea sheet, but just for sentencing.
Q: Why do you settle these, why not just take them to jury sentencing?
A: For certainty. To get rid of it, get rid of the case. We aren't totally volume driven,
but we have to get rid of them, there are others waiting to go. If you settle it, it won't
come back in 18 months because some witness said something he shouldn't have. So to
get this certainty you make it a little sweeter than you would otherwise.
Q: How does this play with victims?
A: I always tell 'em, say in a murder, "Folks, the appeal isn't based on if he did it or
not, it's based on all sorts of issues, he can appeal the play of the case, he's got an
issue here, and here, and here. We can give him this sentence and he'll be barred from
raising those issues, or we can go ahead and try this case."
Another urban prosecutor explained that after a guilty verdict, defendants
will bargain over sentence, waive jury sentencing and appeals, settle for a given
sentence, the judges go along, happens about half the time. Give you an example of a
case in which jury convicted on two felonies: I offered the defendant to run these new
sentences 10 years concurrent. Rejected. The jury gave him maximum, judge ran
consecutively for a total of 20. Judges encourage these settlements. They are more
inclined to probate or run concurrent with settled sentence. Although not supposed to
be punished for exercising right to jury sentencing.
KY-P6-U. Reported a defender:
I've tried to bargain with prosecution on sentence. Once the jury convicts, it tends to
get pretty punitive, you want to avoid it if you can. In one case I tried in which the
jury returned a guilty verdict on a lesser offense the prosecutor and defendant agreed
to waive jury sentencing and agreed on the penalty.
Q: What is the nature of these agreements?
A: The defense (and the prosecution) waives the right to jury sentencing-agree on a
sentence.
Q: I understand that in some places the sentence agreement includes waiver of
appeal?
A: Sure, that'll be part of it... Trial is hard work, by the time you've been through a
couple of days of days [of trial], it'll wear you out. The prosecutor is more likely to
bargain away jury sentencing after conviction-by then we have a better idea of what
the jury will do with sentence.
KY-D5-U. The waiver of appeal in this situation was recently upheld by the state's Supreme
Court. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2003).
62. See, e.g., KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.26 (referring to cases "tried without a jury").
63. KY-D6-U. One prosecutor explained the lack of bench trials as
tradition. People are used to what they are doing. We do have them in district court,
they use only a 6-person jury there too. From the defense standpoint it would be like a
slow guilty plea. Judges would also convict more easily than juries. A lot of judges
concerned about keeping their name off that front page. They can't afford acquittals.
KY-P1-U.
64. See, e.g., KY-P6-U ("It never occurred to me to consider a bench trial.... Defendants
always ask for jury. I wouldn't want bench instead of jury either. Maybe a matter of ego, my
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defenders both expressed distrust of judges, and didn't want them
making guilt/innocence decisions. 65 A defender put it bluntly: "It
would be malpractice to go to bench trial in this state. The judges are
all elected, they'd convict more often than juries. '66
Limits on defense access to judicial sentencing through "open"
guilty pleas. Access to a sentence set by someone other than the
prosecutor or jury seems to be nonexistent for most defendants. 67 As
in most states, a prosecutor can veto a defendant's guilty plea and
insist on trial.68 "Open pleas" without sentence recommendations are
rare, and judicial compliance with the prosecutor's recommended
sentence is routine. 69
talent would go to waste with the judge. Judges here think they can see through the prosecutors,
want to be able to persuade the jury of some things couldn't persuade the judge about.").
65. See KY-P5-R ("[I'm rieluctant to do a bench trial. Both my judges were really good trial
lawyers. Turns out when you become a trial judge, there is a real longing on the part of the judge
to be part of the battle again rather than the referee. I'm concerned that might happen with a
bench trial, that I'd have an advocate up there. I have a highly developed belief in the dual role
of the prosecutor. It would bother me, I might worry one judge might lapse back into being a
[what they were before]. It just isn't fair to put a single individual in the position of making the
decisions that the jury was designed to make."). One prosecutor was more accommodating. "Q: If
a defense attorney asked you for a bench trial, what would you say? A: I would never turn that
down. They are getting big enough sentences already; going for the highest sentence is just piling
it on." KY-P1-U.
66. KY-D1-U.
67. One judge explained that 90 percent of the cases have sentence agreements. KY-J6-U.
68. There is no constitutional right to plead guilty as charged. E.g., United States v.
Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999).
69. KY-P1-U ('Most cases are resolved like this," explained one prosecutor, "We'll offer a
recommended sentence term, and either oppose or recommend probation. Judges follow the
recommendations 99 percent of the time."); KY-P2-U ("[Tlhey go along. I can shut down his court
room if he doesn't, just by taking everybody to trial. Haven't done it but I've threatened. Q: Tell
me about that. A: Once had a judge here, thought he'd mess with these. We'd go in with a
recommendation and he'd say, 'That's silly, I'm not going to accept that.' After the third time, I
told him, 'If we can't come to an agreement here, we'll have to see what a jury says on all these
cases, it'll be two cases a week.' That would just shut him down. He's just like me- he has as
many cases, and has to move them in x number of days, and they're looking at his statistics. He
can't afford that. Q: Did it work? A: Yes."); KY-D5-U ("Judges almost never vary from the
bargain, even though the judge could impose a different sanction, this never happens."); KY-J6-U
("Where the judges sentences after a plea, in 90 percent of those cases there is a sentence
recommendation and the judge goes along with that."). Another explained that it was not
uncommon for his judges to disagree with his recommendation not to give probation, but noted
that they were bound to consider probation by law. "Judge rarely deviates from the
recommended sentence. The judge regularly deviates from my recommendation about whether
its probated or not. I agree to probate in about 35-40 percent of cases, judges are more than half.
... They're weak willed. [A recent statute] was a watershed law, it imposed a strict presumption
in favor of probation and I have two judges who can read and they're following the law." KY-P5-
R.
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4. Summary of Statistical Findings
The analysis of sentencing data from all three states is
reported in detail in a separate article. 70 Only a very brief summary of
the preliminary results is presented here. Sentencing data from
Kentucky included all noncapital felony convictions from 2000 and
2001, and was consistent with most of the perceptions summarized
above.71 Of all felony convictions recorded, only .1% followed a bench
trial, confirming statements that bench trials were exceedingly rare in
felony cases.
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the Kentucky data was
that it did not support the assumption that sentences selected by
juries are always less consistent than sentences after guilty plea.
When non-incarceration and incarceration sentences were included in
offense-specific comparisons for several fairly serious offenses,
sentences after jury trial were actually more consistent than sentences
after guilty plea. 72 This greater variability for plea-based sentences
does not translate necessarily into greater unpredictability, however,
as judges reportedly closely follow prosecutors' recommended
sentences after guilty pleas and presumably the defense has a good
idea of the recommendation before entering the plea. When only
sentences of incarceration were compared, the expected relationship
emerged: sentences after jury trial were much less consistent than
plea-based sentences for the same offense.
A comparison of the severity of sentences imposed after jury
trial with the severity of sentences imposed after guilty plea, 73 offense
by offense, confirmed the expected: the price of a jury trial is a higher
sentence, on average. For example, for cocaine trafficking the average
incarceration sentence after jury trial was 107 months, compared to
71 months after guilty plea; for first-degree rape, 390 months
compared to 191. Cases tried by juries did involve more serious
offense or offender characteristics than cases settled by guilty plea.
70. See King & Noble, supra note 6.
71. Because Kentucky data included only final sentences imposed, no information was
available to refute or confirm reports that judges rarely modified the sentences that juries
included in their verdicts.
72. The possible explanations for this include charge bargaining (so that defendants are
receiving higher sentences for offenses due to the dismissal of more serious charges), and judicial
decisions to suspend or probate part of the minimum sentences that juries have no option but to
impose.
73. We compared sentences after plea and sentences after jury trial using a scale that took
into account both non-confinement and confinement sentences, and also compared incarceration
terms measured in months. See King & Noble, supra note 6. All of the statistics in this
paragraph are drawn from King & Noble, supra note 6.
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Yet our preliminary regression analysis of incarceration sentences,
controlling for variables associated with sentence severity, including
prior offense status, number of charges, court location (urban or not),
and offender demographics (race, gender, age), revealed that the
choice of jury trial over guilty plea had a significant effect on sentence
length.
5. The Consequence: Prosecutorial Resistance to Change
A person accused of a felony in Kentucky has only two options.
He can admit guilt and take the sentence the prosecutor offers, or he
can insist on a jury trial and hope either that he'll be acquitted or that
if he is convicted, the jury will impose a sentence that is no higher
than what the prosecutor was offering. If he is lucky enough to be in
certain urban areas, he may be able to secure a jury's decision on guilt
or innocence and a sentence agreement, but only if he is also willing to
waive his right to appellate and postconviction review of his conviction
and sentence. There are no other options: Kentucky trial judges
reportedly do not conduct trials without juries, and only rarely reduce
jury sentences, depart from the prosecutor's recommended sentence,
or take guilty pleas without a sentence recommendation. Why so many
Kentucky trial judges do not assert more independent sentencing
authority will be explored in the next Part. It is enough here to
observe that this united front appears to be what allows the
prosecutor to create, preserve, and wield in negotiations the sentence
differential between guilty plea and jury trial.
The bargaining power provided by jury sentencing in Kentucky
raises an interesting question: Does jury sentencing operate to deter
jury trials more effectively than other incentives to waive jury trial
present in judge-sentencing jurisdictions? Put differently, have jury-
sentencing jurisdictions that once may have hoped to increase
community input into criminal justice reduced its frequency? Testing
this hypothesis would require additional data, including information
on nonconviction disposition and conviction rates. Even if a further
analysis showed that fewer cases go to jury trial in Kentucky than in
judge-sentencing jurisdictions, or showed that jury trial rates fell as
the disparity between judge and jury sentences increased, it would be
difficult to prove that parties were opting for settlement because of the
deterrent effects of jury sentencing. Scholars who have studied plea
bargaining disagree about the reasons why defendants may plead
guilty or go to trial in different proportions. There is no single
explanation for the differing rates of plea bargaining that we see
among the various states, among the counties within those states, or
908 [Vol. 57:3:885
2004] FELONY JURY SENTENCING IN PRACTICE 909
among different offenses within a single jurisdiction. Instead the rate
at which any given offense is disposed by jury, bench, plea, or
dismissal seems to depend upon a large number of variables, some
very difficult to measure. They include local charging and screening
practices; 74 caseload constraints;75 sentencing law, such as that
explored in this article, which allows the prosecutor more leverage to
extract pleas;76 local bargaining and disposition norms;77 attorney-
specific bargaining and disposition norms;78  and case-by-case
assessments of probability of risk. Consequently, we do not claim here
that the use of jury sentencing to maintain a trial tariff is more
effective in encouraging guilty pleas than are other incentives to waive
jury trial that are present in jurisdictions where judges sentence.
Our conclusion is more modest, but significant nevertheless:
prosecutors interviewed believe that without jury sentencing, trials
would multiply, and that in some locations appeal waivers would be
jeopardized as well. Not surprisingly, interviewees reported that
efforts to abolish jury sentencing in Kentucky have been consistently
opposed by prosecutors. 79
74. See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 40. Even state wide data on conviction rates, per
offense, which we did not obtain from Kentucky, would not reflect local variation.
75. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 41.
76. See, e.g., id.; ROTHMAN, supra note 57 (describing how prosecutors and judges used the
option of probation to encourage guilty pleas).
77. Judges simply may not conduct bench trials, as in Kentucky, or bench trials may be a
common substitute for plea bargaining as "slow pleas." See generally Stephen Schulhofer, Is Plea
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). Or, a prosecutor may adopt a policy
prohibiting plea bargaining in certain types of cases (DUI repeaters, for example). See Malcom D.
Holmes et al., Plea Bargaining Policy and State District Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time
Series Analysis, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 139 (1992) (discussing impact of plea bargaining ban in El
Paso on jury trial and jury conviction rates).
78. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 121-22 (1978) (describing differing views of prosecutors); Darryl K.
Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 801, 830 (2000) (collecting authority finding that "justice notions and self-serving personal
preferences have independent effect"); Thomas A. Goldsmith, Felony Plea Bargaining in Six
Colorado Judicial Districts: A Limited Inquiry into the Nature of the Process, 66 DENVER U. L.
REV. 243 (1997) (empirical study concluding "Colorado plea bargaining practices are not uniform;
they differ from district to district, prosecutor to prosecutor, judge to judge."); NARDULLI ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 373 (concluding that "consensus, court community norms, and shared
perceptions are far more central to the guilty plea process than concessions, coercion, and
bazaar-type behavior").
79. See, e.g., KY-P1-U ("Q: Have there been any efforts to switch to judge sentencing? A:
From what I understand it comes up every 5-6 years and is defeated soundly every time."). Only
a small group of prosecutors reportedly favor changing to judge sentencing:
There is a core group of prosecutors who are in favor of [judicial sentencing].
Q: Why do they want to change?
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D. Jury Sentencing as Trial Penalty in Virginia
1. Descriptions of Jury Sentencing as Trial Penalty
As in Kentucky, the prospect of jury sentencing was commonly
described by interviewees in Virginia as providing an incentive for
defendants to avoid jury trial.80 One prosecutor summed it up:
"Defense counsel will plead guilty rather than run the risk of being
sentenced by the jury, it tends to force a plea."8 1 According to those
interviewed, the gap between sentences after jury trial and sentences
that judges impose after the defendant waives jury trial is the product
of deliberate policy choices by state lawmakers.
2. Reasons Given for Higher Jury Sentences
Disparity of options. Several expressed the view that juries, not
limited by the guidelines, are "generally tougher"8 2 in sentencing than
A: Because they practice in circuits with judges with different backgrounds, and they
think those judges would be tougher than juries. Only about 6-8 of about 57 of us.
They will push pretty hard for this but when it all lines up there is no groundswell.
KY-P5-R. One prosecutor interviewed opposed jury sentencing based on his concern for
consistency:
My biggest concern with jury sentencing is its unpredictability. With judge-based
sentencing you could advise a client what he'd get, depending on which judge. With
juries, they latch on to the weirdest things. The other problem is, at times they'll be
more severe on property crimes. I don't want to downplay them, but it's hard to justify
some of these sentences. A guy shoplifts $305, he gets 1 to 5 years as a class D felony,
and if there's a PFO, up to 20 years for that. Or 1-5 for possession of a forged
instrument 2d degree, up to 20 with PFO.... I'm a big proponent of judicial
sentencing. I don't think juries are better. They are good on guilt or innocence, but by
the time you get to sentencing, they are tired, they don't give due deliberation to the
sentence. They'd rather not do it. They've already been there two days.
KY-P1-U.
80. See, e.g., VA-P3-R (Eliminating jury sentencing "would lead to an increase in jury trials.
A defendant would have nothing to lose by going to jury trial, why not go to trial? If we don't
have jury sentencing option, the judge sets the same sentence, trial or plea."); VA-P3-U ("Defense
attorneys are reluctant to take their cases to juries, so they end up pleading guilty to the judge.
They can be confident that they'll get the lower guidelines sentence.").
81. VA-P4-R. Said one defender: "Prosecutors like having the threat of jury sentence after
jury trial." VA-D6-R. Judges, too, agreed. See, e.g., VA-J2-R ("One of the practical aspects of jury
sentencing is that you get a lot of guilty pleas because of it. Juries are generally tougher in
sentencing than judges. Judges see a lot of cases, and to a jury this guy is the French Connection.
So if you are a defense lawyer and you go with a jury your client is in real jeopardy..."); VA-J4-U
("Prosecutors in some places, not here, now use the threat of a jury as a weapon to get
defendants in drug cases to plead guilty. In other jurisdictions, the prosecutor will say to a
defendant, 'You can either plead straight up or take your chances with the jury.").
82. VA-J2-U.
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judges, who are encouraged to stay within guideline ranges.8 3 In
many cases, jurors lack authority to set sentences as low as the
guidelines recommend. When an offense carries a statutory minimum
sentence, under Virginia law, that minimum binds the jury, but it
does not bind the judge. A judge must impose the minimum, but then
may suspend the sentence "in whole or part" and/or place the accused
on probation.8 4 Juries do not receive information about probation or
suspension of sentence or about rehabilitative services.85 By granting
only to judges, not juries, the authority to suspend or probate a
sentence so that the defendant serves less than the minimum term
specified for the offense,86 Virginia's General Assembly has in effect
encouraged higher minimum sentences for those who opt for jury trial
than for those who opt for plea or bench trial.
Specifically, many drug and property offenses carry a statutory
minimum term of two or five years, but the guideline ranges for these
nonviolent offenses, designed to approximate the actual pre-guidelines
sentences served, call for much shorter terms. For example, prior to
the abolition of parole, a drug offender sentenced to the statutory
minimum five years often served less than a year. With the abolition
of parole, the sentencing guidelines call for a judge to impose five
years, but to suspend or probate all but one. Thus, a Virginia judge
who follows the sentencing guidelines often must impose a sentence
much less severe than the statutory minimum term, or else justify the
upward departure. A Virginia jury, by contrast, has no power to
83. E.g., VA-J4-U ("What kinds of cases do juries come back higher than the guidelines?
Most cases, particularly drug cases and sex offenses."); VA-J1-U ("[T]hey are about on the mark
or low for paper crimes, thefts without violence, people without records, there the
recommendations from the jury are fines instead of incarceration, the jurors are interested in
what else can be done with the person").
This severity as compared to judges was reported in a news article even before bifurcation
was adopted in 1995. A newspaper survey of 1,300 felony dispositions and sentences from
Charlottesville and Albermarle County Courts from 1989 to 1991 reported that "judges gave
shorter average sentences than juries for most crimes-even though they usually were fully
aware of a defendant's history of prior convictions while the juries usually were not." Few Are
Willing to Gamble on Jury, DAiLY PROGRESS (Charlottesville, Va.), Nov. 17, 1992, at 1. Lawyers
said judges gave shorter sentences because the preliminary guidelines suggested shorter
sentences, because they have information on what most of their fellow judges are setting as
sentences, and because judges can suspend or exempt a person from serving even the minimum
term. Id. The story asserted, "Lawyers usually recommend that clients plead guilty rather than
risk facing a jury" and quotes one attorney as saying "I rarely recommend that clients take a
jury-just because it is such a big crapshoot." Id.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Michie 1979); Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1977).
85. VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 19.2-295 - 316.3.
86. See Carcamo v. Commonwealth, No. 1554-95-4, 1996 WL 523965, at *5 (Va. Ct. App.
Sept. 17, 1996) (the jury had no authority to recommend a sentence of less than five years for
drug offense; court was not required to follow the jury's recommendation for leniency).
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suspend or probate any portion of the statutory minimum term; it
must return a sentence of at least five years.8 7 A defender was quoted
by a newspaper reporter as stating, "'It's an extortion effect ... Even if
you didn't do it, it's safer to plead guilty than not.' 8 8 It is doubtful
that Virginia juries invariably agree with the stiff minimum sentences
they are required to return. For example, after convicting a man of
giving a 17-year-old a puff of marijuana, and learning that the
minimum sentence for that crime was ten years in prison, one jury
87. E.g., Virginia ex rel. Shifflett v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 718, 721 (W.D. Va. 1971).
In a cocaine case, maybe twenty to forty dollars' worth, juries would give eight or nine
years. And that was typical for judge sentencing after bench trial too. When
guidelines came in the sentence was nine months ... While the sentence for selling
crack might be nine months under the guidelines, the minimum is five years. That's
what the jury would have to give, but the judge could suspend all but nine months.
VA-J3-U; see also VA-P1-U ("The legislature has enacted several crimes with minimum
sentences-say abduction with intent to defile, it carries a twenty-year minimum and the jury
has to impose that statutory minimum, but the guidelines are frequently under that.... A judge
can impose twenty and suspend most of it."); VA-D1-R ("This gives the prosecution a huge
advantage in sentencing. Even if jury gives the minimum, it often exceeds the guidelines
sentence.... The judge will have to follow mandatory minimums. But most minimums are not
mandatory. Most guidelines sentence recommendations are below the statutory minimum
sentence, the judge cannot set a sentence below, but can suspend.... Say you have a distribution
of cocaine case, carries a statutory range of 5-40 yrs. Juries under the old system were giving a
defendant like this 5 years, and he was pulling 1 because of parole. Now the guidelines are
adjusted for that parole effect, so the sentence recommendation is for 1 year. The judge would
give a five-year sentence, and suspend 4 so he serves one year. But if you go to the jury, you get
five years."); VA-P4-R ("A third-offense DUI ... a judge may give two years and suspend all but
10 days of that; a jury will give two to four years."). Explained one judge,
We are supposed to tell them that they should simply recommend the sentence they
think is just and not concern themselves with what happens afterwards, but some
judges, if there is no objection from the attorneys, will tell the jury you can make
whatever other recommendations you would like along with that sentence but the
court will not be bound by those. But I can't instruct them about alternatives.
Q: What kinds of recommendations will they make when you give them that opening?
A: They might recommend drug counseling, for example.
Q: Do they know that you have the right to suspend the sentence, do they ever
recommend that you do that? Do you tell them about it?
A: They might know about it, but I wouldn't want them to know.... they might give
the defendant a higher sentence in anticipation of something I'd do What I'm looking
for from the jury is for those 12 people to tell me what they believe I ought to give to
the defendant in terms of punishment. The more information I have the better."
VA-J1-U.
88. Alan Cooper, Jury Trials Plunging: Sentencing Guidelines, Parole Abolition Sway More
Defendants to Seek Less Risk; With a Judge, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1997, at BI
(quoting defense attorney discussing the risk of taking a jury trial in a drug distribution case
with a minimum sentence of five years from the jury, but guidelines ranges of a little more than
a year); see also Austin Graham, Man Guilty in Multiple Burglaries, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
May 26, 2001, at B4 (reporting defense attorney said the defendant pleaded guilty because he
"feared his punishment would be more severe than state sentencing guidelines suggest if a jury
found him guilty.").
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reportedly refused to return a sentence that high. The judge declared
a mistrial and selected a new jury for sentencing.8 9
This legislated disparity in sentences raises some of the
concerns that led the Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson9° to
invalidate a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act that provided
that the death penalty could be imposed only if the defendant was
convicted by jury.91 Virginia's system, however, does not run afoul of
the Constitution. 92 In Virginia, the differential between the minimum
sentence after jury trial and the minimum sentence available if a
defendant waives a jury has two important features that the statutory
differential in Jackson lacked. First, the lower sentencing guidelines
ranges that apply in Virginia when the defendant waives a jury trial
are not mandatory-the judge may depart and impose sentences that
are just as high as those that juries might impose. Second, the higher
statutory minimum sentences that juries are instructed to apply are
not inevitable either; the judge has the authority to reduce the jury's
sentence by suspending part of it, or placing the defendant on
probation.93 Thus, in theory, the state statutes do not necessarily
impose a trial penalty. In practice, as discussed below, judicial
sentences remain lower and judges rarely reduce jury sentences to
approximate sentences imposed after plea or bench trial.
Information disparities. In addition to differences in sentencing
options, interviewees in Virginia identified three gaps in the
information that jurors receive that may contribute to the difference
in jury and judge sentencing. Virginia jurors do not receive
89. 32-year Prison Term Given in Fatal Beating, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 2, 2002,
at B2 (subtitle: "Jury rejects minimum sentence in drug case").
90. 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
91. See also Atkinson v. North Carolina, 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (invalidating, following
Jackson, state statute that mandated the lower ceiling of life imprisonment for cases in which
prosecutor accepted guilty plea, and that exposed defendant to death sentence if the defendant
pleaded not guilty or the prosecutor refused to accept guilty plea).
92. There is also some doubt as to whether Jackson is still good law. For the best exposition
of this issue, see Joseph L. Hoffman et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2313, 2372-90 (2001) (discussing several alternative approaches to interpreting Jackson
today, including a finding that it is limited to invalidating "the narrow category of statutes
creating what might be called a 'pure' statutory discount-absent any possible connection with
the 'give-and-take' of traditional plea negotiations ... for defendants who waive their
constitutional rights and plead guilty," and a finding that Jackson "prohibits any statute that
authorizes death or non death for the same crime depending upon whether a defendant proceeds
to jury trial or pleads guilty").
93. Cf. Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1977) (reasoning that punishment by jury is
not final, and may be suspended by the trial judge in whole or in part on the basis of any
mitigating facts that the convicted defendant can marshal; the trial judge can bring his so-called
superior judgment to bear upon the issue of proper punishment in reaching his decision whether
to suspend the sentence or not).
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information about the recommended guidelines sentence ranges,
which often are lower than the sentence ranges supplied to jurors. 94
Interviewees also reported that jurors do not have the experience in
sentencing that judges have and, as a result, may overreact to what a
judge would consider a routine, less serious offense. 95 Finally, jurors
did not until recently receive accurate information about the effect of
parole on a defendant's term of incarceration. For the first five years
after bifurcation, from January 1995 until June 2000, state law did
not permit jurors to receive instructions about the abolition of parole.
Regularly, interviewees reported, jurors selecting a sentence from
within the broad statutory range would send a question to the judge
about parole release. Before the abolition of parole, standard jury
instructions provided that judges had to answer: 'You are not to
concern yourself with what happens after sentencing."96  After the
abolition of parole in 1995, the standard answer to jury confusion did
not change. 97 Not surprisingly, when judges left jurors to guess about
how close the sentence they recommended would be to the actual time
they wanted the defendant serve, some jurors guessed incorrectly. 98
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (Michie 1994); see also VA-J4-U ("The jury doesn't get
the guidelines."); VA-J1-U ("I have information they don't have. I know what the guidelines
recommendation is, they don't. I know of mitigating evidence that they may not have."); VA-D6-R
(jury sentences are higher because of "bifurcation and because juries don't get to hear about the
guidelines").
95. E.g., VA-J2-U ("Juries don't have the perspective that judges do, haven't seen the
cases."). But consider another Virginia judge's take on juror experience:
I'd have jurors in the past that would sit for sixty days or more, and their sentences
would get tougher and tougher as they had more trials.
Q: Why?
A: They see more cases and they think there's a crime wave. Especially that last day
of the term. That's when they think, this is our last opportunity to put a stop to this
nonsense. I always say if you've got a good personal injury case, try it on the last day
of the term, the jurors tend to be their most punitive.
VA-J3-U.
96. See VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2.7000 (1994). This instruction had been standard
for over sixty years. See Coward v. Commonwealth, 178 S.E. 797, 798 (Va. 1935) (it is the duty of
the jurors if they find the accused guilty to impose such punishment as they consider to be just
under the evidence and within the limits stated in the court's instructions; they must not concern
themselves with what may afterwards happen); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 72 S.E.2d 693
(Va. 1952) (this is the appropriate response to inquiry by jury as to time defendant would
actually serve).
97. See, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 486 S.E.2d 126, 132 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (jurors are
not entitled to consider parole eligibility, and the abolition of parole does not require departure
from this rule); Mosby v. Commonwealth, 482 S.E.2d 72, 74-75 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (appellate
court is not at liberty to require that jurors be told of defendant's parole ineligibility in
noncapital cases).
98. See, e.g., VA-D1-R ("There was a widespread perception that juries were increasing
their sentences to take account of parole, that juries were making that upward alignment
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Five years after the change to no parole, even the Executive Director
of the Sentencing Commission admitted, "[t]he average juror really
isn't fully cognizant that defendants must serve at least 85 percent of
their sentences."99 Some defendants were luckier than others. They
ended up with jurors who were familiar enough with the news to know
already that ten years meant ten years, not two. 100  In other
jurisdictions the trial judges reportedly answered the jurors truthfully
when they asked about parole release. 10 1 The battle to allow the jury
to hear the three magic words "no more parole" was even taken up as
a legislative proposal, but went nowhere. 10 2 Not until June 2000 did
the Virginia Supreme Court step in to declare in Fishback v.
Commonwealth that, upon defense request, the judge must inform the
jury at sentencing that there is no parole for the defendant's offense. 103
The effect of this information blackout was summed up by one
defender:
They thought jury sentencing would be better after these changes because the jury
would be more informed and make better decisions. But the opposite has happened.
Juries are not much better-they are even more in the dark about their sentences, in
relation to what the guidelines sentence is. Even if they are told under Fishback about
the end of parole, they have no concept about what sentences for that offense typically
because they believed in early release. Q: So you think that was happening? A: I know it was.").
Explained one judge,
Some juries had bad information, and went in there and assumed there was parole
when there wasn't. I'm sure that happened. The jury should have the truth, but it is
hard to tell them about this accurately. It isn't true to say that there is no parole,
because we still have geriatric parole.
VA-J2-U; see also Alan Cooper, Jury Trials Plunging: Sentencing Guidelines, Parole Abolition
Sway More Defendants to Seek Less Risk; With a Judge, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 30,
1997, at B1 (quoting defense attorney decrying refusal of judges to answer jurors' questions
about parole: "by not answering the jury, you're almost telling them there is parole ... It's going
to take years for it to sink in that we no longer have parole.").
99. Alan Cooper, Jurors To Get More Info; They Must Be Told About Parole Law, RICHMOND
TIMES DISPATCH, June 10, 2000, at B1.
100. Two interviewees from urban areas reported that the later change to informing juries
about the abolition of parole didn't make that much difference. VA-P1-U ("Our juries are fairly
educated, middle class. They understood that parole had been abolished. It wasn't news to
them."); VA-D2-U ("Not really, when we had parole they didn't learn about it, when it was
abolished they didn't learn about it. We were worried that it might make a difference but it
didn't.").
101. VA-J2-U ("Before the law changed there were a number of judges who would tell them
about parole. Fishback was not really a revolutionary thing. Judges were glad it was clarified.").
102. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 64-65 (1995) (discussing
proposal).
103. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000); see also Hills v. Commonwealth,
534 S.E.2d 337 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (Fishback applies only upon defense objection and juror
request).
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are under the guidelines. This isn't truth-in-sentencing at all, they are even more in the
dark after bifurcation because they are making less intelligent sentencing decisions. 
1 0 4
3. Enforcing the Disparity
Keeping judicial sentences low. As suggested above, judges in
Virginia could narrow the penalty gap between judge and jury
sentencing in a number of ways. They could, for example, simply
impose sentences more in line with those juries deliver. In Kentucky,
this would require departing upward from the prosecutor's
recommendation; in Virginia, it would require departing upward from
the guidelines. Why don't judges do more of this? Judges and lawyers
alike explained that guidelines adherence was linked to the judicial
apprehension that upward departures would be considered negatively
by the legislature at reelection. Because this perceived incentive to
impose lower sentences bucks the usual political wisdom that
legislators are more likely to reward judges who are tough on crime
and penalize those who are too "soft," an extended quote or two is
warranted. Consider the comments of one judge:
A: Here the General Assembly will have our deviation rate from the sentence guidelines,
they'll have that information about whether we deviate up or down.
Q: Why would they want that information-what are they looking for? In states where
the trial judges are elected by popular vote, some judges are conscious of being soft on
crime. What about Virginia?
A: In our state, what the General Assembly is looking for is that we stay within the
guidelines. When we went to sentence guidelines and abolished parole their hope was
that there wouldn't be an explosion in the prison population, and more funding needed
for prisons. So if I departed up 45% of the time, they'd be concerned-not because they
are soft on crime, but because the prisons would become overcrowded and it would cost
money. If I deviated down that often, then there might be pressure to impose more
sentences within the Guidelines for fear that I was soft on crime.
10 5
Another judge explained,
A: You know if you didn't comply you were told that you get a black mark against the
score kept by the VCSC, and they've made this public. There was a fellow, Rick Kern,
he came to that meeting [a guidelines orientation] and he told all of us judges to watch
out. They keep track of compliance judge-by-judge. And make it public. The legislature
gets it. The legislature is interested in the bed space, they don't want to have to build
104. VA-D1-R; see also Frank Green, Panel Guards Its Secrets on Toughest, Easiest Judges;
Sentence Data Not Compiled for Each, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 1998, at A13
("Juries are not told what the guidelines are or that there is no longer parole and that most of
the reduction of sentences for good behavior in prison has been eliminated. Consequently, juries
sometimes hammer a defendant with a far stiffer sentence that a judge would. Baugh [a defense
attorney] said that makes many lawyers reluctant to ask for a jury trial.").
105. VA-J1-U.
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more prisons. We've been taking prisoners from all sorts of other states because we
have so many empty beds now.
Q: You mean the legislature would look more negatively on a judge who departs upward
from the guidelines than a judge who departs downward?
A: Absolutely.
Q: Isn't that contrary to all the tough-on-crime rhetoric you often hear from legislators?
A: Sure, I used to tell the defendant from the bench: "Why, before we got 'tough on
crime' I would have locked you up, but now that we've gotten 'tough on crime,' I have to
put you on probation." You know, a short jail sentence, say under sixty days, but not
over, can be very therapeutic, particularly for a young person or a first offender. We
used to be able to suspend a sentence and give the defendant a short term in jail, but not
now. Some judges still do it, and they get bad compliance records.
Q: Have the compliance figures made a difference in the judges' chances at reelection by
the legislature?
A: Some judges have not been reelected, but I don't know whether it was linked to
compliance. You see there are so few lawyers in our legislature, they don't understand
the problems. 
10 6
106. VA-J3-U. This judge also reported:
The guidelines are an important piece of this because the judges were told that the
General Assembly would have a record of how often they departed, that information
would be available to them, and they would want an explanation when you were
departing. They see it as a way of controlling bed space. That's what they were
concerned about.
Id.; see also VA-P1-U ("Theoretically, they [the guidelines] are supposed to be of historical origin
based on data from sentences in years past. The problem is even if they were once accurate, they
go down, down, down. Q: What do you mean? A: The judges depart underneath, they rarely go
above. Q: Why not, are there different incentives for judges in departing above and departing
below? A: The legislature denies this, they'll deny that reappointment of judges has anything to
do with compliance with the guidelines. But judges will tell me it does. This, let's call it the
compliance threat, is never made explicitly, but it is there implicitly. I'm sure of it. Q:
Compliance generally, or is there a difference in complying up or down? A: I believe the dirty
truth to be that the guidelines are designed to relieve the pressure on the corrections system by
replacing parole. They serve as the spigot in the coffeepot. To depart up would mean more public
money spent, and the legislature doesn't like that. I can't swear that I'm right, but I feel that I
am. This abolition of parole and guidelines went hand in hand. Had to do something to keep
populations down."); VA-D2-U ("There were veiled threats to judges that if you depart from the
guidelines it will be held against you at the reappointment. Q: Are these rumor or reality? A: I
think they are reality. Because I've had judges tell me they were told that."); VA-P4-R ('They are
elected by the majority party of the legislature, the same legislature that enacted the sentencing
guidelines and there is a concern among the judges that they better stay within those guidelines
or they'd be looked at. But the party in control has changed now, I would think that a judge who
departs upward might be looked at favorably now."); VA-P5-R ('The General Assembly has
encouraged at least implicitly every judge to follow them, by requiring judges every time they
depart up or down to justify why. This is pretty strong encouragement to stay within the
guidelines ranges-'we're watching, if you depart, we ask you questions.' Q: What would happen
if they departed and imposed higher sentences? A: ... Circuit Judges are elected by the General
Assembly for 8-year terms. Men and women with 8-year terms are serving at the pleasure of the
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Indeed, in 1998, in response to a request by the Richmond Times
Dispatch, the Sentencing Commission released to the public
information on the compliance rates of Virginia circuit judges, after
the Commission earlier had refused to release the information. 107
Limited defense access to judicial modification. The penalty
gap between judge and jury in Virginia is also maintained, as in
Kentucky, by judicial reluctance to reduce the sentences that juries
recommend. Interviewees reported that modification did not happen
after most jury trials. Explained one prosecutor, "In order for the jury
trial to produce harsher sentences.., the judge would [have to]
sentence in accordance with the jury's sentence. Fortunately around
here our judges do."108  These reports are confirmed by the Annual
General Assembly. In recent years they made it very clear that judges don't enjoy lifetime
tenure. Several have lost their positions. Q: Why-because they are departing from the
guidelines in criminal cases? A: I haven't followed it that closely. I think in last couple years a
number of judges have been replaced. Judges are like all of us. If there 100 of us and 1 gets
knocked off, the other 99 are gonna get a whole lot more cautious. The rest of 'em are going to be
saying, 'Whoa, I do not want to upset the fellows down at the General Assembly.' The General
Assembly says we are going to be keeping an eye on what you are doing. I don't think judges are
concerned about occasionally going over or under the guidelines, but I believe a judge who
routinely went over or under would find himself in an awkward position at his reappointment
hearing.").
Not all judges believed job security accounted for compliance. VA-J4-U ("Q: Why comply?
What is your incentive? A: The sentence guidelines people did a really good job in compiling the
guidelines and selling them to the judges. A really fine job selling judges on compliance. They'd
see a judge set a burglary sentence in one county of 2 years and in another the same offense
would get 8 to 10. That created a problem in the department of corrections, the judges
understand that. The guidelines are based on a compilation of data from sentences that were
actually served. This explanation was convincing to most judges, they'll go along with what most
people are getting. Q: Does the compliance with the guidelines play any role in the
reappointment of judges there in Virginia? A: I can't recall any judge ever saying, 'They asked
me about the guidelines.' ").
107. Frank Green, Judging Virginia's Judges: They Comply with Guidelines 75% of Time,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 28, 1998, at B1; Green, supra note 104.
108. VA-P1-U; see also VA-J4-U ("You could change a jury sentence. But most of the judges I
know are very reluctant to reduce jury sentences, particularly when the defendant has opted for
the jury. They are not as reluctant to modify a jury's sentence when it is the prosecutor who
seeks the jury .... here's an example: Take a sexual offense, where the prosecutor insisted on
going to jury trial, the jury came in, as it had to, with the mandatory minimum sentence of 5
years.... The jury has to give at least that much, but the guidelines recommended less. So I
might reduce that. Sometimes the statutory range will be [2 to 10], but the guidelines call for 7 to
8 months. We have to evaluate these on a case-by-case basis, can't simply defer to the jury.");
VA-P3-U (In distribution cases, "Juries impose the [minimum time] 5 years, and the judges are
historically very loath to interfere with jury sentences. But if the judge was sentencing, the judge
would suspend the sentence after imposing the five. Q: How often have you seen the judge
modify a jury sentence? A: Of the thousands of cases I've handled personally, less than five
times. It is absolutely rare."); VA-P4-R ("Our current judge has never reduced a jury verdict in a
criminal case."); VA-D1-R ("[Miost of them will say, 'I respect the judgment of the community,'
and leave it alone .... They acknowledge that is the way the system is set up; if you have a jury
than you have to accept the jury's sentence. Now I think this is fine if it is the defendant that
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Reports of the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, which
indicate that judges tend to reduce roughly one-quarter of jury
sentences, and that of the sentences reduced, less than half are
reduced to guidelines levels. The reasons why judges do not modify
jury sentences more often or to a greater extent are explored in the
discussion of judges in Part III.
Limited access to judge sentencing after guilty verdict. As in
Kentucky, prosecutors and judges in Virginia do not allow a defendant
to bypass jury sentencing following a jury's guilty verdict by agreeing
to a waiver. 10 9 Indeed, state law now prohibits judicial sentencing
once the jury has returned a guilty verdict. 1 0 Unlike defendants in
many other jurisdictions, the defendant in Virginia has a right to
plead guilty to a felony charge under the state's constitution, and the
prosecutor and judge are powerless to block a guilty plea by insisting
on jury trial."1 Defendants in some counties in Virginia 1 2 use this
power to plead guilty and obtain the lower guidelines sentence after
the presentation of the prosecutor's case in chief and the denial of a
directed verdict motion (called a "motion to strike" by Virginia
asks for the jury-You live by the sword and you die by the sword. But if it is the prosecutor who
is insisting on the jury, and this is what happens sometimes, then it's unfair.").
109. Defense attorneys, explained one judge, "know by now they can't come in and argue
they have a right to judge sentencing. Prosecutors will just say, 'I will not waive the jury.' " VA-
J2-R. Or, as a prosecutor put it, "Once we get rocking and rolling in front of a jury, we're going to
finish the thing." VA-P5-R.
110. Although a defendant may plead guilty at any time prior to the return of the jury's
guilt-phase verdict, following the return of a guilty verdict "a plea of guilty is untimely and may
not upset the procedural course of a bifurcated trial." Daye v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 287,
289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); see also VA-J2-R ("Now, we used to have a system where the jury came
back with guilt and gave the sentence all at once. Then we went to bifurcation and we got what
we call 'slow pleas.' A slow plea is where the Commonwealth's attorney would ask for a jury trial,
jury would find the defendant guilty, then the defendant would decide to plead guilty instead,
and be sentenced by the judge under the guidelines. The prosecutor had no authority to object to
the defendant's guilty plea. The prosecutors went to the legislature and asked this to be changed,
so now once the jury comes back guilty, the jury must sentence. The net result of all this is that
there are very, very few jury trials.").
111. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("In criminal cases, the accused may plead guilty. If the
accused plead not guilty, he may, with his consent and the concurrence of the attorney for the
Commonwealth and of the court entered of record, be tried by a smaller number of jurors, or
waive a jury."); see also Dixon v. Commonwealth, 172 S.E. 277, 278 (Va. 1934) ("the language of
[the Virginia Constitution] makes it mandatory that, whenever an accused pleads guilty to the
whole of any indictment, the court shall try the case without the intervention of a jury"); Graham
v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 270, 275 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (no statute, rule, or constitutional
provision limits the time by which a defendant must enter his plea of guilty, and a plea may be
tendered mid-trial).
112. Some interviewees reported that this did not happen in their jurisdictions. E.g., VA-D6-
R (reporting that this happened "rarely"); VA-P3-U (reporting that a guilty plea with judge
sentencing following a judge's denial of directed verdict "does not happen very often, but several
times a year here").
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practitioners). In other words, defendants are able to test the waters,
and only dive in for the jury's sentencing verdict if the temperature is
acceptable. The lower guidelines sentence after guilty plea, imposed
halfway through a trial requested by the prosecutor, also may
discourage prosecutors from insisting on a jury trial when the
defendant prefers a bench trial.
Consider the views of one prosecutor on this tactic:
Q: What would you call the situation where a defendant goes to jury trial, then after the
motion to strike is denied, decides to plead guilty?
A: [chuckles] What I would call that isn't decent ... I'd call it damnable.
Q: Why? What about it irritates you?
A: It's a no-risk gamble. The defendant makes the state go through all of this expense
and risk of trial then says, "uhuh, I'd prefer to plead guilty." Seems to me to truly lack
contrition. I have had little luck getting judges to agree with me on this, I've tried
arguing that these people should be treated differently than the person who pleads
guilty at the get go. The person who pleads right away shows more contrition, and
should get lighter sentence.
Q: Judges don't agree?
A: No they don't see it this way, they say we can't penalize a person for exercising the
right to trial.
1 13
One defender, whose detailed explanation is worth reading in full,
noted
[Dirug and drunk driving cases [are] where we are more likely to plead guilty after
motion to strike is rejected. The prosecution makes bad offers because they are higher
profile cases. Prosecutor can say he is helping keep the drug dealers and drunk drivers
off the streets. These are the sorts of cases in which the prosecutor would veto a bench
trial. Now for most cases they'll go along with a bench trial. They don't have a special
interest in them, and they can't say no to every case because they will run out of
resources. In your typical breaking and entering, or embezzling, they'll often agree to
bench trial. There is another category of cases where they'll insist on jury: sexual
assault, violent sex assault cases. In these high stakes-case they're going to want to go
to jury trial and go for the jury sentence. 1 14
113. VA-P1-U; see also VA-J1-U ("Q: I've heard that there are cases where a defendant will
want to avoid a jury trial and ask for a bench trial, but the prosecutor will refuse, then at the
jury trial, after the prosecutor's put on his case, the defendant will make a motion to strike, and
if it is denied, the defendant will plead guilty. Does that happen? A: Happens sometimes. Once
the verdict is returned, a defendant cannot plead guilty, but up until the jury verdict I have to
accept the defendant's guilty plea ... Q: Do prosecutors ever argue to you, 'Judge you ought not
to give this defendant the same break you give the defendants who plead guilty earlier'? A: It
would be illegal to penalize someone for exercising his right to go to trial but we can reward a
defendant who accepts responsibility early and spares the victim the stress of testifying in
court... I can't impose a higher sentence because the person went to trial. I tell defense
attorneys they should bring this to my attention when sentencing someone who pleads guilty.").
114. VA-Dl-R:
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A: Let me give you an example. Take the drug distribution case we were just talking
about. That's a case where the defendant might want a bench trial. You always want
a bench trial in these cases because there you have a chance of no conviction, but if
you were convicted, then you don't have that jury sentencing, you get judge
sentencing. There are very few incentives to go for a jury. Most of the time you'd want
a jury only when you have a strong issue on guilt or innocence, but you have a cynical
judge, you've got a defense, say consent or something, that you can sell to a jury that
you know you can't sell to a judge. You hope you win before the jury, but if you can't,
you know you'll get hammered on sentencing. Except for those, in most cases you
want a judge to hear it. You say, I want a bench trial, even though you don't have
much of a chance, but there is always the chance of a witness not showing up, or you
could avoid the conviction. You want to have your cake and eat it too. Maybe the
prosecutor might make a mistake and your client would get off. The prosecutors have
figured this out-they'll say no, we'll take you in front of a jury and if you get
convicted, which is likely, as I explained, we're going to ram it down your throat.
Q: Can they realistically threaten this? Don't resources prevent them from trying all
these cases?
A: Oh they can do it and they will. They will do it. And you'll end up pleading guilty.
Now we can also pull the plug and plead guilty after the prosecution rests. You make
your motion to strike and it's overruled, you can plead guilty and get judge sentencing
the judge will send the jury home.
Q: How often does this happen?
A: A lot of jury trials end that way in drug distribution cases. Other times you have a
jury trial, there are other reasons for the jury, maybe the client wants a jury. Most of
the time we carry jury cases all the way through, because those cases we wanted the
jury to decide. But there are these drug and drunk driving cases where we are more
likely to plead guilty after motion to strike is rejected. The prosecution makes bad
offers because they are higher profile cases. Prosecutor can say he is helping keep the
drug dealers and drunk drivers off the streets. These are the sorts of cases in which
the prosecutor would veto a bench trial. Now for most cases they'll go along with a
bench trial. They don't have a special interest in them, and they can't say no to every
case because they will run out of resources. In your typical breaking and entering, or
embezzling, they'll often agree to bench trial. There is another category of cases where
they'll insist on jury: sexual assault, violent sex assault cases. In these high stakes-
case they're going to want to go to jury trial and go for the jury sentence. Sometimes
the defendant will want a jury too, for other reasons.
Q: Which motivates prosecutors more, the immediate publicity or are they trying to
raise the price of the plea in all of these cases?
A: Absolutely to raise the price of the plea. They want the change in pleading. In these
cases the prosecution wants to put pressure on the defendant with the sentencing, and
very often will end up pleading guilty even in the middle of trial. Sometimes trial is
really a means of educating the defendant, by that time they see what they're up
against.
Q: Can the prosecutor veto your guilty plea?
A: No, not if you plead guilty before the case goes to the jury. That's the beauty of the
system. You've got to make your decision in time to save yourself from jury
sentencing, the last time you can do that is before the case goes to the jury....
Q: Do judges ever punish you because you make them go through with half of a jury
trial then plead guilty?
A: No, and they shouldn't because that would be a penalty on the exercise of the right
to jury trial. I had a discussion with a judge about this once. There was a case where
this happened and the prosecutor was very upset. The judge was absolutely clear with
him saying that the defendant has every right to do what he did and under no
circumstances would he punish him for doing so.
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Limited defense access to judge sentencing after bench trial. As
suggested by the discussion above, bench trials are more frequent in
Virginia than in Kentucky, and are attractive to defendants as a
means to obtain lower guideline sentences while still contesting guilt
and preserving objections that would otherwise be waived as part of a
guilty plea. 115 Judges, not subject to popular election, are reportedly
quite willing to conduct bench trials, as they pose less risk of reversal
than do jury trials. 116 Judges in Virginia need not fear losing their
jobs over adverse public reactions to acquittals in bench trials.
Nevertheless, some Virginia prosecutors reportedly function like
Kentucky prosecutors in many cases, vetoing jury waivers and forcing
defendants to choose between conceding guilt or opting for jury trial
with the probability of much higher sentences. A judge explained,
A: As a matter of strategy, then, in some counties, including mine, in serious cases the
prosecutor will not agree to waive a jury.
Q: So the prosecutor uses jury sentencing as leverage to get the plea?
A: Exactly. In some less serious cases, say larceny or property offenses, the prosecutor
is not as likely to insist on the jury .... But in cases that are likely to outrage a jury,
they're going to ask for a jury. 11 7
Defense access to open pleas. This is where Kentucky and
Virginia practice differ starkly. In Kentucky, interviewees reported
that truly open pleas, without an understanding between the parties
on sentencing, were rare, because judges invariably impose the
prosecutor's recommended sentence, and the prosecutor could block
the defendant from pleading guilty by insisting on jury trial. In
Virginia, the right to plead guilty as charged, over the prosecutor's
insistence on jury trial, is protected by the state's constitution. Jury
sentencing pushes defendants not to the prosecutor's offer, but to an
open plea with the confidence that the judge will sentence under the
guidelines. As one judge explained, "We don't have a lot of plea
bargains, more open pleas. The jury will sentence higher than the
115. See, e.g., VA-J4-U ("Q: You mean that the option of a bench trial, the prosecutor vetoes
that? A: Right. ... that has never been the practice of our Commonwealth's attorney, but in
other places I understand this does happen. Q: What happens in your county, the defendants
who want to avoid jury sentencing ask for bench trial and those requests are granted? A: Yes,
usually.").
116. VA-D7-U.
117. VA-J2-R; see also VA-P1-U ( "If you have a fragile victim, or a child victim, or a case
where there is a legal issue, then we might agree to a bench trial, otherwise we set all of our
cases for jury trial. Now other jurisdictions are different, they could have more jurors there who
are skeptical of the police."); VA-P3-U ("Because of the sentence" this prosecutor explained, "I
tend to ask for a jury in serious cases."). Use of the bench-trial veto reportedly varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
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guidelines, it is a safe prediction." 118 The contrast between the lower,
guidelines sentencing after an open guilty plea and the higher jury
sentence after jury trial encourages defendants to bypass the jury and
the prosecutor and seek a sentence under the guidelines from the
judge.
4. Summary of Statistical Findings
Data from Virginia is composed of two data sets. Data from the
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission included all noncapital
felony sentences imposed between 1997 and 2001. Another data set,
provided by the Department of Corrections, allowed us to examine all
sentences imposed between 1995 and 2001. The large number of
cases, along with the frequency of bench trials in Virginia, allowed a
comparison of sentences after jury trial with sentences after bench
trial for several individual offenses.
Given what we had learned about guidelines compliance in
Virginia, we expected to find that sentences that were imposed after
jury trial would vary more widely than sentences after bench trial for
the same offense. Comparing bench and jury sentences, we found that
for most offenses this result was confirmed.11 9 The analysis also
confirmed what interviewees had been saying about relative severity.
Average sentences after jury trial were more severe than average
sentences after bench trial or guilty plea, with many offenses showing
significant differences. In our preliminary analysis of the Virginia
118. VA-J2-R; see also VA-P4-R ("Usually we ask for a jury, then the defendant just pleads
open, straight up, and gets the guideline sentence. We end up getting a conviction, which is a
good thing."); VA-J1-U ("Q: In your jurisdiction are there more pleas straight up or plea
bargains? I am finding out that it differs quite a bit from place to place. A: It does differ. Here
there are not a lot of plea bargains in Circuit Court. The philosophy of the Commonwealth's
attorney is that any deals have to be cut at the preliminary hearing. Q: No sentence bargaining?
A: Some sentence bargaining, too. They'll agree to recommend a sentence within the guidelines,
or agree to a specific sentence, and if I don't agree the defendant can withdraw his plea. But
there are fewer bargains here than other places."); VA-P1-U ("We refer to straight up plea as no
agreement at all. We also have sentence bargains. We used to have quite a few of those before
bifurcation, when it was a crap shoot, now we do very few because we think the people ought to
plead straight up if they think they can get a better deal under the guidelines. Q: You mean your
offers, your sentence agreements would be over the guidelines? A; Our office policy would often
call for sentences over the guidelines, we think a case is more valuable than what the guidelines
says. We frequently are at war with the guidelines."). But see VA-D2-U ("Q: Do you have mostly
plea bargains or straight up pleas? A: Mostly plea bargains. The bar here is much more
aggressive, much more jury-oriented that the rest of the state. More motion oriented. Prosecutors
have a hard time.").
119. The Commission data also allow a comparison of the sentence in each case with the
recommended guidelines sentence, and include a value indicating whether the sentence exceeds,
falls below, or is in compliance with the guidelines. Sentences after jury trial were in compliance
with guidelines in a much lower proportion of cases than sentences after bench trial.
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Sentencing Commission data using ordinary least squares regression,
we found that sentences after jury trial were significantly longer than
sentences after bench trial for drug offenses. For defendants convicted
of these offenses, the choice of jury trial rather than bench trial meant
a sentence averaging anywhere from four and one-half to over
fourteen years longer, depending on the offense. The difference was
even greater when comparing incarceration sentences after jury trial
to incarceration sentences after guilty plea. Analyses of the cases
included in the corrections data set, using the same methods but
different variables, also confirmed that the choice of jury over bench
trial meant a significantly longer sentence.
For one offense-rape-the Commission data suggested that
the choice of bench trial versus jury trial, or guilty plea versus jury
trial, had no significant effect on sentence length. Rape cases may
present reasons apart from sentencing outcome for defendants, or the
attorneys who advise them, to avoid trial, such as publicity.120 High
plea-based sentences also could be a product of charge bargaining-
prosecutors may be more willing to settle for a certain conviction, with
a higher sentence on one count in exchange for dismissal of others.
Finally, with the variation in post-trial sentences significantly
exceeding the variation for plea-based sentences, defendants may be
more willing to settle for "a bird in the hand" in order to avoid the
possibility that their sentences would exceed the average. As one
defender from Arkansas noted, "Most defendants don't trust the
system so they want to know what their deal is and have it signed
before going to court."121 The risk of a particularly high jury sentence
for these crimes may be small, but defendants may want to avoid it by
waiving jury trial. 122
120. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
205, 210 n.9 (stating based on his experience as a prosecutor that "judges and prosecutors placed
a constant and systematic pressure on defense attorneys to make their clients plead guilty
[which] led defense attorneys to frame plea offers in ways that made the offers look better than
they were-good enough to overcome loss aversion and culminate in pleas"); id. at 239-43, 247
(collecting authority discussing the defense attorney's incentives to agree to avoid trial); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1989-90 (1992).
121. AR-D7-R.
122. Scholarship exploring settlement behavior, including examinations of this risk-aversion
model of decision making, is extensive. For one recent application to guilty pleas, collecting prior
literature, see Birke, supra note 120.
Interestingly, one study of federal sentencing under the Guidelines concluded that
expectations about greater variance prompt concessions by the prosecutor in bargaining, so that
the greater the variance in an expected sentence, the lower the bargained sentence will be.
Chantale Lacasse & A. Abigail Payne, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum
Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L. & ECON. 245, 267 (1999)
(finding that "the less predictable a judge is in his sentencing, the more of a discount is given to a
defendant who pleads guilty"). The difference between what interviews and sentencing data
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5. The Consequence: Prosecutors Protect Jury Sentencing
As in Kentucky, jury sentencing in Virginia is overwhelmingly
supported by prosecutors, in part because they believe the risk of a
higher sentence from a jury deters jury trials. 123 Indeed, Virginia's
own state reports suggest that jury sentencing, in combination with
judicial sentencing guidelines, is in part responsible for lowering the
rates of jury convictions as compared to all convictions. 124  As
suggest in these states and what Lacasse and Payne find in federal court may boil down to which
party considers the choice of sentencing after trial to be riskier than negotiation. When a U.S.
Attorney anticipates that a federal judge might depart below the guidelines sentence whether or
not the defendant goes to trial, she must decide whether to run that risk or settle for something
less-this allows "defendants to exploit risk aversion on the part of the prosecutor." Id. In jury-
sentencing states, prosecutors do not try to avoid jury sentences; prosecutors expect juries to
impose sentences as high as the sentences judges would impose, so it is the prosecutor who is
able to exploit risk aversion on the part of the defendant.
123. A Virginia prosecutor reported, for example:
Q: Does this come up in the legislature; are there efforts to change it, if the judges
want it changed?
A: Comes up all the time. Our organization rails against it. It came up before, it was
never going anywhere.
Q: What happened?
A: We said disparaging things about it.
Q: Like what?
A: Like ... we need more citizen participation not less. We don't need more of what
judges want, we need to hear from the citizens.
Q. But didn't the legislators see through that? When the jury trial rate has gone down
to 2 percent how can you say this is more participation?
A: The legislature likes the 2 percent too. They may not tell you this. You won't hear
them say, "The fewer jury trials the better," but you'll hear them talk about "judicial
economy and efficiency." Also, no appeals, that's another benefit... While
participation by citizens may be low, it is more meaningful... You can't appeal much
after a guilty plea ... Judge sentences after guilty pleas, there isn't much to appeal.
There is very little room for error. The judges aren't swayed by prejudice, so
arguments aren't a problem, there is very little action there."
VA-P1-U. Another prosecutor reported,
There have been proposals before for doing away with jury sentencing, but they fairly
routinely have been laughed off... About 2 to 4 years ago, there was a Commission
that.., issued a variety of recommendations, one was a proposal for abolishing jury
sentencing. The prosecutor [on the commission] recommended it too, but was hooted
down by all of his colleagues. Prosecutors like the option of being able to get a read on
what the community standards are on these sentences.
VA-P 3-U.
124. In a 1999 report, TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN VIRGINIA, prepared by the Virginia Criminal
Sentencing Commission in conjunction with the National Center for State Courts, the authors
noted the lower overall rates of compliance with the guidelines after jury trial, and that nearly
half of jury sentences studied in the report exceeded guideline ranges. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL.,
VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N (S.C.), TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN VIRGINIA: EVALUATING THE
PROCESS AND IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM 50-51 (1999). The report also noted the declining
percentage of convictions adjudicated by jury trial in Virginia, attributing this decline to
reluctance by defense attorneys to steer their clients toward trial given three developments: 1)
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discussed earlier in connection with Kentucky, the belief in a causal
link between jury sentencing and falling jury trial rates is itself an
important policy constraint, even if empirical study has yet to confirm
or refute that belief.125
E. Jury Sentencing as Trial Penalty in Arkansas
Jury sentencing functions in a slightly different way in
Arkansas than in the other two states. According to many of those
interviewed, jury sentencing operates as a trial penalty, but only for
certain categories of crime. Several aspects of Arkansas law and
practice make jury sentencing a somewhat less effective bargaining
tool for the government than it is in Kentucky or Virginia, at least in
some non-drug prosecutions.
1. Descriptions of Jury Sentencing as Trial Penalty
Prosecutors in Arkansas do value jury sentencing as an aid in
plea bargaining. Offered one prosecutor:
See this is the beauty of jury sentencing, though no two crimes are precisely alike, if I
know you robbed a Stop and Go with a gun and a jury came in with 15 years for that, I
can hold that up and say, "This is what you are facing." I've got that as a basis to
negotiate. 126
Defense attorneys and judges reported that prosecutors used the
threat of a jury's sentence to obtain pleas in some cases, particularly
drug and sex offense cases. 127 Arkansas courts have rejected claims by
statistics showing longer sentences in cases adjudicated by juries than in cases where judges
sentenced, made public starting in 1989 by the sentencing commission; 2) bifurcation of guilt and
penalty phases in 1994, permitting jurors to learn of a defendant's criminal history; and 3) the
absence of any jury instructions about recommended sentence ranges, following the adoption of
truth in sentencing and guidelines and abolition of parole in 1995. Id.
125. Comparing the data in the Virginia Commission reports with national statistics
compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that jury trials as a proportion of convictions
in Virginia is lower than the national average in every category of crime. See SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 5, at tbl. 5.42 (sharing the percent of convictions by jury trial: all offenses 3 percent;
violent offenses 9 percent; property offenses 2 percent; drug offenses 2 percent. In Virginia for
2001, the percentage of convictions that followed a jury trial were: all offenses 2 percent; violent
offenses 7.1 percent; property offenses 0.4 percent; drug offenses 0.4 percent).
126. AR-P1-U; see also AR-P2-R (quoted supra text accompanying note 36).
127. Explained one judge,
Generally speaking a prosecutor will try cases that 1) they will win and 2) that will
set a standard for that particular type of case .... They'll pick a case that has
egregious facts, the rape of a child with the child's mother assisting the perpetrator.
In most parts of the state that case would be tried to a jury. Then the prosecutor uses
that sentence, which would be 10 to 40 years, or life, as bargaining power in other
rape cases where children are the victims.
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defendants that the difference between the recommended guidelines
sentence and the expected sentence from a jury creates an
unconstitutional penalty on the right to jury trial. 128
Most of the prosecutors, and some judges and defenders,
reported jury sentences were higher than judge sentences in at least
some categories of crime.1 29 But unlike professionals in Kentucky and
Virginia, Arkansas judges, defenders, and, less frequently,
prosecutors, also reported that juries will often impose sentences that
are more lenient than the sentences a defendant would obtain from a
judge after bench trial, or even after a guilty plea. In other words,
according to many of those interviewed, jury sentences are not
predictably higher in most communities, or even in most cases. Many
of those interviewed singled out drug cases as most likely to produce
AR-J3-U; see also AR-J5-R ('There is a probation facility with drug rehab where the offender is
locked in, but the jury doesn't have that alternative. So instead of probation he is facing a 20-
year sentence."); AR-D6-R ("In drug cases it does [change the advice one gives clients]. It is hard
to find a jury that's going to be soft on drug dealers. You end up counseling defendants that it is
better to take a plea rather than taking a risk with jury sentencing.... Juries will go for harsher
sentences."). In addition to drug and sex offenders, multiple offenders were mentioned as
particularly pressured to avoid juries, as in Kentucky. See, e.g., AR-J4-R ("[Jury sentencing after
bifurcation] also puts more pressure on the defense lawyers, when they are representing a
multiple offender .... For a multiple offender, where they expect a conviction, they know the
jury is going to sock 'em with a stiff sentence. It means they are less likely to go to jury trial, has
a strong plea bargaining effect.").
128. Pickett v. State, 902 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Ark. 1995) (sentencing guidelines do not burden
the fundamental right to a jury trial); Hutcherson v. State, 47 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001).
129. See, e.g., AR-P1-U ("Jurors give higher sentences [than the guidelines call for], at least
with violent offenses, with property offenses about the same"); AR-D4-R (juries tend to be "more
severe" than the guidelines sentences); AR-J3-U ("Jury sentencing is in most cases, especially in
nonviolent property crimes, tend to exceed the recommended sentence under the guidelines. I
expect it is because those cases usually involve habitual offenders, or where the defendant does
not make a very good witness. But I don't think jury sentences here exceed guidelines all that
much.., in violent crimes the jury sentences here tend to follow the guidelines and are
sometimes less severe than the recommended guidelines sentences. This seems to hold true in
drug cases, as well. .. [Law enforcement supports jury sentencing because] jury sentences tend
to be more severe than judge sentences."); AR-J5-R ("Juries seldom if ever impose a sentence
below the guidelines sentence. Most often they'll come in over the guidelines. . . . A multiple
offender will get a higher sentence from a jury than from the guidelines."); AR-D5-U ("Juries are
'less likely' to give probation than a judge. Once the jury decides to convict, the jury is more
likely to send the defendant to prison." "Normally, a judge will find guilt and be more lenient at
sentencing." Jury sentences are "almost without fail higher" than the guidelines.); AR-P2-R
("Juries impose stiffer sentences [than judges]."); see also Linda Satter, NLR Man Pleads Guilty
to 6 Counts in Child Porn Case, Main Exhibit Was To Be Old Album Filled with Sexually Explicit
Photos, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, May, 31, 1997, at 2B (noting that the prosecutor stated the
defendant pleaded guilty with a 30-year sentence because "I think he was a little fearful that a
jury might life him.").
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higher sentences from juries than from judges. 130 A defender put it
this way:
I don't avoid jury trials to avoid jury sentencing, except in drug cases. It does affect
when to waive jury trial and go for bench. Jury sentencing does make a difference in
drug cases. Juries go ape-shit over drug cases. For a drug case, I wouldn't go to jury
trial unless I have a real good case on possession (say your guy is a back seat passenger
in a car).1 3 1
2. Reasons Given for High Jury Sentences for Drug Offenses
Information disparities. As in Kentucky, parole information is
limited to eligibility only,1 32 and several defense attorneys and judges
reported that high jury sentences may be attributable to the
possibility that jurors are equating eligibility with release. 33
130. AR-D6-R ("I feel good about taking cases to trial and get better sentences from the jury
than the prosecutor has offered as a plea bargain. Except drug cases. Otherwise I get better
sentences from juries than the plea offers."); AR-J4-R ("I think [juries] are probably higher than
the grids on drug cases."); AR-D7-R ("I think it is safe to say that drug cases, particularly
methamphetamine manufacturing, and child abuse cases get stiffer penalties from juries. There
is a county to the north of us [where] a man was charged with murder and possession with intent
to deliver methamphetamine. He was sentenced to less than 20 years on the murder and life on
the drug charge. A local jury gave a man 40 years for about a kilo of cocaine .... these are two
types of cases I don't like to take to juries. Usually they will find guilt and sentence fairly
harshly.").
131. AR-D3-U; see also Rob Moritz, Drug Offender Appealing 2 Life Terms as Inhumane
Penalty Too Stiff for Amount of Cocaine, Defense Says, ARK. DEM. GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 2000, at B1
(quoting defense attorney stating that the two life sentences for a first offender convicted of
selling less than a half-gram to a police informant "is harsh but consistent with most juries'
treatment of drug offenders. 'It's a defense attorney's worst nightmare to go to a jury trial on a
drug charge,' he said. 'Juries go bananas over drug cases'.. . penalties for drug dealing are in
some cases more severe than those for murder.").
132. The model jury instructions that judges use reads:
In your deliberations on the sentence to be imposed, you may consider the possibility
of the transfer of [the defendant] from the Department of Correction to the
Department of Community Punishment. After he serves one-third of any term of
imprisonment to which you may sentence him, he will be eligible for transfer from the
Department of Correction to the Department of Community Punishment. If transfer is
granted, he will be released from prison and placed under post-prison supervision.
The term of imprisonment may be reduced further, to one-sixth of any period you
impose, if he earns the maximum amount of meritorious good time during his
imprisonment. Meritorious good time is time-credit awarded for good behavior or for
certain achievements while an inmate is confined in a Department of Correction or
Community Punishment facility, or in a jail while awaiting transfer to one of those
facilities. It is awarded an inmate on a monthly basis so that he receives one day for
every day served, not to exceed thirty days per month. Accrual of meritorious good
time does not reduce the length of a sentence but does decrease the time the
defendant is required to be imprisoned before he becomes eligible for transfer to
community supervision, under which the remainder of his sentences will be served.
ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL §§ 9402, 9403 (2d ed. 1994); see, e.g., Clark v. State,
944 S.W.2d. 533, 536 (Ark. 1997) (approving instructions).
133. See, e.g., AR-D6-R ("This is why jury trials are so risky. Lawyers believe that juries
think that the guy's going to get out real quick."); AR-D4-R ('They get the info about parole, but
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Although most of those eligible are released, jurors do not learn that a
significant percentage remain in prison.134 Some Arkansas judges
may leave the jurors in the dark about parole, and do not volunteer
information about parole to jurors. 135 Because this explanation should
affect all offenses equally, however, it does not explain why drug
offenses in particular might generate jury sentences that are higher
than judge sentences.
A better explanation for the pattern of higher jury sentences in
drug cases involves the state's sentencing guidelines. As in Virginia,
some of the sentences recommended by the guidelines are far below
what jurors tend to impose. For drug crimes, in particular, Arkansas
prosecutors have complained that the guidelines simply don't reflect
sometimes don't understand it."); AR-J3-U ("[L]ast term I tried nine or ten jury trials, and in
eight or nine the jury hadn't been out twenty minutes when here comes a question about parole
eligibility.... They ask, 'How much time will the defendant serve if we give him ten years?'... I
read them the parole eligibility instruction. I think at that point I have to give them the
standard instruction."). One judge after reporting that jurors imposed sentences higher than the
grids on drug cases, explained, "I think judges know what to expect and how much time he's
actually going to serve. Juries know that somewhat, but they don't know as much as the judge."
AR-J4-R.
134. See Julian E. Barnes, It's the Law: Criminals Only Serve Bit of Time, ARK DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 1996, at 1A (quoting Department of Corrections records as stating 73 percent
of inmates are released at their first eligibility data, another 10 percent are indefinitely delayed
because of disciplinary problems, and the remaining 17 percent are delayed for other reasons;
but also quoting Chairman of the Post-Prison Transfer Board and stating that release is "almost
automatic").
135. One judge's explanation is instructive:
Back in 1994 when we first bifurcated, the model jury instructions included an
instruction which permitted the jury to consider alternative sentences such as
probation and/or suspended sentences. The model instructions also contained an
instruction on parole eligibility. I took the position that the parole eligibility
instruction wasn't really fair to defendants. Although the instruction is a correct
statement of the law, parole eligibility is affected by a significant number of factors,
and consequently, it's virtually impossible to predict actual time of incarceration for a
criminal defendant. So I decided not to give that instruction, and for fairness, decided
not to give the alternative sentence instruction either. At present, I've changed my
view on this to some extent and have given these instructions once or twice in recent
cases. Very seldom are these instructions requested, and this may be a consequence of
my prior position on this issue.... When I've given it, more than twenty times or so,
invariably the sentence seems higher.... Jurors don't really know about the parole
eligibility guidelines. I think I ought to give those alternative sentencing instructions
when anybody asks, but when nobody ever asks me to give them I don't.
AR-J3-U.
Explained one defender,
I don't mention parole because whether or not the defendant is locked up in a facility,
if he is on parole, he is still under sentencing .... Of course eligibility for parole and
making parole are apples and oranges. Not everyone eligible gets out, so I think that
is a prejudicial argument.
AR-D7-R.
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juror sensibilities. 136 But the guideline recommendations are kept
from the jurors, so they never learn of the disparity. 137 One defender
complained,
The real problem is in the cases where I want to go to jury but the jury is more severe
than [the] guidelines. I can't tell the jury about the guidelines, and prosecutor vetoes
[the] waiver of jury sentencing and fights us telling juries about guidelines. It serves as
a penalty on the jury trial right.... In drug cases, the guidelines provide for suspension
of part of [the] sentence with certain offenses, but we cannot tell the jury that. 138
A prosecutor had a different spin on the same differential:
What jurors give is the appropriate sentence. We've now reached the point where the
pleas and the grid is the baseline sentence and what juries do is the exception. Better to
let them decide. They tend to be higher than the judge.... When coming up with grids,
the major concern was that they be no longer than what the status quo called for,
because the prison walls wouldn't hold 'em. The public perception of what sentences
were is a lot higher than what these grids say, [there is] a lot of difference. 139
Increased emotionalism and punitiveness. The information gap
between jury and judge on the usual sentence was not the only
explanation for higher jury sentences. Other explanations included the
conservativeness of the jury pool 140 and community outrage about
drugs and violent crime.141  "I think [prosecutors] like the jury
sentencing... [b]ecause maybe it is easier to fool the jury, get them
stirred up and emotionally involved. Judges for the most part are a
pretty level-headed bunch, you know, and are able to detach
themselves from all the hoopla."142
136. See, e.g., Ray Pierce, Dickey Picks Apart Pryor's 9-Point Plan, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAzETE,
Sept. 16, 1998, at B6 (quoting candidate for attorney general as stating that prosecutors want
tougher sentences than the grid will allow, and criticizing the sentencing guidelines); Mike
Rodman, Grid Goes Too Easy, Some Say Critics Call for Jails, Not Sentencing Rules, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, July 17, 1994, at Al (collecting complaints about the leniency of many
sentences under the grid).
137. See Pickett v. State, 902 S.W.2d 208, 208 (Ark. 1995).
138. AR-D3-U; see also AR-D6-R ("Juries don't hear about the guidelines. Plus judges know
what these cases would normally plea bargain for."); AR-D4-R ("[S]ometimes the range of
punishment the jury has is higher than the guidelines sentences. They don't get the guidelines.");
AR-J1-U ("Juries tend to impose higher sentences because the jury is not aware of all the factors
that go into negotiations and with other prior cases earlier in the year. They aren't aware of the
sentences and terms for similar cases.").
139. AR-P2-R.
140. One defender explained tough drug sentences this way: "We have a very conservative
jury pool." AR-D7-R.
141. E.g., AR-J1-U ("We have had some pretty steep sentences. Sometimes I think that these
sentences are not to punish the offender for his drug offense, but they are to punish for the
offender because drugs are a social problem in America.").
142. AR-J2-R; see also AR-D7-R ("If the judge is one who sentences very harshly, then the
prosecutor is in a win/win situation .... For an introverted prosecutor, this is great. A prosecutor
who is theatrical and can impassion juries into high sentences, when a judge would not
ordinarily slam the defendant, would like jury sentencing. Prosecutors look to getting elected,
and whichever method suits their purposes will be their preference.").
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Disparity in sentencing options. Finally, as in Kentucky and
Virginia, jurors lack information about the more lenient alternatives
to incarceration that judges understand. Said a defender, "The judge
tries and works to be consistent. Juries don't have that information,
they just get a range, 5-20 years and pick." 143 Although Arkansas
jurors can and do recommend probation or a suspended sentence,
some alternative sentence options are not available after jury trial.
Consider the remarks of one judge discussing the problem in the
context of drug cases. "We have good alternative responses to this kind
of crime. There is a probation facility with drug rehab where the
offender is locked in, but the jury doesn't have that alternative. So
instead of probation he is facing a twenty-year sentence. 144
While the reasons above may explain why jury-imposed terms
of incarceration for drug crimes remain high in Arkansas, they do not
explain reports by those interviewed that for other offenses jury
sentences are sometimes lower than both bench sentences and plea-
based sentences. 45 One reason offered for the lower jury sentences in
nondrug cases may be that jurors are asking for probation or
suspended sentences. 46  The use of the model instruction on
probation, however, is spotty, according to those interviewed. Judges
may refuse to give the instruction, 47 and will only give the instruction
when defendants ask.1 48 Alternatively, some of those interviewed
143. AR-D1-U.
144. AR-J5-R; see also AR-P1-U ('Most [alternative programs] are not available after jury
trial, only bench or plea."); AR-D3-U ("certain expungement provisions applicable only if
[defendants] plead guilty, [which] operates as a trial penalty.").
145. See, e.g., supra notes 130-131.
146. Higgins v. State, 936 S.W.2d 740, 743-44 (Ark. 1996) (jury recommended no fine and no
sentence, jury was sent was sent back because the sentencing range for the offense of
conviction-theft of property over $2500-was 5 to 20 years, jury then returned sentence of 5
years probation and fine); see also Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Ark. 1994) (AMI Crim. 2d
§ 9111 instructs the jury that it may recommend an alternative sentence but that the
recommendation is not binding on the court, and instructs the jury to state whether the
alternative sentence recommended is probation or a suspended sentence; also noting that the
defendant's closing argument "extensively discusse[d] alternative sentencing and the restrictions
which would accompany probation or a suspended sentence," so that the "jury was fully apprised
of the options to imprisonment prior to setting [the defendant's] sentence").
147. See, e.g., AR-P5-R ('Most of the time the jury will be higher, the jury won't get that
instruction on probation unless the judge agrees, and the judge won't agree unless the defendant
is a first offender."); see also Dale v. State, 935 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (no error to
refuse to include instruction based on AMCI 2d § 9111, noting the trial court may, but need not,
instruct the jury regarding alternative sentencing).
148. AR-J4-R ("Q: Do they ever hear that they could recommend that you impose probation-
are they told about this? A: They are not told, unless they ask. Q: How often will they ask? A:
From time to time, not that often."). Stated one judge,
I give it when appropriate for the crime and when it's requested. I'm not going to give
it if nobody asks for it. They still have to fill out what the sentence is, and then if they
2004]
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thought that juror leniency in sentencing was due to inexperience.
Explained one judge:
Juries, especially inexperienced jurors, are more lenient. Maybe they just haven't seen
that much of this. I'm talking about the young and inexperienced jurors now. We have 6-
month jury terms. I like to ask [jurors] to serve six months. Once they finally get some
seasoning to 'em they start to get more realistic, and deliver more appropriate sentences
than when they are inexperienced. [T]hey'll hear on average at least 12 cases, they
may go higher. 
14 9
Notably, interviewees in Kentucky and Virginia attributed severity,
not leniency, to sentencing inexperience. 150  These competing
hypotheses pose interesting empirical questions for further study. 151
3. Maintaining the Sentencing Differential in Drug Cases
In those prosecutions in which jurors are perceived as more
severe sentencers than judges, Arkansas prosecutors, like their
counterparts in Kentucky and Virginia, benefit from routine judicial
agreement with their sentence recommendations and relatively little
access by defendants to judicial sentencing without their consent.
want to recommend an alternative sentence, they note that. I'll give a great deal of
consideration to that. [Defendants] [d]on't seem to ask for it, often not requested.
Q: Why?
A: I don't know.
AR-J2-R; see also AR-D4-R ("Q: Do defendants ask for the instruction? A: "Not always. Don't
know why."); AR-P2-R ("Occasionally" they'll ask, "Not very often."); AR-J1-U ("Defendants have
started asking for it more.... Some did not ask for it, they didn't know about it. It didn't come
out at the same time as bifurcation so its fairly new, but it's catching on now. Even that's a
recommendation on [the jury's] part-to suggest suspending or probation."); AR-J3-U
("Occasionally I'll get a question about probation or suspended sentencing, then I'll read that
instruction.").
Defenders and judges also noted the limited value of the information juries receive on
alternative sentencing.
Juries at the discretion of the trial judge can be instructed that probation is an
alternative to the statutory sentence and occasionally a jury will find a defendant
guilty and sentence him to probation. But our jury instruction on probation does not
explain well what probation is, how long it will last, what it amounts to. Not as likely
to use it as an option in sentencing. . . . Jury can't suspend a sentence. The only
alterative to sentencing within the minimum is probation. But they are not given the
information they need to understand what it means.
AR-J5-R.
149. AR-J2-R.
150. See supra notes 52, 95.
151. Twenty years ago, prior to bifurcation, Melissa J. Himelein completed a masters thesis
on this very topic, and examined jury sentences in Kentucky. She found that "More experienced
juries punished criminal defendants more severely, on average than did less experienced juries."
Melissa J. Himelein, The Effect of Prior Jury Experience on Jury Sentencing 35 (1983)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Kentucky) (on file with author).
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Defense access to potentially lower judicial sentences through
judicial modification. Not surprisingly, elected Arkansas judges, like
trial judges in Kentucky, rarely modify jury sentences, according to
those interviewed. 152 "I have never seen our judge do so," explained
one defender. "I think judges are hesitant to change a jury sentence,
unless the verdict is just wrong, such as it was based on emotion and
not the facts. In our jurisdiction, a judge selects a jury panel that
serves for four months. If he just summarily changes their verdict,
they will have no incentive to consider the evidence." 15 3 "Judges are
elected, jurors are votes. Judges are slaves to the jury. They don't
tend to modify the jury sentence, up or down."1 54 Appellate decisions
include examples of cases in which trial judges have stated on the
record that they don't modify jury decisions, 155 and appellate courts
have found it necessary to remind trial judges that there "must be an
exercise of judgment by the trial judge in sentencing, not a mechanical
imposition of the sentence suggested by the jury in every case."'15 6
152. E.g., AR-P1-U ("Not very often."); AR-P3.U ("Never, not once in 20 years."); AR-D6-R
("Never."); AR-D5-U ("Sometimes judges deviate .... Once a jury recommended prison sentence
for a police officer and the judge changed it to probation, there was a public outcry. They can
grant probation. Very rarely does it happen-when it does it is to the advantage of those whom I
call 'system players,' like that police officer" A "Judge may modify sentence where prosecutor
insists on jury trial; of course the judge could come off the jury sentence. I've seen them do this.
One case the jury came in with several consecutive sentences, and the judge ran some of them
concurrently. That happens."); AR-J1-U ("If there is some injustice, and the jury's sentence is
way outside of the loop, a judge might change it.... but generally the judge follows the jury's
sentence.... I had a case where the jury stacked the sentence and had him serving 70 years. I
changed it to 28."); AR-J2-R ("Generally I don't [modify the jurors' recommendation of
consecutive or concurrent], I leave them alone. Unless I know a lot more about the defendant
than they do. I can't change the sentence up, but if they recommend concurrent I can run them
consecutively."); AR-J5-R ("It is difficult for me to find a basis to substitute my judgment for that
of the jury. It would be a very, very rare occurrence. The few times I have done it, the defense
attorney did such a poor job that I felt it had contributed to an unjust sentence."); AR-J3-U
("Very seldom, I've done it about 3 or 4 times in 13 years.... I never get a pre-sentence report in
jury cases. I have never been asked to order a pre-sentence report. Given the fact that I'm not
going to disturb a jury verdict, there is no need for one. If I have serious concerns about the
verdict, I will delay sentencing for some time. If the sentence seems excessive and the defendant
asks for a delay in sentencing, I will do it.").
153. AR-D7-R; see also AR-P5-R ("I've never had a judge change a jury sentence.... You give
the decision to twelve people, it would be kind of foolish to reject what they say.").
154. AR-D3-U.
155. E.g., Rodgers v. State, 71 S.W.3d 579, 580 (Ark. 2002) (reversing sentence of
imprisonment for aggravated assault because in denying defendant's motion for imposition of
probation instead of the jury's verdict of imprisonment, the judge failed to exercise discretion and
instead rubber stamped the jury's verdict, stating, "I have not gone against a jury yet and I don't
think this would be the appropriate time to start."); see also Rodgers v. State, 64 S.W.3d 275, 276
(Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (Hart, J., dissenting) (noting that this judge admitted that as a matter of
custom he imposed whatever sentence was recommended by the jury).
156. Lawhon v. State, 940 S.W. 2d 475, 476 (Ark. 1997) (citing Acklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d
594 (Ark. 1980)).
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Defense access to potentially more lenient judicial sentencing
after guilty verdict. As in Virginia and Kentucky, prosecutors in
Arkansas are reluctant to allow a defendant to opt for jury trial but
waive jury sentencing. 157  One defendant's saga illustrates how
dramatic this all-or-nothing choice can be. The defendant, facing a
charge of selling cocaine, first sought to contest guilt but avoid jury
sentencing by requesting a bench trial. After the prosecution rejected
that option, the defendant asked the judge to instruct the jury about
the recommended sentence for his offense under the guidelines-four
and one-half years, a sentence the judge was obligated by statute to
adjust to the mandatory minimum of ten years. The judge denied the
request, and the jury gave the defendant sixty years. The court of
appeals rejected the defendant's argument that his fundamental right
to trial by jury was impermissibly burdened by the prosecutorial
power to deny the defendant the option of judicial sentencing after
jury trial while denying to the jury information about guidelines
ranges. 158
The barriers erected by Arkansas prosecutors to judicial
sentencing after jury trial are not impermeable. Interviewees reported
some willingness by prosecutors to allow judicial sentencing after jury
trial, particularly in cases in which prior to sentencing the prosecutor
has lost confidence in the likelihood of a stiff jury sentence and is
willing to settle for a sentence from the judge.159  Unlike
157. See, e.g., AR-P1-U ("We don't bargain sentence after going to the trouble of trying the
case. That would be a rare event."); AR-P3-U ("Never.... When the jury has heard the evidence
and decided the guilt issue we let them determine sentence."); AR-J3-U ("Q: Do attorneys ever
try to settle after the guilty verdict but before sentencing? A: That happened once in about 400 to
500 trials."); AR-D3-U ("Waiving jury sentencing is extraordinarily rare. Prosecutors can and do
veto this ... The real problem is in the cases where I want to go to jury but the jury is more
severe than [the] guidelines. I can't tell the jury about the guidelines, and prosecutor vetoes [the]
waiver of jury sentencing and fights us telling juries about guidelines. It serves as a penalty on
the jury trial right."); AR-D7-R ("Some judges won't allow a plea once a jury is called in. I have
never had a guilty verdict and then settled the sentencing phase, I suppose it could be done.").
158. Pickett v. State, 902 S.W.2d 208 (Ark. 1995).
159. See, e.g., AR-P2-R ("If the jury is out for a long time, and it's hard for them to reach
agreement, or if they come back with a lesser, after a long trial or long deliberation, rather than
have a day long sentencing hearing, we may agree to a sentence.... Usually we'll just agree to a
low sentence, it's worth it to save the trouble."); AR-D5-U ("When they come back with a guilty
verdict, every so often we waive jury sentencing and let the judge do it .... Last time was a girl
convicted of being an accessory to robbery. The jury was likely to give her too harsh a sentence.
But the prosecutor didn't want to take the chance of creating error when he could avoid it so we
let the judge sentence her. Q: Why would the prosecutor forego jury sentencing? A: Might be a
timing thing, not wanting to spend the time, or risk jury recommending probation."); AR-D6-R
(One attorney had never waived jury sentencing himself, but noted "other lawyers have. They
might agree to a sentence recommendation .... The prosecutor may have a reasonable feel for
what the case is worth and may be comfortable with that. Or he may be worried about jury
sentencing."); AR-J1-U ("Infrequently there will be a sentence agreement. Actually, once the jury
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Commonwealth's attorneys in some urban jurisdictions in Kentucky,
however, prosecutors in Arkansas reportedly are not so confident in
their bargaining power or eager to avoid the burdens of appellate
review that they condition the opportunity to obtain lower judicial
sentencing upon a defendant's promise to waive the right to appeal.
Defense access to more lenient sentencing through bench trials.
In at least some communities in Arkansas, trial judges refuse to
conduct bench trials in felony cases, a practice that restricts further
the defendant's access to potentially lower judicial sentences. 160 One
interviewee reported, for example: "No bench trials in this county.
Not with this judge. He was elected about ten years ago. If you want
a trial, you use a jury."161 Some judges admit they discourage bench
trials by imposing stiff sentences:
A: Out of 2,000 felonies each year, we have maybe 50 jury trials, 10 bench trials. Not a
lot of felony bench trials.
Q: Why?
A: Because I try to discourage them.
Q: How?
A: By handing down sentences that are within the guidelines, but at the upper end.
Q: What's the rationale for discouraging bench trials?
A: To encourage settlement. Right now we have 2000 new felony cases, plus another
500 revocation cases and 250 civil cases. It's a matter of judicial economy. 162
Even where judges are not as aggressive in discouraging bench
trials with their sentencing decisions, Arkansas defenders, like those
in Kentucky, may be wary of a trial by an elected judge where the
is impaneled, I'm still open while a trial is in progress to the possibility that the parties will
settle. Sometimes when juries having trouble agreeing it happens."); see also Armer v. State, 929
S.W.2d 705, 707 (Ark. 1996) (defendant waived jury sentencing with consent of prosecutor and
judge in drug case; court noted that although the defendant made no record of the reason for
waiving jury sentencing, "the reason may have been that indicated in oral argument, that the
trial judge did not ordinarily send first-time drug offenders to prison"); Seth Blomeley, Ex-officer
Gets Probation in Fratricide Family's Letters, Reduced Manslaughter Charge Noted in Judge's
Ruling, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 1999, at Bi (after jury convicted defendant of lesser
offense and victims pleaded for light sentence, prosecutor allowed judge to sentence defendant).
160. Some judges continue to rely on the prosecutor's recommendation even when there is a
bench trial so that the prosecutor's recommendation rather than judge's independent judgment is
the rule. See, e.g., AR-J4-R ("Q: Do you have bench trials? A: Yes, but usually at the conclusion of
the trial, the attorneys will recommend a sentence and point out where it is on the guidelines.").
161. AR-D1-U.
162. AR-J3-U.
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chances of acquittal are extremely low. 163 Nevertheless, bench trials
are more frequent in Arkansas than in Kentucky. Interviewees
reported resource constraints as the explanation. Admitted one
prosecutor, "[W]e've got some judges who sit only 52 days [not weeks]
a year. So we can't try many [cases] .... We use [bench trials] to move
some of the less serious cases, not the homicides, robberies, rapes."164
Even in some urban jurisdictions, bench trials are used to move cases.
Reported one defender, "Prosecutors here don't mind bench trials, they
look at it as sort of a slow plea of guilty. Most prosecutors are not that
hot to trot to get king size sentences, they weren't bent out of shape if
we wanted a bench trial. May be different with other prosecutors."' 165
Defense access to potentially more lenient judicial sentencing
through "open" guilty pleas. Recall that in Virginia the right to plead
guilty to the offense charged is protected by the state's constitution,
giving the defendant ready access to lower guidelines sentences when
a stiff jury sentence looks likely. In Arkansas, as in Kentucky, the
prosecutor has the right to insist on a jury trial even when the
defendant would prefer to plead guilty as charged and argue for a
lower sentence from a judge. 166 This allows prosecutors in Arkansas,
163. One attorney who reported trying only two bench trials in twenty-one years noted,
"Normally, a judge will find guilt and be more lenient at sentencing.... A defendant will not
receive the benefit of reasonable doubt with 99 percent of judges." AR-D5-U; see also AR-D3-U
("Certain types of cases still go to a jury, identification cases, self-defense cases, always have a
better chance of acquittal before a jury regardless of the risk of a higher sentence,").
164. AR-P2-R; see also AR-P1-U ("It's a physical impossibility to try more jury trials. [We
already try] about all we can do. Defense attorneys recognize this, a case will have a ratchet up,
say sex offenses, because of the jury, and the defense may ask for a bench trial, we'll consent to
that.").
165. AR-D3-U; see also AR-D4-R (Bench trials "have become more and more frequent here. I
think it's the guidelines, judges here sentence by the guidelines."); AR-D6-U ("There are cases
where the prosecutor won't agree to a bench trial [but] we can have 5 bench trials in a week.
They may be more willing to do this here, I'm sure it raises the bench trial rate."); AR-J5-R
("Judges like me believe in finding alternatives to the penitentiary. Defense attorneys and
prosecutors know what my history and background is and they ask for a bench trial then. They
don't know what's going to happen, but here's a person who believes in the need to look at other
alternatives for drugs, for example .... I do not try many bench trials at the felony level. Quite a
few judges do. When we do have a bench trial, the defendant will want the judge to sentence
rather than the jury. The prosecutor and the defendant can't agree, the defendant may have
prior offenses. Something that would make sentencing before a jury more risky than sentencing
before a judge ... defendants are generally not looking for acquittal when they choose bench
trial. Their client is guilty, or they are certain their client is guilty, and they expect conviction.
What they are looking for is the judge's sentence rather than the jury's. Q: Do judges after bench
trials stick with the guidelines in sentencing? A: Not necessarily. Deviations must be
reported .... But judges after bench trials should follow them.").
166. See State v. Singleton, 13 S.W.3d 584, 585-86 (Ark. 2000) (prosecutor has veto power to
block a plea of guilty); State v. Vasquez-Aerreola, 940 S.W.2d 451, 456-57 (Ark. 1997) (Arnold, J.,
concurring) ("Under the present Rule 31.1, a prosecutor could demand that a defendant accept
the plea bargain offered, or force him to be tried by a jury . . . . [A] better rule would be to allow
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as in Kentucky, to effectively shut out judges-and the sentencing
guidelines-from the sentencing process. The defendant is left with
the choice of either the sentence the prosecution is offering as part of
the deal, or the sentence the defendant might receive at a jury trial.167
The price of any given offense, then, is set by the jury and the
prosecutor, rendering judicial sentence norms and the guidelines
largely meaningless.
A prosecutor explained, "Occasionally you'll have a defendant
who'll want to plead open, we won't let him, and will insist on a jury
trial, but in some of these, it's because the guidelines would be so far
off the mark."168 An Arkansas appellate judge, reluctantly joining an
opinion rejecting a defendant's objection to this arrangement,
complained that state law creates "a dual criminal justice system that
provides unfettered discretion to the government to select those
criminal defendants who should be exposed to greater punishments
and those defendants who should be exposed to lesser punishments," a
process that she predicted "will deprive individuals of personal
liberties and can result in a vast difference in the sentence imposed by
the jury and the court."169 This stranglehold on the price of
punishment can be expensive for a prosecutor to maintain. A
prosecutor simply cannot veto all open pleas and bench trials and
insist on jury trial instead-it is too costly. Instead, this seems to be a
correction mechanism that prosecutors resort to selectively.1 70
the accused to enter a plea of guilty to the court, while permitting recommendations from the
prosecutor regarding [the] sentence."); State v. Smittie, 20 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Ark. 2000)
(Thornton, J., concurring) ("By these precedents, we are invalidating the forms prepared by our
Administrative Office of the Courts, and distributed for many years to all trial judges, containing
the statement that 'if you are guilty you may plead guilty, and the court will decide your
sentence.' This instruction ... while flying in the face of our recent decisions, remains a
reasonable statement of what the law should be . . . . The prosecutor's right to veto a waiver of
trial by jury under Rule 31.1 should be limited to the penalty phase."); see also Comment,
Pleading Guilty in Arkansas: A Journey Down the Rabbit's Hole, 55 ARK. L. REV. 401, 402 (2002)
('The effect of giving prosecutors this choice is that the prosecution can force a defendant to
receive his sentence from a jury.").
167. See, e.g., AR-P5-R ("Q: [C]ould defendants plead guilty and get a guidelines sentence? A:
Not really, the judge will follow our recommendation. We have very few open pleas without a
sentence recommendation from the prosecutor.").
168. AR-P2-R.
169. Hutcherson v. State, 47 S.W.3d 267, 273-74 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (Hart, J., concurring).
170. See, e.g., AR-P2-R ("We see more unconditional pleas. Defendants think that judges will
follow the grids, so they will reject an offer and go for that .... While in Little Rock they may
have six judges to try cases, fifty-two weeks a year, we've got some judges who sit only fifty-two
days a year. So we can't try many of 'em."); AR-D3-U ("Prosecutors are making decent offers,
they are pretty responsible. The courts are so crowded that they can't realistically threaten
trial."); AR-D6-R ("When two judges cover six counties, there is about one week every three
months set aside for trials. We have a part time prosecutor and part time public defender. It
limits the number of trials-prosecutor has to select the six or so cases per year he wants to try.
2004] 937
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:3:885
Even with selective use of their plea veto, however, prosecutors
reportedly are able to persuade defendants to accept plea offers with
sentences well above the recommended guidelines sentence. In many
communities in Arkansas, the guidelines mean very little.
Q: So you still make offers over the guidelines range?
A: Oh sure. The guidelines represent a bare minimum sentence. They were set up to
represent what the majority of people in the penitentiary already had-most had pled
guilty, and the sentences reflect offers made to move the cases. The grids are not the
appropriate sentence, they reflect the need to move cases, the limited number of cases
you can actually try. 
17 1
Said another,
I haven't looked at that book in years. We don't really pay any attention to it... you
have to mark a reason for departing from the guidelines sentence, but there are sixteen
reasons, and then a blank for "other".... Very seldom does the jury come in for less
[than what we've offered], a lot of cases they'll hit right on the same sentence we've
offered.172
Prosecutors can be confident that judges will not disturb their
sentencing recommendations. Judges "typically go along with"
recommended sentences after plea agreements. 173
He can't threaten to take them all to trial. We get really good deals because nobody has the time
to push for trial."); AR-D4-R ("A guy gets an offer of twenty-four months (he'll serve three) or go
to trial and have to serve eighteen months before his appeal on a good issue is heard. A felony is
like a traffic ticket to these guys. But the main thing, of course is the numbers. The number of
cases, you can't take every case to jury trial. The court system couldn't do it. You have to pick
your strongest cases.").
171. AR-P2-R. Said one defender, the grids are "never mentioned during bargaining... I
never look at them." AR-D1-U. Another said, "[Airound here [they] are complete baloney...
meaningless" although "around the state, there were some places where the guidelines did make
a difference .... Occasionally the judge will follow them, and use it as a justification for what he
does..." AR-D3-U; see also AR-D7-R ("Like anything new, the sentencing grid was met by
resistance by some. In some instances, prosecutors resisted because they thought the sentences
were too light, others liked it because they had been offering less and felt they were now justified
in offering higher sentences in negotiated plea situations. Defense attorneys were the same. I,
personally, liked the grid because our prosecutor offered more severe sentences as a rule. Others
didn't because they could argue for lesser sentences and got those offers in their counties. One of
our prosecutors offers the grid routinely. There has to be something serious ... to deviate; the
drug prosecutor seldom goes by the sentencing grid.., always higher."); AR-J1-U ("Q: How
about the guidelines-do you use them? A: For the most part no. My probation officers prepare
the PSR-I'll have them do it even after a jury sentence-and they'll use the guidelines but
they're not beholden to them, I'm not either.").
172. AR-P5-R.
173. AR-P1-U. One judge noted that he has departed from negotiated pleas "two dozen times
in the past 28 years. Most of these, that I reject, they don't come back. The vast majority of them
the court accepts. They are mostly first offenders and the sentences are within the guidelines.
Kind of traditional to accept those." AR-J-R; see also id. ("99 percent of the settlement
negotiations I approve .... The attorneys will present the agreement to me, and typically I'll
approve it. If I don't, it usually ends up in a jury trial. This is my mode of operation.... Q: So are
there any cases where the defendant will simply plead guilty and let you set the sentence
2004 FELONY JURY SENTENCING IN PRACTICE 939
4. Summary of Statistical Analysis
The Arkansas statistics once again mirrored the observations
of practitioners. The interviews suggested that jury sentencing as
administered in Arkansas is perceived most consistently as a trial
penalty in drug cases. Our preliminary analysis of the data indeed
showed that, when comparing sentences for narcotics offenses imposed
after jury trial with those imposed for the same offense after bench
trial, average jury trial sentences were significantly higher than
average bench trial sentences, and this effect remained even after
regression analysis controlling for factors associated with case
seriousness. 174 The sentencing differential between the two types of
trials was not significant for several other serious offenses, such as
robbery, battery, and rape.
5. The Consequence: Prosecutors Favor Jury Sentencing
Arkansas prosecutors believe that a significant differential
between high jury sentences and low judicial sentences is deterring
defendants from opting for jury trial. The statistics do not necessarily
back up this perception for some nondrug crimes; other reasons, such
without the prosecutor making a recommendation? A: Very few. The sentence is part of the
agreement. It is rare when there isn't a negotiated plea. But the defendant is told that the
sentencing is not set in stone and that the court will impose a sentence. Q: But you generally
approve these? A: Right. Q: So very little independent power exercised by judges in sentencing-
the sentence is recommended either as a jury verdict or as part of the negotiated plea? A: Right.
Q: Except in bench trials? A: Yes."); AR-J1-U ("Mostly I go along with plea bargains; when I first
came in I didn't follow them as much and I think my sentencing was an aberration. I came from
a constituency that felt drug sentences were too high, and I felt comfortable deviating from the
deals. I was appealed to the Supreme Court a great deal. But we have adjusted, I've adjusted
some, the prosecutor has. Some judges, I think, have taken another look at it because of my
sentencing, you know we're all in the same district and don't want to give the impression that
some judges are unnecessarily harsh."); AR-D7-R ("If judges start rejecting plea agreements in
mass, they are asking for a lot more work, because prosecutors will stop making offers and
telling defense attorneys to plead to the court. That will back up dockets considerably because
presentence reports might be required for court sentencing.").
One amusing description was offered by a cynical prosecutor:
Usually if the judge bucks at a recommendation it's a posturing thing, they don't have
to move these cases, they don't care, so they'll look out at the people in the courtroom
and say, "Well, I'm really reluctant to accept such a lenient plea offer, really this
despicable behavior deserves something more serious than this, but the prosecutor
tells me it is important to approve this to get him behind bars. When I was a
prosecutor I certainly wouldn't agree to something like this... blah blah blah."
AR-P2-R.
174. See King & Noble, supra note 6. The average sentence for possession with intent to
deliver after bench trial was about one-third the average jury trial sentence; possession of drug
paraphernalia bench trial sentences averaged one-half the length of jury trial sentences for the
same offense. Id.
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as the unpredictability of a jury's sentence, may drive defendants
away from jury trials. Nevertheless, because many Arkansas
prosecutors seem to believe jury sentencing is a hammer useful for
obtaining guilty pleas, they worry about what would serve as a
substitute if jury sentencing was abolished.
Q: Couldn't your grid factor in cooperation-give a sentencing discount for quick
admissions, etc. Go to trial, get one sentence, admit guilt, get a sweeter deal?
A: Well the problem with that is that the grids are really based on pleas already. They
are already getting the sweetened deal. Now they get it only if willing to plead early. If
no jury sentencing, [you'll] get access to the sweet deal no matter what you do .... As it
is, the jury doesn't get the grid, and it works. You couldn't really do it by changing the
grids, can't really put a price on trial.
1 75
Said one judge, "prosecuting attorneys are bitterly opposed to [judge
sentencing] ... I think they feel like they can get more out of a jury.
When we tried to change to judge sentencing, our Chief Justice was
afraid the whole judicial article would fail because of opposition to it,
so we dropped it. ' ' 176
III. JURY SENTENCING AND TRIAL JUDGES
The foregoing discussion focused on prosecutors and the basis
of their support for jury sentencing in each of the three states. This
next section examines judicial perceptions of jury sentencing. Based
on the interviews, judicial allegiance to jury sentencing can be
summed up with three words: deference, dodge, and docket. Together,
these concerns help to explain why judges in Kentucky and Arkansas
so seldom modify jury sentences, why judges in the same two states
seem to shun bench trials or open pleas that would require them to
exercise their own sentencing discretion rather than approve the
sentencing choices of either the jury or the prosecutor, and why most
of the judges interviewed in all three states oppose the abolition of
jury sentencing.
175. AR-P2-R; see also AR-P1-U (When asked if he'd heard of any efforts to modify jury
sentencing in Arkansas, this prosecutor replied, "No, if they did I'd probably go in with a good
horror story of child molestation or murder, they'd listen. I'm talking about the victims of crime
now. Victim impact helps some, but the system still fails them, the victims, more than anybody
else."); AR-P5-R ("No one wants to face your peers. That's why most of them plead guilty. They
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A. Deference
Judges in Kentucky and Arkansas overwhelmingly considered
the jury a superior assessor of the appropriate punishment due
individual offenders. 177 Even in Virginia, where judicial support for
jury sentencing is less pervasive, judges recognized the norm-setting
value of jury sentencing. Said one judge,
[T]he more important reason to support jury sentencing is its leveling effect on judges.
The perception of the prosecutor is that the judges are too lenient, and most people
probably think judges are more lenient, but not always. The jury keeps them in line.
And it can work both ways. Let's say you have a judge who is really severe, a defendant
would opt for the jury in that situation. Would have a leveling effect. What supporters




But there is much more at work here than respect for the jury
as decision maker, however sincere. Judges have a vested interest in
jury sentencing: the jury takes the heat for sentencing so the judge
does not have to. Should a judge dare to reduce a jury's sentence, his
decision becomes fodder for editorial comment or even criticism by the
(also elected) prosecutor. "I'm very disappointed that the jury's
sentence, the sentence decided by the citizens.., was not followed" by
the judge, a Little Rock prosecutor was quoted as stating, in an article
entitled, "Judge Cuts 7 Years Off Jury's Sentence in LR Man's
Trial. ' 179 Judges facing election generally don't welcome this sort of
attention.
177. See, e.g., AR-J2-R ('The jury knows everything about the defendant that I know. They
find out his criminal record, they hear the victim impact evidence, they hear the evidence of the
crime during trial just like I have. I go along with their collective judgment."); AR-J1-U
("Generally the judge follows the jury's sentence. They are the citizens speaking for the
conscience of the community."); AR-J3-U ("Juries do a good job with most of these cases in this
circuit. It is important to defer to the jury of twelve citizens in that a jury's sentencing verdict
will usually reflect appropriate punishment within the community for certain criminal
conduct."); KY-J4-U ("The downside of jury sentencing is that it is more cumbersome. It would be
easier, more efficient to let the courts just do it. But I sort of like the idea of the jury hearing
more information and then recommending a sentence within the legislatively prescribed range.
Juries have a pretty good sense of what is fair .... It seems to work well for us."); AR-J5-R
("Sentencing is literally power over liberty. The people should have that power. I believe that the
choice of submitting the sentencing decision to the people should belong to the defendant, and to
the prosecution. Otherwise it concentrates too much power in the hands of the government.").
178. VA-J2-R.
179. Traci Shurley, Judge Cuts 7 Years off Jury's Sentence in LR Man's Trial-Drug
Offender Eligible for Boot Camp, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Dec 8, 2001, at B2. On the high
electoral salience of crime, see Sara Sun Beale, Selling Fear: The News Media's Coverage of
Crime and Why it Matters (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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As Justice Scalia recently noted, "elected judges... always face
the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings
and therefore vote them off the bench."'80  The judges themselves
reported that this affects other judges:
Judges probably don't reduce jury sentences because they are afraid of the
interpretation by the public that they are soft. This shouldn't be a concern, but with
elections it is. Politics plays a role in sentencing decisions inevitably, in the sense that
sentencing is supposed to deter others from committing crime, and judges pay attention
to that ... there are times when I think we'd get more cases resolved with judges
sentencing, other times that I appreciate jury sentencing, it is easier to explain a
sentence by saying that was what the community thinks this case is worth. 
1 8 1
180. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002); see also id. at 789
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not
satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects." (citing
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the
Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1995)); Mark
A. Behrens & Casy Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for
State Court Judges, 11 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 273, 283 (2002) (1998 study sponsored by Texas
Supreme Court found that 83 percent of Texas adults, 69 percent of court personnel, and 79
percent of attorneys believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions "very
significantly" or "fairly significantly." Even 48 percent of Texas judges confessed that they
believed money had an impact on judicial decisions.); Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A
Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1017 (concluding that because judges cannot
decide capital cases in a consistent manner without fear of public persecution, politics play a role
in judicial decisions to override a jury's decision to spare a defendant's life); ALFRED P. CARLTON,
JR., AM. BAR ASS'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST
CENTURY JUDICIARY 25-26 (2003) (collecting anecdotal reports of attacks during judicial races on
judges for being soft on crime); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and
Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247 (2004). But cf. John
Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An
Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1999) (reviewing anecdotal evidence of the influence of
partisan elections on the decisions of appellate judges asked to review death sentences, but
finding no statistically significant relationship between the method of judicial selection and the
rate at which an appellate court reverses sentences of death).
181. KY-J6-U; see also AR-J1-U (stating that elections "could make a difference to some
judges in deciding whether to alter sentences. We're elected from different constituencies. To
probate or suspend a sentence is probably more acceptable to my particular constituency than it
might be to the voters in other districts. In other districts, where voters are not dissatisfied with
steep sentences, judges may be more sensitive to that."); AR-J5-R ("Q: Those cases in which
judges do change jurors' sentences, how do the jurors react? How does the public react? A: The
jurors do learn about it. It depends upon how the press treats it. Most jurors understand that
when a judge adjusts a sentence, that change is based upon some information the judge has that
they were not allowed to learn. But if the media picks up on it and does what they usually do,
make it controversial, it can leave the impression that the judge acted without a good reason.
Leaves the public unsettled about it. Q: Has this happened to you? A: Yes, it has. Q: How do you
counteract this? A: You can't. It is a matter of long-term politics. If those things end up on the
front page just before elections it can be devastating, and judges will try to act accordingly. Q:
You mean judges will be less likely to adjust sentences right before elections? A: That's right. But
there aren't many sentences adjusted. Very seldom will it occur."); id. ("[Judges] do act different
about sentencing close to elections and in high-profile cases."); VA-P4-R ("I think that they like
jury sentencing because they are not responsible then for the decision that's made in the case.").
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Said another, "[A] lot of judges like jury sentencing. They don't want
to be bothered with it, takes the heat off of 'em."'8 2
In Virginia, where judges are selected and reappointed by the
legislature and need not undergo popular elections, avoiding the
exposure that sentencing brings seemed to be much less of a concern
for trial judges. Indeed, the political incentives in Virginia appeared
to be aligned in favor of encouraging judges to impose lower sentences
within the guidelines, rather than to demonstrate a "tough on crime"
attitude for public consumption.18 3 Nevertheless, responses suggested
that judges have concluded that deferring to the jury's sentence is
useful for maintaining a positive reputation in the community. 8 4
182. AR-J4-R; see also AR-J3-U ("The press and people like to pick on lenient liberal judges
when they come in below jury sentences. Q: Ever happen to you? A: Not really, but then I live in
a progressive part of the state. I'm not saying the rest of the state is not progressive, but it may
be more a problem elsewhere."); AR-J2-R ("I wouldn't be adverse to [judicial sentencing], but I'm
not a big proponent of it. A lot of judges would probably resist it because it's gonna turn up the
heat on 'em, especially in the smaller communities ... out here in the hinterlands of Arkansas,
people tend to get bent out of shape at the juries-if judges were doing the sentencing, then
they'd really hear about it. Q: What kinds of things do people get bent out of shape about at
juries? A: In child molestation, rape cases, they don't like what the jury does. Q: They complain
about the sentence? Too low or too high? A: Too low, can't get too high for these folks in those
cases."); AR-J5-R ("I always try bench trials, when requested. I don't turn them down. Q: Are
some judges afraid of them? A: Yes, because they can be very controversial cases with emotions
running high on both sides. Controversial for the defendant and the defendant's family;
controversial for the victim and the victim's family. So as a political consideration some judges
will not take bench trial, if they decide they don't want to take the heat."); AR-J1-U ("On some
matters I don't want to do the sentencing and I'm glad they do. Q: Why? A: I'm not sure, I have
mixed emotions about some cases, I'm glad to have twelve members of the community, twelve
people who bring that community sense. I can live with what they do."); KY-J4-U ("I like juries.
I'm surprised we're in the minority, on this, that more states don't use jury sentencing. Maybe
it's because this is the only way I've ever done it. They make all the hard decisions, and I can call
the balls and strikes."). Attorneys see this as well. See, e.g., AR-D5-U ("Sometimes judges
deviate.... Once a jury recommended prison sentence for a police officer and the judge changed
it to probation, there was a public outcry. Q: Why not more often? A: The judge is not going to
alienate voters .. "); AR-D4-R ("Let's be honest, we have elected judges and they don't want
that publicity-'Jury said 10 years, but the judge says only 5.' ").
183. See supra notes 105-106.
184. E.g., VA-J3-U ("Judges are reluctant to modify that sentence. I only did it once that I
can remember, less than five times in all my years on the bench. Why didn't I modify more often?
Because they are the conscience of the community. Q: What would happen if you did [modify]? A:
There'd be outcry. Q: But you aren't elected. A: We are elected by the legislature for eight-year
terms. Anybody can contest your election; can appear before the legislature and testify against
you. Happens sometimes. Not modifying is a local legal culture."); VA-J1-U ("Q: How often do you
change jury sentences? A: Doesn't happen that often. Some judges are reluctant to do it because
they would get bad publicity, and because that was not the way it was done for years. This is a
fairly new thing. Q: What kind of bad publicity, being soft on crime? A: Yes.... [Take] a case
involving just a little bit of cocaine, and somebody had asked the defendant where he could get
some and he had only referred that person to somebody else, it's usually not just to give the guy
twelve years for that. I have to take it down to 7-12 months to be within the guidelines, and
that's tough to do. The same case in some of those other states that have jury sentences where
the judges are elected, it would be even tougher. I would hate jury sentencing if I was elected by
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Indeed, at least one judge from a non-jury sentencing state recently
suggested that, "jury sentencing would provide for judges a welcome
respite from a morally uncomfortable chore." 18 5
C. Docket
Judges, like prosecutors, share the view that jury sentencing
helps to move cases. Said one judge from Kentucky:
Judges have the attitude, "Fine, if you want a trial, you are stuck with the jury's
sentence and you won't be eligible for squat." It's a judicial management thing, to
encourage plea bargaining.. . Although in some places they can try eight cases at a
time, here in the real world judges travel between counties and from a management
standpoint it makes sense.
18 6
Comments from Virginia interviewees also suggested that opposition
to the abolition of jury sentencing in recent years came not only from
prosecutors, but also from trial judges themselves. Trial judges have
expressed concern that without the prospect of more severe sentences
by juries, plea rates would go down and the jury trial rates would
become overwhelming.1 8 7 Explained one defender, in his circuit, trial
judges have never modified a jury sentence, "Because they don't want
to encourage us to have jury trials, they don't want us to think that if
it goes wrong it will be fixed."188
In Kentucky, judges also admitted that the appeal waivers that
urban prosecutors secure in exchange for a defendant's agreement to
forego jury sentencing are quite valuable, as well. Explaining why
judges routinely accept such deals, one judge stated, "although the
popular election. It would be really tough .. "); VA-P3-R ( "[T]here are some cases where I'm
sure that they are happy to pass it off to the juries. We had a judge who insisted on a jury trial
for every sex abuse case. He didn't want to make the call on credibility and he didn't want to
weigh all the factors in sentencing."); see also VA-P5-R ("Locally, [judges] think jury sentencing
is a good thing. It gives them a comfort level. Say you have a case that turns you every which
way but loose, for instance, a guy with a perfect record catches his wife with another man, or
misunderstands something and kills somebody. The victim's family is terrifically upset. The
media's all over it. Leaders of the community are talking about it. It is nice to be able to say,
'Let's let twelve men and women decide what to do.'.. . Juries tend to get it right.").
185. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 994-95.
186. KY-JI-R.
187. VA-J2-R ("A: The net result of all this is that there are very, very few jury trials. Q: How
do judges react to that? A: Well, it's a pretty efficient method. I don't know what would happen if
jury sentencing was eliminated. The fear is that everybody would ask for a jury trial since there
would be nothing to lose. That is the practical reason..."); see also Wright & Miller, supra note
40, at 40 (collecting sources, and stating that because of caseload pressures, "sentencing judges
tend to validate and encourage bargains through a 'plea discount' (or a trial penalty): They
impose lighter sentences on those who waive their right to trial"). On the motives of judges in
case disposition, see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1099-1103 (1976).
188 VA-D7-U.
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sentencing phase is relatively short, the benefit of no future post
judgment appeals is very attractive."'1 8 9
D. The Result: Judicial Acceptance of Jury as Sentencer
In brief, judges reportedly defer to jurors' assessments of
punishment because they believe that trust in the verdict by both
public and victim is enhanced if the jury's verdict remains unchanged,
because they fear the public's reaction if they disturb jury sentences,
and because they consider jury sentences to be effective deterrents to
jury trial and would prefer that defendants plead guilty or select a
bench trial rather than insist on a jury trial. Judges are not rallying
to take over sentencing authority in these states. Only one of the
Kentucky judges interviewed would favor a change to judge
sentencing. 190 A survey of judges present at the Kentucky Supreme
Court's Jury Summit in June, 2002, administered by the Kentucky
Supreme Court's Jury Task Force, indicated that judges were
generally not in favor of shifting from jury sentencing to judge
sentencing. 191 In Arkansas, where judges are more accustomed to
sentencing after open pleas and bench trials than they are in
Kentucky, one judge spoke favorably of abolishing jury sentencing
because of its "inconsistency,"'192 while the rest interviewed praised
189. KY-J6-U. Consider also the comments of the trial judge in Runyon v. Commonwealth,
29 Va. App. 573 (1999), rejecting the defendant's request to reduce the jury's sentence in a drug
case to probation (the recommended sentence under the guidelines), stating "Counsel are aware
this Court did not try the defendant. She put her faith in the hands of a jury of her peers .... If
the defendant rushed the sentencing Court .... Then perhaps she should have put her faith in
the hands of the Court."
190. KY-J1-R ("It's not very efficient, it is not an efficient use of our time if we have the
authority to undermine what they do. I would do judicial sentencing, with the minimum and
maximum statutory range and all of the information from the presentence report. I would
certainly recommend it if we had a corrections program other than a penitentiary with no
education, if we had meaningful drug treatment, sex offender treatment-judicial sentencing
would be mandated by the notion of [rehabilitation]. Q: Why couldn't a jury do that? A: They
wouldn't.").
191. Survey results provided by G. Thomas Munsterman; available from author.
192. AR-J3-U ("I'm not a fan of jury sentencing.... It's inconsistent. Here the sentences are
all within reason. We don't have so-called runaway jury verdicts here, but there's an
inconsistency and it affects predictability. Judges are better suited to impose consistent
sentences. . . . If you changed [to judge sentencing] there would sure to be some complaints
because we've done it this way since the earth cooled. I'm sure you'd have some complaints when
the court imposed a sentence different than what the jurors would have thought appropriate...
[Years ago on a state commission] I was a lone voice in a group of about 20 other people. Only
one other judge there agreed with me about abolishing jury sentencing. I brought it up and it
was voted down every time... The majority position was that jury sentencing had worked well
over the years. Law enforcement and the legislators were opposed to it as well. They argued the
people wouldn't like it .... I never got a logical or rational explanation for this. Most every other
state and the federal system use judge sentencing and it's worked pretty well everywhere else.
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it.193 The most ambivalence about jury sentencing was reported by
judges from Virginia. Several Virginia judges considered the
sentencing differential between jury trial sentences and guidelines
sentences to be unfair.194 The sampling of judicial opinion here is tiny,
but one pattern is predictable: the more directly judges perceive their
careers to depend upon popular opinion, the greater their
apprehension about taking on more responsibility for sentencing.
IV. JURY SENTENCING AND DEFENDERS
As one might expect, many defenders in all three states
despised jury sentencing because of its effect on the right to jury trial.
"I prefer judge sentencing in noncapital cases," said a Kentucky
defender. "We hope the judge would have experience in dealing with
defendant after defendant to know more about the human element
than juries. Definitely want juries in guilt phase, they are more likely
to acquit, but get punitive in sentencing." 195 Defense attorneys in
Arkansas, reported a defender from that state, "are maybe 50 percent
for 50 percent against [switching to judge sentencing]. Depends on the
judge. Say if they knew and trusted their judge, probably for it."196 A
Virginia defender summed up the attitude of the defense bar
concerning jury sentencing this way: "[C]lients ought not to have their
right to a jury trial chilled by the prospect of getting hammered by a
jury sentence."' 97
Why don't we give it a try? A judge will know more about the defendant and about sentencing
and have more expertise. I've struggled with this for years. I still don't know what an
appropriate sentence is. You look at Germany and a defendant charged with attempted murder
of a tennis player gets four years over there; we send drug offenders away for much longer terms.
At least with our grids we can have some predictability and consistency.").
193. See supra notes 177, 182 (quoting judges from Arkansas).
194. See, e.g., VA-J1-U ("Q: Do judges like jury sentencing? Do they prefer it over judge
sentencing? A: No, because sometimes the sentences are unjust. Q: Can you give me some
examples? A: A multiple charge, multiple conviction case where the jury comes in much lower
than the guidelines. Or to the contrary, a case involving just a little bit of cocaine, and somebody
had asked the defendant where he could get some and he had only referred that person to
somebody else, it's usually not just to give the guy 12 years for that. I have to take it down to 7-
12 months to be within the guidelines, and that's tough to do."); VA-J2-R ("Probably the official
position is that there ought to be judge sentencing, not jury sentencing. But I think individual
judges don't feel strongly about it. . . . I would guess that the official position of [the Judicial
Council] would be to abolish jury sentencing and have judge sentencing. But it is a soft position,
not a very firm one. I have myself sort of mixed feelings on it. If I had to vote on it today I'd vote
to abolish it."); VA-J4-U ("Most judges would prefer not to have the jury sentence. Q: Why? A:
Judges would have more information about the defendant and the occurrence from a presentence
report. The sentencing by the court would be more objective.").
195. KY-D5-U.
196. AR-J4-R.
197. VA-D5-R. Another explained,
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Nevertheless, there was considerable support for jury
sentencing from the defense bar in each of the three states,
particularly in Kentucky and Arkansas. Three reasons stood out.
First, some defenders in Kentucky and Arkansas seemed convinced
that the alternative to jury sentencing-sentencing by elected
judges-would be even worse for defendants. Defenders in these
states conditioned their support for judicial sentencing upon changing
the method of judicial selection. "I've had too many terrible judges to
want judge sentencing. Theoretically, it would work, with limited
structure, such as non-mandatory guidelines, so long as it was
calibrated to prison resources and the judges weren't elected." 198
Second, defenders in Kentucky and Arkansas also reported
that jury sentencing can work to the defendant's advantage if the
jurors learn during the guilt phase of the prospect of a stiff minimum
sentence and decide to acquit as a result. In other words, the juror's
knowledge of the sentence may give defendants a chance at jury
nullification in some cases. 199 In Kentucky, during voir dire before the
A: We ought to go to the federal system of jury assessing guilt and innocence and the
judge setting the sentence. Not the federal system of mandatory guidelines, but the
judge setting the sentence. That would be better than what we have now....
Q: If the guidelines controlled, what would be the incentive not to opt for a jury trial
every time?
A: That's just it, there would be none anymore, and everybody would want jury trial,
which is probably why it won't happen.... If we did get rid of jury sentencing maybe
we'd have the free choice of the jury, which is what we should have. I think the
legislature would have to come up with something to counteract that if it was to
happen.
VA-D1-R.
198. KY-D4-R; see also KY-P5-R ("I don't think [defense attorneys would] like [judicial
sentencing] either. For a different set of reasons. More than 50 percent of the judges are former
prosecutors. Defense attorneys are afraid of that, they look at the potential political pressure
having the other result, with judges being harsher. Take this case I mentioned earlier, where the
judge probated a child abuser. There were eighty letters to the editor about that case, puts some
pressure on them."); KY-D1-U ("I'd keep jury sentencing, it is better than the alternative.... It
is much fairer to go before jury; better than guidelines (those are an abomination)-you can still
get some sympathy from the jury."); KY-D4-R ("In the early 1990s there was a strong push by a
fairly broad group. Real effort to go to judge sentencing .... Both prosecutors and defense
attorneys opposed. Q: Why did defense attorneys oppose? A: Because they didn't trust elected
judges to be good sentencers. Judges can get cynical, juries can look at someone like a human
being, they are seeing him for the first time. But it can be potentially disastrous too. Because
juries can get really outraged."); AR-D3-U ("Q: Would you do away with jury sentencing if you
had the choice? A: Yes, if we could get rid of judicial elections, too.").
199. Some recent research argues that accurate information about penalties could improve
the quality of jury decisions, even in cases in which jurors do not sentence, because jurors may
sometimes decide to acquit due to misapprehensions about sentence, or convict on the false
assumption of light sentence. In a recent article, Professors Diamond and Stoffelmayer reviewed
the literature examining whether the jury's knowledge of the punishment, or knowledge that it
will be setting the punishment, affects the decision to convict or acquit or the length of a
sentence choice. The literature supports, although not uniformly, the "notion that juror decision
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guilt phase, jurors may be asked about their attitudes toward the
penalties authorized for the charged offenses, in order to insure that
each juror would consider any authorized penalty.20 0 Counsel may not,
however, urge the jury during the guilt phase to nullify and acquit
because the penalty is too severe.20 1 In Arkansas, too, the jury may
learn during voir dire of the sentencing consequences of their
decisions. 20 2 Said one judge,
There could be situations.., where the sentence is high and causes the jury to consider
delivering a not guilty verdict in order to go below the minimum range. In a rape case,
for instance, where the range is ten to forty years in Arkansas, if the case impresses the
jury as one where they'd hate to see a minimum of ten years, and at this point they are
not told anything about parole-this occasionally happens.
2 0 3
Defenders in Arkansas also expressed a fondness for jury sentencing
as a source of leniency for defendants. 20 4 Even in Virginia, one
defender reported that juries in some cases impose sentences that are
more lenient than the guidelines recommendations. 205
making is influenced by crime and penalty severity." See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari
Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining "Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt," 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 769, 780 (2000). A 1994 study had concluded that verdicts
did not vary as a function of crime or penalty severity, while another study from 1986 found that
knowledge of severe penalties led to fewer convictions only when the evidence was weakest and
that mock jurors who controlled sentences assigned more severe, not more lenient, punishments
than those who merely recommended punishments to a controlling authority. Jonathan L.
Freedman et al., Severity of Penalty, Seriousness of the Charge, and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 199 (1994); Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under
the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 14 (1986).
200. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Ky. 2001) (voir dire questioner should
"define the penalty range in terms of the possible minimum and maximum sentences for each
class of offense-i.e ... a term of imprisonment of one (1) to five (5) years for a Class D felony.").
201. Medley v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ky. 1985). For a boilerplate motion to
"Prohibit Encouraging Jury Nullification" by the defense, see ABRAMSON, supra note 53, § 29.26,
at 298.
202. One interviewee in Arkansas, however, reported that jurors did not always receive
information about the sentence range or minimum before their deliberations on guilt. AR-D4-R
("Q: Do jurors learn about penalty during voir dire? A: "Maybe you could [ask about it] in [a]
noncapital case but I never did, they don't learn.").
203. AR-J5-R . 'The defense counsel can ask about the penalty at voir dire, and if the juror
were to say, 'No I can't consider that sentence' then that juror would be excused with a challenge
for cause." Id; see also Armer v. State, 929 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Ark. 1996) (upholding trial judge's
decision to allow either side to inquire about the penalty range, but not to allow defendant to ask
questions such as, "Should drug addicts be treated differently than drug dealers?").
204. See, e.g., AR-D5-U ("Jury sentencing is a better deal for defendants. And prosecutors,
too, they can get a more harsh verdict. When it's light it is light and when it's hard it's hard.");
AR-D4-R ("I like it the way it is-jury sentencing is fine, they get the information they need.");
AR-D6-R ("On balance I would keep [jury sentencing].... I feel good about taking cases to trial
and get better sentences from the jury than the prosecutor has offered as a plea bargain. Except
drug cases. Otherwise I get better sentences from juries than the plea offers.").
205. VA-D2-U ("I love jury sentencing because I find it is easier to work with, and I can have
more impact on the jury. The jury is more honest, and less influenced than judges, when they are
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Finally, like judges, defense attorneys may actually appreciate
the leverage jury sentencing provides in settlement negotiations. 206
No defender admitted this personally, though one Virginia defender
stated:
The sad truth is, many members of the defense bar-an overwhelming majority of
criminal defense attorneys-do not like jury trials. They are time consuming, they are
expensive, and they're scary ... most attorneys want to avoid trials. I've had peers call
me and ask me to talk their clients into pleading guilty. Now I tell you this, getting back
to the guidelines, because the guidelines give them a way to get out of having to go to
jury trial. They tell their clients you'll do better under the guidelines.2 0 7
V. LESSONS FOR SENTENCING REFORMERS
In state criminal justice systems driven by politics and
budgets, jury sentencing is not simply a privilege for the accused. Its
role is much more complex. This "right" of those convicted of crime
serves as a tool, adapted by legislators, judges, and attorneys, to
provide incentives to avoid trial, to protect elected judges from
controversial sentencing decisions, and to appease constituents who
support ever higher sentences for crime but don't trust the judiciary to
impose them. Because attorneys, judges, and legislators in each of
these states apparently have come to rely on jury sentencing to
advance these interests, modification of jury sentencing policy, either
to substitute judge sentencing or to increase jury power, would face
several challenges. Before accepting a modified system, prosecutors,
for example, would demand equivalent bargaining leverage, elected
properly prepared. I trust the jury. The guidelines were written the way they were to discourage
jury trials.... I always demand a jury. Not all defense attorneys would agree with me. They
don't go to trial as much as I do. Q: Why not? A: Because they're punks. They don't have enough
confidence.... I still run across some prosecutors who will say, 'If you don't take this deal, I'll
take this to the jury.' And I give them my standard response, 'Oooh, I'll have to sleep with my
night light on I'm so scared.' I love the jury-I'm not intimidated by it. So many defense
attorneys do not do an adequate voir dire; some, to this day, never even ask one question. Not
one question. That's so incredibly stupid. Lazy people don't go to jury trial.").
206. See supra note 120. See generally Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1254-55; Richard Birke,
Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 210 n.9 (1999) (stating that
based on his experience as a prosecutor, "judges and prosecutors placed a constant and
systematic pressure on defense attorneys to make their clients plead guilty [which] led defense
attorneys to frame plea offers in ways that made the offers look better than they were-good
enough to overcome loss aversion and culminate in pleas"); id. at 239-43, 247 (collecting
authority discussing the defense attorney's incentives to agree to avoid trial); Pamela S. Karlan,
Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 583, 586 (1995) ("Given their huge
caseloads and the economic pressures for quick turnover, appointed counsel face tremendous
disincentives for thorough investigation and extensive pretrial litigation; they often survive only
by pleading a huge portion of their clientele guilty as quickly as possible."); Schulhofer, supra
note 120, at 1989-90 (defenders tend to "develop a strong priority for moving their caseloads").
207. VA-D2-U.
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judges would demand equivalent political cover, and legislators would
demand equivalent electoral appeal.
A. Barriers to the Substitution of Judge Sentencing for Jury
Sentencing
Turning first to proposals to abandon jury sentencing in favor
of judge sentencing, bargaining leverage is the first, but not the
highest, hurdle. Trial rates need not explode should judges take over
sentencing. In jurisdictions that use judge sentencing, incentives to
waive jury trials other than punishment differences, such as resource
constraints, manage to keep the jury trial rate below 10 percent.208
Preserving a trial penalty, even within a guidelines system, is
business as usual in judge-sentencing jurisdictions, 20 9 although the
existing guidelines in Arkansas and Virginia may require expensive
retooling to accommodate a systematic plea discount.
The more intractable difficulty facing jury-sentencing
abolitionists is replicating the other unique functions of jury
sentencing-protecting judges from the public and protecting the
public from judges. Sentencing by jury and the selection of judges by
popular election have a symbiotic relationship in Kentucky and
Arkansas. Jury sentencing is appreciated by the public, legislators,
and attorneys who do not trust judges to sentence fairly; judges who
are elected appreciate jury sentencing because it allows them to avoid
responsibility for sentencing. As one Kentucky judge summed up the
public's attitude about jury sentencing: "The dirtier the judge, the
better the people like it."210 Consider this from a Kentucky prosecutor:
208. Consider this comment from a Virginia defender, for example, when asked if he thought
there would be more trials if the state switched to judge sentencing: "I don't know.... We can
only have one jury trial a day. When you start setting 8 jury trials for one day, there is pressure
on the judge and the prosecutor to try and resolve some of these cases, because of the docket."
VA-D5-R; see also Stephen Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1984).
209. For the latest information on average sentences from a national sample for a number of
major crime types, comparing sentences after guilty plea, bench trial, and jury trial, see
MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2000: STATISTICAL TABLES,
(NCJ 198822) (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sc0O02st.pdf.
210. The full quote reads:
Q: Has anyone ever tried to change jury sentencing, substitute judge sentencing?
A: About 6-8 years ago some really tried. The legislature said 'You can forget that in
Kentucky. The boys and girls who pay the taxes will be the ones who make the
decisions."
Q: What do you mean?
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A: [The sponsor of the bill for judicial sentencing] kept saying it would generate more
uniformity in sentencing. Well that wasn't true either. We have Circuit judges here, one
who would have probated Charles Manson, another who would hang Mother Theresa.
We've got some total knot-heads on a lot of things. There wouldn't be uniformity. Why I
am opposed to judicial sentencing? Our system is one of elected judges. They have very
low experience requirements. Sometimes we get a great judge, mostly we get mediocre
judges, sometimes we get absolute lunatics, people who somehow become popular, from
name recognition mostly [describes judge]... So you can walk into a courtroom with
that kind of nightmare. They have no idea, no balance. So his [referring to sponsor of
judicial sentencing bill] whole reason to have judicial sentencing was false. And even
good judges tend to get calloused to what they've seen. Anybody who is in the system for
a long time starts comparing the case in front of them to the worst they've ever seen and
the sentences keep getting a little lighter. There ought to be a reasonable punishment
for any offense, but judges will get calloused, start easing up. Judges are, they are
elected. A judge is influenced by that defense attorney standing in front of him-he
knows that attorney is one of the primary contributors to his campaign.
Q: But couldn't you have the same kind of influence?
A: I could. But my assistants, they don't, they're poorly paid, they aren't big contributors
to judicial races. We have a couple judges here that ought to be wearing sponsor
patches on their robes. Close calls tend to go to the defense attorney who
contributes.
2 11
A: Well, you may understand this because you've had some of the same there in
Tennessee, but we've got some really boneheaded judges here. In certain communities
the dirtier the judge, the better the people like it [jury sentencing].
Q: Why?
A: With jury sentencing they're better able to check judicial corruption, and
prosecutorial corruption too.
KY-J1-R.
211. KY-P2-U; see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790-92 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[R]elying on campaign donations may leave judges feeling indebted
to certain parties or interest groups ... the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be
motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to undermine the public's
confidence in the judiciary" and collecting empirical evidence supporting distrust of judiciary on
this basis); KY-J6-U ("Both prosecutors and defense attorneys would object," to judge sentencing.
'They both think [jury sentencing] has pluses. Prosecutors will opt for jury when they fear the
judge would favor the defense attorney ... [less than 1/4 of our felony court bench] are former
prosecutors ... the balance have no prosecutorial experience.").
A Kentucky defender had this to say about efforts to limit jury sentencing:
I know it would be so difficult. Especially with legislators from rural areas.
Q: Why?
A: Because 1) they would be opposed to tying it to resources, they'd want the
maximum amount of time for these offenders and wouldn't want to compromise that.
But 2) there is a tremendous populist streak in Kentucky. A move to do away with
jury sentencing and give it to judges would be perceived as concentrating power-this
is a populist issue. That's why it's not a liberal or conservative thing, all of those who
are elected are sensitive to it.
KY-D4-R. Arkansas interviewees, too, reported that opposition to judicial sentencing would be
strong. AR-J5-R ('Q: How do you think the people of Arkansas would react if the legislature was
to abandon jury sentencing in favor of judge sentencing? A: The folks in Arkansas generally
would be upset about it .... I think there is some distrust of government, in general. People are
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A shift from jury to judge sentencing in Kentucky and
Arkansas may not require a simultaneous shift from elected to
appointed judiciary; for example, Tennessee in the early 1980s
managed to move from jury sentencing to judge sentencing within the
context of a system with elected trial judges. 212 But reforming the
process of judicial selection might address one of the major reasons
jury sentencing seems to be so persistently protected in these two
states. 213
In Virginia, where judges are reappointed by the legislature, a
switch to judicial sentencing would not face this barrier.
Nevertheless, a political objection to stripping all sentencing power
from juries remains. The state continues to take pride in being the
Jeffersonian home of democracy; jury sentencing there is a symbolic
token of that republican spirit. Said a Virginia judge, "there was a
Commission on the Future of the Judiciary about 15 years ago,
abolishing jury sentencing was one thing that commission came up
with. But the legislature says, 'The People should have a voice, we
should keep jury sentencing.' "214 Said another judge, "No legislator
wants to undertake this issue. It would be perceived as anti-
democratic, with a small 'd.' Nobody wants to be accused of taking the
people out of the criminal justice system."215  Perhaps if Virginia
voters understood the weakness of juries, as compared to the
Sentencing Commission, in setting actual sentencing policy, they
might be less concerned about the prospect of abandoning jury
sentencing.
simply more satisfied if a decision is made by twelve jurors. They have more confidence; they
think there's some good reason for the decision. This attitude is not specifically related to the
judiciary in particular, but to government in general. People are less suspicious, and confident
the outcome is based on fact.").
212. See generally 11 DAVID RAYBIN, TENNESSEE PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 32.2, at 177-78 (1985).
213. As Justice O'Connor recently concluded, "If [a] State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of
popularly electing judges." Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also CARLTON, supra note 180, at 31-34, 43, 50 (reporting results of surveys and
studies demonstrating public perception that campaign contributions influence case outcomes, as
well as a survey reporting that 45 percent of trial judges themselves expressed the view that
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B. Strengthening the Jury as Price Setter: Increasing Jury Power and
Information
The findings reported here have implications for change in the
opposite direction as well. Reforms that would provide a more
muscular and informed system of jury sentencing face a different set
of hurdles. The academics' hope of modifying jury sentencing to "build
on the jury's democratic contributions" 21 6 by providing jurors with
more information and power sounds good in theory. Give the jury
adequate information and all of the sentencing options authorized by
the legislature, not simply a subset of the information and options
that judges receive, then ensure that the jury, not the judge, is the
default price setter for both adversaries. With the jury as the default
price setter, prosecutors would be able to set the price of a sentence
after plea accordingly.
In practice, however, this scheme would probably look very
unappealing to prosecutors, judges, and legislators in these three
states. Not one state gives juries true price-setting authority today,
complete with both the power and the information needed to set the
upper and lower bounds of punishment within legislated ranges. In
Kentucky and Arkansas, either party can resort to the jury's sentence
rather than the judge's sentence by vetoing a guilty plea and insisting
on jury trial,217 but the jury is denied crucial sentencing information
216. Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 382.
217. Explained one Arkansas judge:
In some instances the prosecutor will try to bring pressure on judges with the jury
sentence. In violent cases I'm right in line with them, but in drug cases I'm probably
more lenient. The prosecutor will sometimes use the jury's sentence to send out a
message even to the judge about the sentence for those. And for new crimes, too,
they'll start out by saying we want a jury to take a look at this, say registration of sex
offenders, because the jury's sentences can provide a sort of benchmark for the judges
and provides some guidance on what juries think these cases deserve.
AR-J1-U. Arkansas defendants, too, can insist on jury trial if the prosecutor's offer is too high,
and state law prohibits judges from raising jury sentences. Should offers depart significantly
from jury sentences, defense counsel can force better offers by taking insisting on taking these to
jury trial. Consider, for example, the following story by an Arkansas defender:
We had a prosecutor for a short time that was really into long sentences. He would
start all plea negotiations at 15 years if your client had no money to contribute to the
drug fund and 10 years if he had the $5,000. I told the DTF people they couldn't do
that, so they said they would no longer give me offers. I told them I would sue them.
In the meantime, I had about seven trials, all of which the jury gave my client less
time than the prosecutor offered. Needless to say, their little game stopped.
AR-D7-R.
A Kentucky defender had a similar tale:
A lot of times you try a case because the deal is so awful, you take it to the jury
because you think you have a chance at acquittal, but often it is the sentence ....
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and the full range of options that judges receive. 218 In Virginia, the
jury lacks both information and power, and is routinely bypassed by
defendants who prefer the guidelines sentences that they can obtain
by exercising their state constitutional right to plead guilty. The jury
does not set the default sentence "floor" in Virginia. Instead, it is the
Sentencing Commission that sets the going rate for crime.
The research here suggests that several obstacles stand in the
way of giving meaningful power and information to sentencing juries
in these states. In Virginia, where the prosecutor has no access to the
jury sentence should a defendant prefer a lower guidelines sentence,
the state would have to extend jury sentencing to guilty pleas, or
eliminate the defendant's constitutional right to bypass the jury's
sentence through the guilty plea process, restoring to the prosecutor
and the judge the option of insisting on jury trial. 219 Neither option
seems particularly realistic.
Second, in Kentucky and Arkansas, where jurors have power to
set sentencing norms but little information about what they are doing,
efforts to remove the jury's blinders in sentencing are unlikely to
succeed. Initially, there is the problem of the cost of teaching jurors
what they should know about sentencing. As Professor Ronald Wright
has observed, of the many information voids jurors suffer as
sentencers, the "feel" for sentencing practices over time, that judges
develop through experience, is perhaps the most difficult and
Q: How often do prosecutors give offers that are higher than what you think the jury
would give?
A: I think that would happen with some regularity in the rural counties, there are
some where the prosecutors are not willing to go with a lesser or to offer lower
sentences . . The jury is really an outlet. For both sides. It is strategically useful for
the defendant in counties where the bargains are coming in really high. Prosecutors
regularly coming in at max on DUI 4th, for example. Can do better with the jury.
Q: But wouldn't that lead to too many jury trials? How could the system handle it?
Wouldn't the prosecutor have to come down?
A: Well at some point the judge comes and says to the prosecutor, "You can't keep this
up.
Q: Has this happened?
A: Yes, I had one time where the offer was too high, we were going to trial, and the
judge came in and got directly involved, put a lot of pressure on the prosecutor to
settle that case, the message was clear. Judges have all kinds of ways to make the
prosecutors accommodate. Some counties the prosecutor will try every single case in
front of that one judge.
KY-D4-R; see also KY-D4-R ("Sometimes the prosecutor will just want a jury sentence on a
particular case. Or sometimes both sides wills say, we haven't tried an X case in a while. Let's
see what a jury says, they take it to trial. They use it to set a benchmark that they'll use in
negotiations later on. They watch to see what the jury gives. So next time, when an offer comes
in above, the defense attorney can say, but look what I'll get from a jury.").
218. See supra text accompanying notes 94-104.
219. See supra note 118.
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expensive to fill.220 More importantly, prosecutors would no doubt
anticipate a net loss in bargaining leverage if jurors were to receive
more complete information about sentencing options and practices.
Their influence over criminal procedure policy has caused it to march
unceasingly in the direction of providing greater, not fewer, incentives
to avoid jury trial. In the words of Professor George Fisher, judges and
prosecutors "raise up those procedural institutions that help plea
bargaining and beat down those that threaten it."221 Interviews from
each state suggest that the adaptation of jury sentencing that has
taken place in these states is yet another illustration of this pattern:
Efforts to modify jury sentencing so as to increase its utility as a
penalty for jury trial have succeeded-allowing prosecutors to inform
jurors about prior offenses in bifurcated trials in particular-while
modifications that could shrink the differential between jury and
guidelines sentences, or that would have otherwise decreased
prosecutorial power, have failed.222
A third obstacle may be an equally formidable barrier to any
effort to increase the power and information juries receive in these
states. This obstacle is the emerging consensus among criminal
justice professionals that the only politically expedient way to limit
exploding prisoner populations and control state correctional spending
is to sentence offenders within state guidelines designed with that
purpose in mind. Sentencing policy these days is not all about
disparity and deterrence; it is increasingly determined by beds and
budgets. 223 Predictable spending requires control over the discretion
220. Wright, supra note 7. Conceivably, jury understanding of the going-rate for sentences
could approximate judicial understanding if a state either (1) collected data on sentencing for a
wide range of offenders and offenses over time and taught all jurors about it, trial by trial, or (2)
replicated the "experience" of judges by either requiring jurors to serve on case after case, or by
selecting for jury service in criminal cases those who have had prior experience sentencing. The
costs of the first step in terms of time and expense are simply too high. As for the second option,
any benefit in added information would be outweighed by the inevitable decrease in jury
representativeness that would result.
221. FISHER, supra note 41, at 180.
222. See supra notes 50, 130-31 (release statistics); supra notes 54, 86 (alternative
sentencing options); supra note 102 (failed proposal to inform juries of the abolition of parole). In
addition, a member of the Virginia legislature allowed an interview, gave permission to relate
his responses anonymously, and reported that there was an effort supported by defense
attorneys to give juries information on the sentencing guidelines, but the general reaction was
that juries would be confused by the guidelines and recommend lower sentences. In Arkansas, an
effort to get rid of the prosecutorial veto over a defendant's decision to plead guilty as charged
also failed.
223. The cost of incarceration jumped from $5 billion in 1978 to over $49 billion today, for
states, counties, and federal government combined. Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing
Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT.
RPTR. 332, 332 (2002). On average, corrections consumed 7 percent of state budgets in 2000. Id.
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of those who sentence. If the state legislature is not willing to lower
statutory sentence ranges, it must find someone who will, or keep
building new prisons.
Of the three states examined here, Virginia is the only one that
has found a potentially effective method of harnessing sentencing
policy to control prison populations. Virginia's unique jury sentencing-
judicial guidelines system, administered by judges who are not elected
by the public, has the potential to keep sentences down for nonviolent
offenders, reducing the costs of corrections, 224 while at the same time
holding down the costs of adjudication by discouraging jury trials.
Judges report that they take their cues from a legislature that
demands adherence to specified sentence ranges, not from a public
that demands high sentences. Legislators, meanwhile, who monitor
carefully the fiscal impact of every bill related to crime,225 are free to
raise statutory minimum sentences in response to popular demand.226
The legislators can be confident that because these minimum
sentences will be routinely suspended or probated by judges following
the guidelines after plea and bench trials, and enforced only after the
rare trial by jury, their "tough-on-crime" legislation will not translate
224. See Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We
Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED. SENT. RPER. 41, 47 (2002) (noting that from the
mid-nineties to date, Virginia's "incarceration rate has grown just 6 percent, well below the
national growth rate of 22 percent, indicating greater discipline in use of expensive prison beds
as a sanction."). A study of the state's innovative risk-assessment pilot program in a portion of
the states courts concluded that the state saved the state one and a half million dollars, and is
predicted to save the state nearly five million dollars if implemented statewide. Id. at 48; see also
Frank Green, Va. Models New Thinking in Prison System Reform, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
Dec. 1, 1996, at Al (predicting that the state may have a surplus of beds by 1998, noting that
although there have been complaints to the sentencing commission that some of the sentences
under the guidelines are too lenient, violent offenders are serving longer sentences, and quoting
Professor Kevin Reitz, one of the nation's leading scholars on state sentencing guidelines,
"Virginia is .. .really out in front as far as I'm concerned... Virginia's is the most impressive
system around."); Alan Cooper, Jury Trials Plunging; Sentence Guidelines, Parole Abolition
Sway More Defendants to Seek Less Risk; With A Judge, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, March 30,
1997, at B1 (quoting head of state sentencing commission as stating that projections for prison
beds have matched reality so far).
225. In Virginia, the economic effects of every change adding new crimes punishable by
imprisonment, expanding the period of incarceration for existing offenses, imposing minimum or
mandatory terms of incarceration or modifying the release of offenders must be printed on the
face of the legislation, reviewed by an Appropriations or Finance Committee. Wilhelm & Turner,
supra note 224, at 47. The sponsor must identify the source of revenue to fund the bill before it
can be reported out of committee. Id.
226. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Pricking the Lines: The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 890 (2004) ("Legislators face
powerful political pressures that lead them to rachet up sentences."); David Sklansky, Cocaine,
Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1285-97 (1995) (documenting legislators'
responses to popular concern about crack cocaine).
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into higher corrections costs. The following exchange with a Virginia
prosecutor is revealing:
Q: What has the legislature done with sentencing since bifurcation and the abolition of
parole?
A: Duplicity. That's the only word for it. They'll pass laws like this one on abduction
with intent to defile with the 20-year minimum, they refuse to ever lower the penalty for
fear they'd look soft on crime, but they have no problem with the guidelines requiring
ten years less.
Q: Don't they get heat for being soft on crime in the guidelines?
A: The guidelines lines are remote, hidden. People don't connect the legislators with the
guidelines. I think they could change them. But they don't. This is the greatest shell
game of all.
Q: So the people don't hold the legislators responsible for low sentences under the
guidelines?
A: No, the guidelines Commission is a nameless, unelected entity. It's invisible. The
other great dodge is you'll hear them say, "Well the guidelines are only voluntary." As I
said, the judges don't really think so.2 2 7
Said another Commonwealth's Attorney:
A: If those in the General Assembly want to limit the sentencing ranges this way, they
ought to make the open decision to do so. I'll give you an example. The minimum
sentence for distributing cocaine, first offense, is five years. The low end of the
guidelines for first offense with no record is seven months. You have to have a heck of a
horrible record to get over five years for distribution of cocaine. The guidelines sentence
would be seven months, that's the real sentence. The sentencing guidelines have given
the legislature a handy way to hide from the public the true cost of their sentencing
decisions. Now if you are comfortable with a sentence of seven months for distribution
first offense with no record, and the General Assembly is implicitly comfortable with it
because they beam upon the guidelines and encourage judges to follow them, they
should reduce the statutory minimum.
Q: Why don't they?
A: They are scared to do that because they don't want to come tell the public about the
seven months because the public is going to squawk. Politicians don't want to tell the
public we have signed off on seven months because that's a reduction of the minimum
five years.
2 2 8
Virginia's effort to reduce the demand for prison beds by
cutting sentences through the use of guidelines is not an isolated
227. VA-P1-U. Consider also the comments of one Virginia legislator, who when asked how
his constituents reacted to guidelines sentences, said, "They don't see any of this. Criminal
justice hasn't been an issue in 8 years. There isn't much known about the commission or the
guidelines." Interview with Anonymous Virginia Legislator (Aug. 26, 2002).
228. VA-P5-R; see also VA-P1-U ("The guidelines are the other shoe of the abolition of parole.
Sentencing is like a coffee pot, the water goes in the top, and it would overflow except for that
little spigot at the bottom that lets it out, that spigot is the guidelines.").
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phenomenon. A growing number of states are adopting initiatives
mandating alternative sanctions for many drug offenders, repealing
mandatory minimum sentences, or liberalizing parole release. 229 One
recent report stated, "Research has shown that when sentencing
guidelines are designed to use correctional resources efficiently, they
are consistently associated with lower rates of prison admissions and
incarceration rates. 230 Professor Kevin Reitz, Reporter for the ALI's
efforts to revise the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code,
concluded in his report this past spring: "Every state that has tried to
deploy guidelines to [manage future prison growth] has succeeded,
which includes a majority of all state guideline systems in current
operation." 231  Legislators who recognize that sentencing guidelines
are the most promising means to control corrections spending 23 2 will
view proposals to give to juries, and not commissions, even more
power to set the going rate for felony sentences as exactly the wrong
proposal at exactly the wrong time. 233 The budget crises that state
legislators face are pushing sentencing policy in the direction of more
bureaucratic control over sentencing, not less.
Kentucky has no politically invisible sentencing commission
actively setting policy with the state's budget in mind but no election
around the corner. Instead, the prosecutors, judges, and legislators
who set sentences in Kentucky either lack an incentive to cut costs or
229. See Schiraldi & Greene, supra note 223, at 333-35 (documenting changes in state law
and policy around the country designed to curb the costs of incarceration); see also Wilhelm &
Turner, supra note 224 (noting that thirteen states took legislative action to ameliorate the
effects of stringent sentencing laws, and praising the use of sentencing guidelines in North
Carolina, Virginia, and Kansas).
230. Schiraldi & Greene, supra note 223, at 334.
231. KEVIN REITZ, ALI, REPORT: MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 72 (2003). The Report
collects studies documenting how state guidelines have slowed prison growth, stating that there
"could be something about the very institutions of commission, guidelines, and resource-
management tools that combine over the long haul in the direction of parsimony in punishment."
Id.; see also Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2000,
2002 CRIME & JUSTICE 39, 84 ("A consensus settled into place: the sentencing structure, like the
sentencing commission itself, was perceived to be apolitical. It was a planning device that
allowed the state to link its sentencing aspirations with the corrections resources at hand. This
role as a credible and nonpartisan technical advisor allowed the sentencing commission and the
sentencing structure to remain intact even after the legislators who created them were no longer
in leadership roles ... ").
232. REITZ, supra note 231, at 334 (recommending that any state looking for ways to reduce
state prison population pressures and correctional costs should consider creating "structure
sentencing guidelines that will shape sentencing practices .... ).
233. Contrary to the suggestion of at least one jury sentencing supporter, see Iontcheva,
supra note 3, at 332-33, interest in judicial sentencing guidelines is not in decline. See, e.g.,
Schiraldi & Greene, supra note 223. Not guidelines, but mandatory minimum sentences, in part
because of their obvious corrections burden and in part because of their less obvious lack of
proportionality, are being reconsidered and even repealed in several states.
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respond to an electorate skeptical of coddling criminals. 234 Without
increased spending on prison space, early release becomes the stop
gap. The well-publicized exodus of Kentucky felons from the state's
filled-to-capacity prisons in 2002 spared judges and prosecutors
negative publicity for being soft on crime and shifted the blame
instead to the state's executive, who in turn could point the finger at
those responsible for the state's budget.235  Giving juries more
independence to set sentencing norms, community by community, is
no cure for this problem. 23 6
Arkansas has a criminal sentencing commission, but no
effective incentives for judicial or prosecutorial compliance with its
guidelines. Not surprisingly, although the Arkansas guidelines were
developed with correctional capacity in mind, the commission has
stated that the guidelines "do not appear to have affected prison
growth." 237 Until statewide guidelines, not juries or prosecutors, set
the default price for sentencing, effective corrections control will
remain elusive. Put differently, the best reason to give more price-
setting power to the sentencing jury runs headlong into the economic
interests of state governments in controlling costs.
The interviews detailed here also expose the likely objections to
the compromise solution under which jurors would apply commission-
created guidelines. 238 Setting aside the argument that binding a
sentencing jury with guidelines would eliminate the very reason to
choose jury over judge sentencing in the first place,239 two practical
234. And some Kentucky prosecutors are vehemently against guidelines sentencing. See, e.g.,
KY-P2-U ("There was bill for judicial sentencing in mid-nineties. I argued against it. One reason
was because of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which we thought were pretty stupid,
although [the sponsor] didn't have guidelines in there at first, we thought that would be coming.
[An opponent] stood up and held up the United States Sentencing Guidelines manual, which as
you know is so thick it nearly broke his arm, and said, 'You pass this bill and you won't be
practicing law, you'll be practicing guidelines.'. . . [The bill would have needed] guidelines to
have any chance at uniformity and that would have killed it.").
235. See Fox Butterfield, Inmates Go Free to Reduce Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at
Al (quoting Governor Patton as saying " 'I have to do what I have to do to live within the
revenue that we have' " and reporting "some politicians expressed support for the governor's
action, saying they do not oppose the early release of nonviolent offenders but do oppose higher
taxes").
236. Indeed, in 1983, in a Report to the Governor, the Commission on Sentencing and Prison
Overcrowding recommended "that judicial sentencing and sentencing guidelines be adopted in
Kentucky." COMMISSION ON SENTENCING AND PRISON OVERCROWDING, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (1983).
237. ARK. SENTENCING COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORT 1998-2000, at 27 (2000).
238. See, e.g., Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 360, 369-70; Wright, supra note 7, at 1377.
239. Guidelines would put the "community barometer" in a pressure chamber, controlled by
the those who draft the guidelines. The more constraints placed upon jury sentencing, the less
valuable its independent contribution becomes, and the more easily it can be manipulated for
other ends. Juries would become conduit for decisions made by state commissioners,
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difficulties remain. Extending guidelines sentencing to juries would
create additional burdens for jurors, judges, and participants in an
already complex and costly jury trial process, requiring states to sink
scarce justice dollars into guideline training and implementation by
jurors. Claims to the contrary240 ignore the experiences of those in the
three state systems examined here. In Virginia, for example, where
guidelines already rule judicial sentencing decisions, each incremental
increase in criminal justice spending faces rigid review. 241 Advocates
of extending guideline sentencing to juries are unlikely to persuade
conservative legislators that the benefits are worth the price tag.
More importantly, the price tag of extending guidelines to jury
sentencing may be more than the cost of juror education. Many of
those interviewed feared that eliminating the difference between jury
sentences and sentences imposed after plea or bench trial would mean
more jury trials. Not only would applying guidelines to juries and
judges alike strip jury sentencing of its independence and involve
costly new procedures, it may hit criminal justice professionals where
it hurts the most by reducing existing incentives to waive trial.
Prosecutors would oppose the application of guidelines by jurors
unless the guidelines preserved a credible sentencing differential
between trial and plea. Indeed, a trial penalty could take on even
more importance if guidelines allowed defendants to predict with more
certainty what a jury sentence would be, reducing the deterrent effect
provided by the unpredictability of jury sentencing.
As discussed earlier, preserving a trial penalty within a
guidelines system has not been difficult in judge-sentencing
jurisdictions. It is not surprising that judges and prosecutors in
guidelines jurisdictions would adapt each sentencing system so as to
give predictably lower sentences to defendants who plead guilty than
they give to those who go to trial-judges, prosecutors, and sentencing
commissioners are happy to cooperate in order to encourage
undercutting the unique value of local community participation in sentencing. With liberal
tolerance of departures and lax review, juries might be free to express community norms
inconsistent with the guidelines, but then the advantage of guidelines-the predictability of
sentences-would be lost. See also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1184-85 (2002) (discussing "bureaucratic solutions" similar to guidelines for
bringing coherence to punitive damage awards).
240. One advocate of jury sentencing glossed over this objection, noting that presenting
guidelines to the jury would require "little additional cost," and that any cost would be "a small
price to pay for the important democratic contribution that the jury could make." Jontcheva,
supra note 3, at 365, 372.
241. See supra note 225.
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settlement rather than trial. 242 It would be more remarkable if judges
were able to convince jurors to systematically deny to the defendant
who has sought a jury's judgment the sentencing discount that a
defendant who shuns a jury trial receives. "Providing jurors with
sentencing statistics or guidelines" may be "essential to ... promoting
the ideal of equality before the law,"243 but equality in sentencing
stands in the way of plea bargaining. The plea discount was disguised
as "acceptance of responsibility" in the United States Sentencing
Guidelines for precisely this reason-the Commissioners feared that
an overt discount would "not be in keeping with the public's perception
of justice. '244 In Virginia, Kentucky, and Arkansas, jury sentencing
without guidelines is the trial penalty. Once the actual disparity
between trial and plea sentences is revealed and quantified, judges
and prosecutors may be happy to preserve it, but jurors may not be
quite so cooperative. 245
To be sure, broad sentence ranges and downward departures
for "cooperation" allow judges and prosecutors to impose sentences
after plea that are lower than most jury trial sentences. This could
keep the practice of granting plea discounts out of sight so that jurors
who dutifully follow the guidelines in an individual case would never
learn that the average sentence for the same sort of offense and
offender is more lenient than what the guidelines suggest. Nor can
there be any doubt that this is exactly what would happen if jurors
and judges were instructed to follow the very same guidelines. Judges
could teach jurors about the state's sentencing guidelines, but together
with prosecutors they would make sure that jurors remain as clueless
as ever about actual sentencing practices.
These debates over whether jury sentencing should be
abolished, strengthened, or modified cannot be resolved here. Each
jurisdiction will continue to decide which trade-offs it is prepared to
make. The larger point is that reformers have little hope of making
progress in fine-tuning sentencing policy to meet sentencing goals
without first understanding what those trade-offs might be. Paying
careful attention to the ways in which attorneys, judges, and
242. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 38, at 1567-68 (noting that in Minnesota, "substantial plea-
based sentencing differentials still exist notwithstanding the exclusion of mode of conviction
from consideration under the state sentencing guidelines").
243. Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 382-83.
244. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the
Offender and Departures, Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 191 (1998); see also supra note 40.
245. Recall the comment of the Arkansas prosecutor quoted earlier: "As it is, the jury doesn't




legislatures have come to rely upon individual features of existing
policies to advance their interests is a necessary prerequisite to
change. In sentencing, as in other phases of the criminal process,
acquiring information about how formal rules are actually employed
on the ground is difficult and expensive, but it is a challenge that legal
scholars cannot ignore.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Rehnquist recently stated that "the democratic
branches of government and individual sentencing juries are, by
design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the
complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of
publicly acceptable criminal punishments. '246 A careful look at jury
sentencing in practice, however, reveals that the jury sentencing
known to lawyers and judges in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Virginia
today bears little resemblance to the lofty ideal of a mini-legislature,
well-versed in all "societal and moral considerations" and dictating
"acceptable" punishment policy for the local community. Judging from
these interviews, any jury sentencing system approaching that ideal
would likely be rejected as prohibitively expensive and politically
unpalatable. Instead, jury sentencing in these states, hobbled as it is,
plays a vital and pragmatic role within each state's unique legal and
political framework: it helps to discourage jury trials and to provide
protection from, and for, an elected judiciary.
246. The Chief Justice mentioned this in support of his assertion that "the work product of
legislatures and sentencing jury determinations ... ought to be the sole indicators by which
courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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